Working Paper

A REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION NEGOTIATIONS

Michael Richards
Forest Policy and Environment Group
Overseas Development Institute

December 2001

Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London SE1 7JD
UK

ISBN 0 85003 563 5

Contents

Boxes

Figures

Tables

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the Department of International Development, UK, for financing this study. This paper forms part of the Effective Participation by Developing Countries in International Governance, Institutions and Negotiations study. This in turn forms part of the Globalisation and Poverty programme, which now includes fourteen projects on the relationship between the global economy, global institutions and poverty, and on how developing countries can influence this. For further information on this project, please contact Sheila Page, s.page@odi.org.uk. For further information on the Globalisation and Poverty Programme, see www.gapresearch.org or email globpov@ids.ac.uk.

The author is also grateful for the work of Claudine Menashe on COP-6 delegation numbers; the efforts of Helene Connor of Helio International which allowed him to attend COP-6 at The Hague; Henny Hoogervorst for kindly sending one of the few remaining copies of Joyeeta Gupta's PhD thesis (Gupta, 1997) on developing country participation in the UNFCCC; help with formatting by Elvina Quiason; and comments by Sheila Page.

Acronyms

AIJ	Activities Implemented Jointly
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
CDF	Clean Development Fund (later changed to CDM)
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
FIELD	Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
G-77	Group of 77 and China
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
JI	Joint Implementation (carbon trading between two countries)
LAC	Latin American and Caribbean Region
KP	Kyoto Protocol
MEA	Multilateral environmental agreement
MOP	Meeting of the Parties
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research

Executive Summary

There is an enormous range of views and interests among developing countries, from the small and vulnerable countries in the AOSIS group, large emitting countries like China and India, to the OPEC group which opposes climate change abatement based on fossil fuel reduction, just as there are major differences between developed country blocks. At the risk of generalising, developing countries, tend to adopt a reactive and defensive negotiating strategy in the UN Framework for Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) negotiations. While this is to some extent forced on them by the nature of the negotiation process and their limited financial resources, it may not be in their best interests.

Much of the negotiation takes place in small working groups working simultaneously on a range of issues, in the corridors, over lunch, etc. To some extent this is power politics, but the complex issues of climate change also make it difficult to negotiate in large formal meetings. Other specific constraints to effective developing country participation include the small size and limited range of skills on national delegations (as opposed to the large and multiple-skilled delegations of most developing countries); lack of negotiating experience, knowledge and skills; lack of information and coordination, partly due to the lack of inter-sessional meetings and national or regional research support; low domestic political priorities; language problems; poor office facilities at the Conferences of the Parties (COP); and, due to many of the above factors, fatigue at the COPs. Regional groupings are on the whole weak; this is partly since climate change interests are not naturally aligned along regional lines.

It is difficult, when national delegations are so small, for small countries to pursue their national interests except to the extent that those interests coincide with a coalition position – most obviously the Group 77 and China position (G-77). G-77 has adopted an equity position along traditional north-south lines in which climate change is seen as another aspect of the world economic order requiring 'redistributive justice'. Apart from insisting that developed countries take the initial actions to reduce their emission levels, G-77 defends the right of its members to emit to develop (or to survive as some express it), and has therefore strongly resisted any emission commitments.

Analysis of the outcomes of the UNFCCC indicates that developing countries have generally been losers, and see themselves as being cheated. A classic example was the way the Brazilian 'Clean Development Fund', introduced as a polluter-pays tax on non-compliance, was turned around at the end of the negotiation process at Kyoto into the 'Clean Development Mechanism' (CDM) – a mechanism through which developed countries could gain carbon credits for carbon offset activities. This and other outcomes illustrate how developed countries armed with superior negotiating power and information are able to convert their interpretations of the UNFCCC into outcomes, often through forced or 'non-decisions' (from the developing country perspective). The outcomes of the UNFCCC have often been fudged so that they are politically acceptable in developed countries. These factors make developing countries suspicious and defensive to developed country initiatives.

There is also the underlying problem that developed and developing countries interpret the principles and responsibilities enshrined in the UNFCCC in very different ways. One fundamental difference is that the powerful 'Umbrella Group' of industrialised countries sees cost-effectiveness as the main criterion when pursuing climate change abatement, while for developing countries the main concerns are equity, the costs of climate change adaptation and

technology transfer. Such diverging interpretations and interests make cooperation difficult, although the EU group focus on environmental integrity has more in common with the equity stance of G-77.

The negotiating position of developing countries is therefore generally reactive, defensive and negative, for example to the 'flexible mechanisms' of the Kyoto Protocol. This leads to what Gupta (1997) has described as a 'hollow negotiating mandate' involving uncertain policies and ambivalent attitudes (e.g., unclear of what their national negotiating priorities really are, susceptible to financial inducements to participate, etc.), and a limited capacity to form coalitions capable of constructive negotiating. More pressure could have been placed on industrialised countries to cut emissions with a more constructive and aggressive negotiating strategy.

1. Introduction

1.1 Brief history and aims of the Climate Change Convention[1]

Since this paper does not assume a detailed knowledge of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or UNFCCC for short), a brief summary of the history of the UNFCCC, its institutions and main instrument, the Kyoto Protocol (KP), is given here. The UNFCCC was adopted in May 1992 and opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio. This followed about a dozen years of lobbying and research from the World Climate Conference in 1979. A major role was played by the independent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) established by the World Meteorological Organisation and UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1988. The IPCC produced its First Assessment Report in 1990 following the second World Climate Change Conference in 1989.

The UNFCCC has as it its ultimate aim to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would enable ecosystems to naturally adapt and not harm food production (Art.2) Various principles are listed (Art.3) for guiding the way this goal should be achieved: equity, both inter and intra-generational, and sustainable development; 'common, but differentiated responsibilities' of 'developed' and 'developing' countries; the need for precautionary measures; cost-effectiveness; and a supportive, open economic system.

The UNFCCC divides the world into two main groups – 'developed' countries including the Eastern European 'economies in transition' (Annex 1 countries) and 'developing' or non-Annex 1 countries. Under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, Annex 1 countries are encouraged to reduce their GHG emissions, and a sub-set of them are required to assist (through financial, scientific and technology transfer support) developing countries to adopt more climate-friendly technologies as well as to adapt to the impacts of climate change.

1.2 The main institutions of the UNFCCC

The most important institution of the UNFCCC is the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) at which major decisions are made. Typically about 10,000 delegates, press and observers attend the COPs. The COP is supplemented and informed by the work of two 'Subsidiary Bodies': the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). These do much of the technical spadework for the COPs, providing working drafts for further negotiation. SBSTA's task is to provide the COP with scientific, technological and methodological advice, and to liaise with the IPCC. The SBI reviews the implementation of the Convention, examines national communications and emission inventories, and advises the COP on financial mechanisms. The two bodies work together on cross-cutting issues like compliance and capacity-building. They are open to participation by all Parties, and governments send experts to participate in the biannual meetings attended by about 1,500 people. Past chairs of SBSTA have included Malaysia, while Mauritania, Senegal and Antigua have all chaired the SBI, although this does not indicate these are lead countries in the Convention.

1These sections draw mainly on UNFCCC, 2000 and Gupta, 2000a.

The COP and its Subsidiary Bodies are in turn guided by the COP Bureau, which is elected by the Parties (countries) to the Convention at the beginning of each COP. The Bureau tries to facilitate consensus in the COP. It consists of 11 officers, with all but one nominated by five UN regional groups, the last seat being reserved for a representative of the small island developing states. The 11 officers are the COP President, seven Vice-Presidents, the Rapporteur and the Chairs of the two Subsidiary Bodies. The UNFCCC is also supported by a one hundred strong Secretariat based in Bonn. The Secretariat arranges the COPs and Subsidiary Body meetings; provides support to the negotiations; coordinates other relevant bodies; prepares official COP documents; reviews national communications; and compiles GHG inventory data. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) provides the main financial mechanism for developing countries to meet their commitments under the Convention, e.g., national communications or GHG inventories, as well as for addressing and adapting to climate change.

1.3 The Kyoto Protocol

The most important instrument of the UNFCCC is the Kyoto Protocol (KP) adopted at the third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) in 1997. The aim of the KP was to reduce emissions of Annex 1 countries by an average of just over 5% below 1990 emission levels by the first reporting period of 2008-2012. This average figure disguised significant differences; thus while the EU countries were expected to reduce their emissions by 8%, the USA by 7% and Japan by 6%, Australia and Norway were to be allowed to slightly increase their emissions.

The most controversial aspect of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) is the three so-called ‘flexible mechanisms’ (see Box 1), and the use of forest sinks as carbon offsets for Annex 1 countries, both within Annex 1 countries (Article 3.4) and in developing countries under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This is because use of the flexible mechanisms and sinks reduce the pressure on Annex 1 countries to cut domestic emissions, and by increasing the carbon abatement supply options reduce the market value of carbon. Implementation of the KP as international law binding on signatory countries requires ratification by at least 55 countries representing 55% or more of 1990 carbon emission levels. Many developing countries have ratified the KP, but industrialised countries have been holding back waiting for the main industrialised countries (excluding the USA which, although it is still a member of the UNFCCC, pulled out of the KP following the change in government). There is an expectation that the Annex 1 countries will ratify it in time for or even at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.

2. Theories of participation and negotiation in global environmental agreements

2.1 Participation in the Climate Change Convention

Provision of a global public good by an individual country benefits every country, and all countries would benefit if the public good is provided jointly. But only those countries that provide the good (by reducing emissions) pay for its provision. The self-interest approach of rational choice, prisoner's dilemma and global commons theories tend to predict non-collaboration, since for individual countries free-riding is a more rational course of action (Gupta, 1997). The climate change problem exhibits the classic features of the free-rider problem; countries outside the coalition enjoy the global environmental benefits without the costs, and this pay-off increases with the size of the coalition. There is a point, unfortunately when the coalition is still fairly small, when the pay-off from being outside the coalition exceeds the benefits of being inside (Barrett, 1999). In other words, since each country naturally prefers others to provide the public good, the result is that little of it will be provided in total.

Box 1:The flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol

The most important 'flexible mechanism' for developing countries is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created under Article 12. This allows investment by Annex 1 countries in climate change mitigation projects in non-Annex 1 (developing) countries in exchange for 'Certified Emission Reductions' that can be set against emission reduction targets. CDM projects should also meet sustainable development criteria. The other two flexible mechanisms involve forms of carbon trading between Annex 1 countries:

- Emissions trading in which countries which are below their emission quotas can sell their surplus 'allowances' to Annex 1 debit countries (Art.17)
- Joint Implementation (JI) between Annex 1 countries (Art.6)

A major aim of the flexible mechanisms is to help Annex 1 countries meet their emission reduction targets in a cost-effective manner, but developing countries see them as 'loopholes' (although they are more ambivalent about the CDM) which allow Annex 1 countries to avoid cutting their own emissions and threaten the environmental integrity of the KP. For example, sales of 'hot air' by Russia and Ukraine to Annex 1 countries would reduce the need to cut domestic emissions. The hot air represents the difference between target and actual emission levels; the latter are much lower due to the economic decline in these countries since 1990.

In a global climate change agreement the amount of climate change abatement undertaken by any country will at least partly depend on the amounts undertaken by others, although for the largest emitting countries, choosing to abate should be the preferred strategy irrespective of what other countries do[1]. All countries are to some extent responsible for GHG emissions, but

[1]For maximising the national interest, the amount provided should equate the marginal cost of provision with its own marginal benefit, while full cooperation in providing a public good requires each country to provide an amount that equates the marginal cost of provision to the aggregate marginal benefit, calculated as the sum of the marginal benefits of all

some much more than others, and all countries are likely to be affected by the problem, again some much more than others. One of the problems of the UNFCCC is the asymmetry in the gainers and losers (Barrett, 1999). Generally speaking it is the poorest developing country and lowest emitters who are most at risk, at least in the short run, while the largest and wealthier emitters are least at risk of serious consequences of global warming, partly because they have the economic and technological capacity to respond to the problems.

But game theories like the prisoner's dilemma, which seem to discourage international regulation of public goods, do not explain the existence of several global environmental agreements involving legally binding commitments. Regime analysis does however offer an explanation for the development of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) (Box 2). Global governance regimes develop as a result of various issue-related and interaction-related factors (Gupta, 1997). Issue-related factors include the development of social and scientific knowledge about the problem; the role of NGOs and epistemic communities in spreading this knowledge; the transition of an issue from the scientific to the political agenda; and, in the case of the UNFCCC, natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes which contribute to the recognition of a common problem. Interaction-related factors include the interaction of international regimes with national interests; issue linkages; changes in power relations; negotiation tactics; the availability of appropriate institutional and organisational fora; the development of other MEAs with demonstration effects and legal and political precedents; and the development of transnational coalitions (Gupta, 1997). Much of this paper surrounds these interaction-related factors, particularly how national and wider interests have affected the negotiating process.

Box 2: Regime analysis

Regime analysis argues that although countries act on the basis of their national interests, they are 'socialised' into the international process when major global goods are at stake. As summarised by Gupta (1997: 29) "regimes are sets of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Countries operate less as individual actors and more as members of a social system with corresponding rights and obligations. Countries will participate in regimes as long as the transaction costs are not too high, negotiations are orderly and there are advantages of reciprocity and information exchange. Regime analysis also argues that international law can facilitate participation in decision making; when stable patterns of behaviour result from compliance with certain norms and rules, the social institution of a regime is formed.

Source: Gupta 1997

Participation by any individual country in an MEA like the UNFCCC theoretically depends on two main factors: how great a change of behaviour is required and how strong the economic incentives are for compliance (or how strong the disincentives are for non-compliance). A narrow definition of effective participation for an individual country is the minimal change in behaviour required to achieve the maximum change of behaviour by other countries in pursuit of global public good values (Barrett, 1999). The UNFCCC and KP are currently relatively undemanding in terms of the required change of behaviour for poor developing countries but a little more demanding of polluter countries.

On the issue of incentives, game theory indicates that for a coalition to be 'self-enforcing',

countries (Barrett, 1999).

each participant in the coalition should gain compared with the initial situation where no-one cooperates, and that no-one should have an incentive to leave the coalition (OECD, undated). One reason why the Montreal Protocol dealing with ozone layer depletion has been relatively successful is the strong disincentive for non-compliance associated with exclusion from a valuable trade: everyone gains and there is no incentive to leave the Protocol. In the UNFCCC the incentives for compliance are much weaker; much will depend, for example, on the CDM to come up with some credible incentives for all Parties, as well as on respect for the international law enshrined in the Convention itself to enforce the reduction of emissions to the agreed levels (Barrett, 1999).

Effectiveness of participation for an individual country is different from effectiveness of an MEA at the global level, which is the extent to which it achieves its environmental objectives. Effectiveness is largely about implementation and compliance; this in turn depends on the effectiveness of national legislation, institutions and policies, including those that ensure access to judicial fora, national capacity and political will (Barrett, 1999). In general, countries are more likely to comply with an MEA if they are confident that others are also complying, and transparency provides some deterrence to non-compliance.

2.2 Theories of negotiation

Negotiation in the context of an MEA can be defined as a decision-making procedure in which one or more parties have shared interests and others are opposed, and in which one party's utility in the outcome depends on the other parties' courses of action (Skodvin, 1993). Two main types of bargaining can be identified:

- 'distributive bargaining' occurs in situations where the amount of the good in question is fixed and the parties' interests are in conflict. This situation is 'win-lose'- one side can only win if the other loses. In distributive bargaining each party has an aspiration and a reserve (or lowest common denominator) position.
- 'integrative bargaining' occurs in situations where the good in question is variable and the parties' interests coincide to some extent. It is based on both sides making concessions in order to get a mutually acceptable deal. Integrative bargaining can be reactive or proactive.

Between these two extremes is 'mixed-motive bargaining'. In most situations there is a mixture of conflictual and collaborative items, and the actors use a combination of distributive and integrative bargaining tactics. Preferences also differ because the parties have differing information and/or opinions about whether a consequence desired by all parties will follow from a specific course of action. Information and knowledge therefore have a key role in negotiations. The more integrative the context, the more open and accessible the information will be, but in distributive bargaining situations, the information is likely to be limited, manipulated and distorted (Gupta, 2000). If motives are unclear, as in mixed-motive bargaining, there can be confusion and risks associated with the exchange of information.

Negotiating strategies can also fall into the category of 'realist' and 'non-realist' (Gupta, 1997). In realist negotiating strategies, the focus is on interests rather than country positions on issues. The techniques of realist negotiating include building on agreement, avoiding polarised issues, addressing single issues separately and providing selective incentives such as

access to funding, resources, markets and technologies. These techniques, used primarily by developed countries, are generally constructive, they can buy time, avoid deadlocks and facilitate an incremental improvement in a regime. Other less constructive strategies used by developed countries include papering out their opponents with complex scientific data, introducing over-complex proposals, and employing procedural delaying tactics in plenary sessions.

3. The negotiation process in the UNFCCC[1]

3.1 Formal negotiations

The COP usually takes place over a two week period. During the first week most of the effort of the national delegations goes into negotiating situations which provide the country's chief negotiator, usually the Environment Minister, with maximum options, as well as trying to support wider coalitions like the G-77 and China group or AOSIS (Alliance Of Small Island States). During the second week most of the focus is on the 'ministerial segment' of the COP. The Ministers tend to arrive during the middle weekend of the COP.

The formal negotiations of the UNFCCC take place in the COP plenary sessions and in meetings of the two Subsidiary Bodies. The COP also serves as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) of the KP, in which all the Parties to the Convention can participate as observers but cannot vote unless they are Parties to the Protocol. Working Groups are named by the COP or one of the Subsidiary Bodies to work on major issues with membership open to all the Parties. The formal sessions are governed by transparent rules of procedure and have simultaneous translation in all UN languages.

Negotiators can only speak in the plenary when they have permission from the Head of Delegation and the Chair after raising their country placard. Delegates can put forward a country position, raise a point of order (e.g., that someone is not following the correct rules of procedure) or make a motion (e.g., that it is difficult to respond immediately and the discussion should be moved to another time on the agenda – a classic delaying tactic often used by members of the OPEC group and others keen to delay progress[2]). A particular bone of contention is the Rules of Procedure, which have never been formally approved (Box 3).

Box 3: The Rules of Procedure

The Rules of Procedure were drafted in 1995 and amended in1996 but disagreement on some rules means that they have not been fully adopted, and are applied on an interim basis. The Rules cover the agenda, the role of observers, participation, the role of the Secretariat, election of the COP Bureau officers, delineation of the tasks of the President, etc. The main controversy concerns voting arrangements governed by Rule 42: decisions can made on the basis of unanimity, consensus (usually interpreted to mean there is no stated objection to a decision) or by a majority vote.

The problem is that voting rules are not agreed, and different Parties favour different voting systems like a simple majority, a 'qualified majority', a 'weighted majority' or 'double majority' rules. Developing countries are clearly in a majority, so to counter this Annex 1 countries have devised the 'weighted majority' system with weights determined by financial subscriptions. Some Annex 1 and OPEC countries prefer decisions to be made by the 'consensus method' rather than voting, since this slows down the process and effectively gives them a right of veto. In practice most countries are cautious and diplomatic in using this right of veto, and the Chair can even decide to ignore a country which objects to an apparent consensus.
Source: Gupta, 2000a

[1]Most of this section is based on Gupta, 2000a.

[2]Various observers noted that progress at COP-6 at the Hague was very slow towards the end due to delaying tactics by Parties less keen to reach a weak agreement, or any agreement at all. At COP-6, Saudi Arabia was particularly criticised for using procedural delaying tactics. One of the reasons for the collapse of the talks was that there was too much detail to cram in at the end.

3.2 Informal negotiating procedures

In the UNFCCC the bulk of the negotiations take place informally since it is impossible to discuss all the issues in plenary sessions with almost 200 countries represented, or even in the large Working Groups. The plenary sessions and Working Groups rather consolidate positions that are determined and negotiated informally in 'contact groups', 'corridor groups', 'non-groups', expert consultations and informal workshops. However these consultations are somewhat less informal than they sound as they are set up by the COP President and Subsidiary Body Chairs to help develop consensus by working in small groups. Most of this involves preparing, re-framing and re-defining text. The President also appoints key individuals to preside over these processes and help develop consensus – these are known as the 'Friends of the Chair'.

The various informal groups hold their discussions in English, are less accessible and transparent, involve few or no observers, and run simultaneously on several issues. A Contact Group is usually a 'spur of the moment' group convened to resolve specific issues on which there is disagreement. Membership is theoretically open to all but is often determined by the Chair who tries to ensure a representative range of viewpoints. Sometime a Joint Contact Group is formed in which two Contact Groups are brought together to resolve differences between them. The Chair also appoints Non-Groups composed of those who are reluctant to enter into negotiations; these encourage communication freed from the stress of negotiation. Informal Groups can also be called into being by one or more Parties for informal consultation.

Many of the ministerial meetings in week two involve small informal meetings; this is where the 'horse-trading' style negotiations take place. The Secretariat also organises informal workshops on key issues between the COPs. This is attended by invited representatives of the Parties and from civil society (especially NGO specialists), and provides an opportunity to explore the options without the pressure of negotiations.

One rationale for this informal negotiation process is that it is difficult to discuss complex political and technical issues in large meetings. The plenaries are there to make statements and set out positions, but are not conducive to open and frank discussion. Agreements reached in the informal groups are not easy to oppose in plenary sessions due to the time invested in them (Gupta, 2000a). The difficulty of the negotiation process for small developing countries is that it makes it very difficult for them to negotiate on the basis of country interests, except to the extent that they can be pursued in the most appropriate coalition (see 4).

4. A brief history of developing country participation

4.1 Outcomes for developing countries

Table 1 summarises the main outcomes from the various COPs, and the observed successes and failures for developing countries, notwithstanding the large range of developing countries' interests at stake. One analysis of UNFCCC outcomes (Michaelowa, 1998) points out the tendency to watered-down or fudged outcomes; for example, at Rio stabilisation targets were agreed but not made legally binding; at COP-1, JI was agreed but without credits; at COP-3, emission targets, although less than desired, were agreed but so were the 'loopholes'; the agreements at COP-6 part 2 and COP-7 were of a watered down KP, due to the need to appease remaining members of the Umbrella Group[1] (following the departure of the US) essential for achieving the magical 55% of global emissions figure. The same source points out that one reason for this is the necessity of making the outcomes politically acceptable at the national level. Ironically this has most obviously been the case of the US, which following the change of government decided to pull out of the KP. It can also be argued that the outcomes of COP-6 Part 2 and COP-7 were at least partly determined by what was politically acceptable in countries like Japan, Canada and Russia. But it is also a natural consequence of negotiations between opposing negotiators leading to lowest common denominator outcomes. Developing countries see themselves as the main losers in these fudged outcomes (Mwandosya, 1998).

In general, developing country negotiators are suspicious of developed country motives and feel cheated by the negotiating process since they have insufficient resources to cover all the issues in the informal consultation processes, insufficient information to argue their case, and are overwhelmed by powerful developed county delegations and the financial inducements inveigled into the negotiations like the CDM (Gupta, 2000b). For example, one comment at Kyoto was that "the US came out as undisputed victor, having totally outwitted both the EU and G-77" (Agarwal et al, 1999). One reason for this comment was the way a proposal to tax non-compliance and facilitate technology transfer was turned into a carbon offset or joint implementation mechanism with credits (Box 4).

Box 4: From the Clean Developments Fund to the Clean Development Mechanisms

A few months before Kyoto, Brazil proposed a 'Clean Development Fund'(CDF) as a compliance mechanism under which defaulting industrialised nations on their binding emission targets would pay into a fund to facilitate technology transfer to developing countries. Due to time and transparency constraints, there was limited information and consultation on a northern counter proposal of a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). For example, according to a Zimbabwean negotiator "the CDM was sneaked in at the last minute. When people are energetic at the beginning of the negotiations, not much is discussed. At the end when people are exhausted, new items are pushed in .....many of us did not know that CDM was different from CDF" (Gupta, 2000b:124). Several developing countries like India and South Africa were suspicious of it and urged caution, but it was approved with the support of most of Latin America and, perhaps more surprisingly, AOSIS (Agarwal et al, 1999).

[1] The 'Umbrella Group' is composed of Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, Russia and the Ukraine; its main unifying factor is its support for the KP flexible mechanisms.

Table 1: History of UNFCCC with the outcomes for developing countries		
Event	**Main outcomes**	**Developing country successes, failures and fudges**
Earth Summit, 1992	UNFCCC signed by 154 countries. All parties obliged to aim to reduce CO2 emissions in 2000 below 1990 levels	Success: recognised primary responsibility of industrialised countries
COP-1, Berlin, 1995	Established budget, Secretariat and Subsidiary Bodies; the Berlin Mandate required adoption of a protocol or other legal instrument involving emission targets by COP-3; agreed to voluntary JI (Activities Implemented Jointly)	Success: Berlin Mandate put onus on industrial world to agree targets Fudge: developed country pressures resulted in JI but without carbon credits
COP-2, Geneva, 1996	Acceptance of 2nd. Assessment Report of IPCC as a basis for future actions	Success: OPEC countries dropped opposition to actions Failure: to agree on rules of procedure, making it difficult to stop veto by OPEC countries Fudge: US agreed to 'medium-term' binding targets but with 'flexibility in implementation measures'
COP-3, Kyoto, 1997	The KP involving legally binding targets (ave. 5.2% below 1990 emission levels by 2008-12) for Annex 1 countries, and 3 flexible mechanisms: Clean Development Mechanism, JI and Emissions Trading (latter two between Annex 1 countries only)	Success: no caps on developing countries Fudge: emission caps agreed by developed countries, but lower than needed, and the 3 flexible mechanisms provided 'loopholes' Failure/fudge: Brazil's Clean Development Fund turned into the CDM
COP-4, Buenos Aires, 1998	A timetabled Plan of Action for establishing the KP	Success: agreed to stimulate technology transfer; increased GEF funding for capacity-building; concept of per capita emissions entitlements incorporated into COP-4 work plan Fudge: Concept of equity included in Buenos Aires Plan of Action, but no practical measures to achieve it
COP-5, Bonn, 1999	Further progress on KP discussions – little to report	
COP-6 Part 1, The Hague, 2000	Agreement on KP came close, but talks collapsed at last minute due to fatigue, divisions within EU over sinks and divisions between EU and Umbrella Group	Fudge: some apparent agreement to limit use of flexible mechanisms like sinks, but subsequent statements by US implied that nothing was really agreed
COP-6 Part 2, Bonn, 2001	Compromise agreement on KP for further discussion at COP-7; increased use of domestic Annex 1 sinks to offset emissions	Success: triumph of multilateralism following US abrogation; new sources of finance; and limited sinks in CDM a partial success for some Latin American countries Fudge: agreement to a watered down KP ('Kyoto-light')
COP-7, Marrakech, 2001	200 page legal text for KP agreed paving way to ratification by or at the WSSD in 2002	Success: an agreement which can potentially deliver future GHG reductions Fudge: Bonn agreement even further watered down by Umbrella group demands, especially Russia; likely to result in a regional approach to climate change with EU taking lead

In general, developing countries feel cheated since the negotiations have not resulted in significant real emission cuts by industrialised countries, and the tendency has been to water down the agreement more and more (as at Bonn and Marrakech) in order to accommodate the domestic political and business concerns of the 'Umbrella Group' (see 6). The negotiating power of the rump Umbrella Group was particularly felt on the penultimate day of the Ministerial segment at Marrakech. Following a veto by Japan, Canada, Australia and Russia to a deal agreed by all other parties, Russia's domestic carbon sink allowance was doubled. An irony of the Marrakech deal is that it went considerably further in reducing real emission commitments than the negotiating position of the US at the Hague.

There have however been some limited 'successes' for developing countries, for example at COP-3, G-77 won the battle to prevent developing countries adopting emissions targets in the face of strong pressures from the US, Japan (the host country) and Britain (Newell, 1998). Although the Berlin Mandate from COP-1 only discussed developed country commitments, these countries argued for an 'evolutionary' approach in which developing countries would gradually assume responsibility. While African[1] and Asian countries remained firmly against 'evolution', some Latin American countries expressed a willingness to consider it in exchange for a financial mechanism. At COP-3 the term 'meaningful participation by developing countries' was continuously used as a bargaining chip, but was eventually dropped in the face of a recalcitrant G-77 (Mwandosya, 1999).

Minor successes from COP-6 and COP7 were the approval of three new funds to help developing countries, although the NGO Climate Action Network South described commitments to these funds as "pathetic". Two of the new funds are under the UNFCCC and the third is directly under the KP:

- the Least Developed Countries Fund primarily for climate change adaptation activities
- the Special Climate Change Fund for adaptation, technology transfer, various environmental sector activities (transport, energy, forestry, etc.) and assistance in economic diversification
- the KP Adaptation Fund, again for adaptation projects. The fact that the latter will be partly funded by a tax on the CDM, but not by a tax on the other flexible mechanisms which don't involve developing countries, slightly takes the gloss of this 'success'.

Also the agreed Compliance system for the KP was one that met most of G-77's demands at COP-7, although by then they were arguing from a negotiating position which had become watered down from previous much tougher stances on compliance (see 7). Another small victory was the election of John Ashe of Antigua and Barbuda as the first Chair of the CDM Executive Board.

The main outcome of the UNFCCC process has of course been agreement to the Kyoto Protocol reached at Marrakech in COP-7. Apart from the important success of keeping whole the process going in the hope that future agreements will be much stronger, developing countries were the main losers. It is so watered down due to concessions (for example on domestic carbon sinks under Article 3.4 of the KP) to the Umbrella Group that the net effect

[1] African countries, in spite of their tendency to adopt defensive or negative positions in the negotiations, have been in some ways among the most active Parties of the Convention. 12 African countries were among the first to ratify it in 1994, and they were fully involved in the fora leading to adoption of the KP in 1997 (Mwandosya, 1999). The Tanzanian Chair of G-77 played a prominent role in the approval of the KP; China also played a major part by brokering the final deal with the US.

may only be a 1.8% reduction on 1990 emission levels by the first reporting period (2008-2012). As pointed out by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (11 November 2001) the market for a ratifiable KP was very much a buyer's market. The four big Umbrella Group countries, Japan, Russia, Canada and Australia, used their leverage (the 'ratification card') at various critical points in the negotiations to weaken the effectiveness of the KP in a number of key areas including the compliance system, eligibility requirements for the flexible mechanisms, transparency and public participation, and on reporting information for sinks. As late as the evening of the penultimate day of COP-7, a deal which had been accepted by all other parties was rejected by the Umbrella Group on the above points, and was only resolved behind closed doors. The biggest winner was undoubtedly Russia which thanks to a its "intransigent negotiating style" succeeded in increasing its domestic sinks allowance from 17 to 33 megatons of carbon (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 11 November 2001).

In sum this would appear to be a rather mixed success for the majority of small developing countries keen to reach a deal and most vulnerable to climate change, since they would have found it relatively easy to meet any emission targets and it might even have eventually resulted in their inclusion in a global emissions trading regime. It has also provided an excuse to Annex 1 countries not to take action; as pointed out by Gupta (2000b), the more vulnerable developing countries have most to lose from inaction. The real winners in this context have perhaps been the larger and more powerful developing countries, as well as the Umbrella Group countries which obtained all the concessions they asked for at COP-7.

4.2 Defensive negotiating strategies and the 'hollow mandate' problem

Developing countries have generally adopted defensive negotiating strategies in the UNFCCC[1]. According to Gupta (1997), when adopting a defensive strategy, developing countries tend to:

- be reluctant to make new proposals
- reduce the issues to a few ideas on which they can develop reactive positions – the damage control approach
- *ad lib* rather than argue from well thought out policy positions
- vacillate when financial gains are on offer
- link the issue to all other international issues, i.e., the North-South divide

Defensive strategies are easier to defend in the domestic context, since they are vague and abstract and are seen as consistent with other foreign policies. Negotiators also fear for the loss of their jobs if they argue for something that could conflict with other stronger sectoral interests (environment as the poor relation), according to interviews by Gupta (1997). On the other hand, a defensive approach can be a good way of getting concessions from developed countries, and a common defensive G-77 position (safety in numbers) has proved 'effective', for example in preventing use of the word 'voluntary' at COP-3 and COP-4 (see Box 5). Even the biggest developing countries feel they are unable to negotiate on equal terms with their northern adversaries, and that on their own they are more vulnerable (Gupta, 2000b). A major advantage for the smaller developing countries is that they benefit from the better information and understanding of the issues provided by the bigger countries.

[1]There have however been some exceptions to the defensive strategy including the AOSIS protocol proposed in 1994 to cut emissions by 20% over 1990 levels by 2005, and Brazil's Clean Development Fund proposal at Kyoto discussed in Box 4.

Associated with the defensive and reactive negotiating strategy, developing country negotiators suffer from a 'hollow mandate' problem according to Gupta (2000b). They are often unclear what they want from the negotiations, e.g. many of them are ambivalent about mechanisms like the CDM which, while offering the potential of finance and a more efficient energy sector, provides another 'loophole'. Another example mentioned by some delegates is a fear that tough climate change measures in the north could harm their own economic development. As discussed below they have insufficient information (e.g., from regional inter-sessional meetings and national or regional research centres) and political support to develop clear national and regional policy positions and to adopt more proactive or realist negotiation positions.

Box 5: Use of the word 'Voluntary'

The word 'voluntary' has been strategically used in the negotiations, and developing countries tend to see it as part of a developed country strategy of 'divide and rule'. For example, it was introduced in the article on Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) at COP-1 suggesting respect for the position of the majority of developing countries who were opposed to JI, while allowing a minority to participate in it. But the word voluntary is misleading, as in practice most developing countries would feel obliged to participate in it rather than lose access to the resources and technologies that could be accessed through it.

'Voluntary' was used again at COP-3 when an attempt was made to introduce an article to encourage voluntary abatement measures by developing countries. This was blocked in Kyoto, but reappeared in COP-4 in Argentina where the host country and Kazakhstan said they wanted to adopt voluntary measures. This placed other developing countries in a difficult negotiating position since it would open the door to pressure being put on them to accept emission targets, as demanded by the US in particular. As one leading developing country negotiator said: "it is difficult for most of the developing countries to accept the proposition that they should enter into commitments that would adversely bind them ether now or later on for the sake of a problem caused by developed countries" (Tariq Osman Hyder cited in Grubb et al, 1993: 27). It was however again resisted.

Source: Based on Gupta, 2000a:60

Furthermore, hollow mandates make it difficult to develop strong regional negotiating positions or coalitions (Gupta, 2000b). Weak coalitions make developing countries susceptible to divide and rule tactics of developed countries including the use of words like 'voluntary' (Box 5), 'side-payments' and 'reprisals'. Some developing countries form coalitions with developed countries, while others like AOSIS support G-77 which is itself very diverse. Lack of resources limits consultation opportunities between the COPs and prevents the development of mutual understanding and trust. Meanwhile developed country negotiators hold regular inter-sessional meetings to develop common negotiating positions. A report of a meeting of eight Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries also reported that lack of coordination is a major problem in achieving effective regional participation in the UNFCCC (IUCN, 2000).

5. Objectives of developing countries: what is a successful outcome?

For the majority of developing countries, the main objective in the UNFCCC is to maintain the pressure on Annex 1 countries to cut their emissions and, following Kyoto, to ensure that use of the three KP flexible mechanisms and sinks will not jeopardise real and verifiable reductions of GHG emissions (Mwandosya, 1999). This equates quite closely with the EU policy position of maintaining the 'environmental integrity' of the Protocol. Secondary objectives or expectations from the UNFCCC include:

- minimum or zero limitation on domestic economic development
- maximum contribution to sustainable development objectives
- maximum financial assistance for capacity-building and climate change adaptation
- maximum technology transfer from developed countries

More generally, the terms justice, equity and human rights are commonly used by developing countries when describing their expectations and aims in the UNFCCC; for example, the human right to emit a certain level of emissions is the basis for the widely favoured 'contraction and convergence' approach.[1] At COP-3, China coined the phrase 'luxury emissions' (of developed countries) and 'survival emissions' (of developing countries) to emphasise the equity aspect (Mwandosya, 1999). Most developing countries see the issues surrounding climate change as an extension of the North-South and OECD versus non-OECD country divide that runs through the UN system (Grubb et al, 1999). Some developing country negotiators have even expressed the view that the UNFCCC is part of a conspiracy to prevent their development (Gupta, 2000a).

A specific aspect of success for any individual country negotiating team is the number of options kept open for the Minister; if the latter has limited room for manoeuvre in the ministerial segment, this is regarded as a failure. This discussion of objectives involves gross generalisations about developing country viewpoints. These can only be dissaggregated with reference to a discussion the coalitions of interests (6) and developing country viewpoints on the various contentious issues (7).

[1]This is based on a gradual process of contraction by developed countries to a point of convergence to a 'sustainable' emissions level over a period of say 100 years. This could also involve emissions trading around an equal per capita emissions quota (Agarwal et al, 1999).

6. The coalitions of interests

It is difficult to understand developing country participation in the UNFCCC without an understanding of the various coalitions of interests. Individual developing country negotiators, unless they are 'big players' or are included among the 'friends of the Chair', have limited influence outside these coalitions. The most important developing country coalition is clearly G-77, currently 133 countries. There is a huge diversity of interests within G-77, with many countries like those in AOSIS favouring the strongest possible agreement and OPEC countries who would rather have no agreement at all. There are two main reasons why G-77 members stick to the large developing country grouping:

- due to the various negotiation limitations (7), many of the smaller delegations have decided that their best chance of 'success' is to support G-77, even when this may mean they are forced to support positions against their national interests
- developing countries are reluctant to lose their 'South vs. North' voice and the protection in numbers that G-77 represents, e.g., bigger developing countries commented that they feel more comfortable with G-77 as opposed to the 'western club' (Gupta 2000a).

A third possible reason is that smaller and poorer countries, which have limited expertise and research resources, are able to benefit from the research and policy analysis carried out by bigger or middle-income countries like India, China and Brazil, which have become the main developing country leaders.

The 43 strong AOSIS group is one of the best organised groups, and has learned the value of drawing on the support of NGOs and the scientific and research community. For example, it draws particularly on the support of the UK Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) which prepares policy briefs to enhance AOSIS's understanding of key legal issues.

The OPEC group has been quite aggressive in pursuing its agenda, arguing for compensation for damage to their economies as a result of any emission reductions stemming from an UNFCCC agreement. Demand for a Compensation Fund has been a perennially significant agenda item supported by G-77 while opposed in principle by many of its members. OPEC countries have also supported sinks and the other flexible arrangements since this would reduce the need for Annex 1 countries to cut emissions. Due to these tensions, 120 countries at COP-1 formed a breakaway Green G-77, but eventually the OPEC countries caved in and opted for the G-77 position rather than remain outside the developing country fold.

Regional sub-coalitions within the G-77 are generally quite weak. They include the Africa group (53 countries) and the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) group (33 members). A more important regional interest group is the 16 strong GRILA Latin American (minus Brazil) group of countries in favour of sinks in the CDM. But in general developing countries have not tended to develop strong regional groupings or positions. This is because their interests are more dependent on such factors as whether they are an oil producer, how low-lying their country is, etc. (although many of the Pacific and Caribbean states are low-lying and so AOSIS does have a regional flavour to it).

7. Developing country positions on key issues[1]

The general position of developing countries throughout the COPs on the main issues has, as shown in the G-77 position, been fairly consistent. For example, they have opposed pressure to take on 'voluntary' commitments; opposed the use of domestic sinks and flexible mechanisms, especially emissions trading and JI between developed countries in which their participation is excluded; and have argued for heavy penalties on non-compliance. However they have been more ambivalent on the issues of sinks in the CDM and the CDM in general.

The overall objectives of the CDM are seen very differently by developing and developed countries. For the former it is a means of securing finance and contributing to the country's sustainable development, while for the latter it is a low cost means of meeting emission targets. The clash between wanting low-cost deals and ensuring projects meet SD criteria will obviously be challenging to the governance of the CDM. Sources of uncertainty for developing countries in the CDM include the future price of carbon; the transaction costs of planning, implementing, monitoring and controlling projects; and whether these transaction costs, which are naturally higher per unit of carbon abatement for smaller projects, will mean that their projects are uncompetitive in the CDM marketplace. They are also concerned that the CDM could reduce overseas development assistance (ODA) and encourage the latter to become more oriented to global environment problems; of a loss in sovereignty over their natural resources if they are tied up in long-term carbon sink deals; and that through the CDM, cheaper climate change abatement options will be exploited by Annex 1 countries leaving more costly future options for the host country to fund.

Most developing countries are not against the CDM in principle, in fact they argue that participating in the CDM fulfils the Umbrella Group demands on them for 'meaningful participation' (apart from their own domestic efforts to reduce emissions levels), but the majority of G-77 (as well as the EU Group) have opposed sinks in the CDM on a range of grounds: that it weakens the environmental integrity of the KP by reducing pressures on Annex 1 countries to reduce emissions at source; problems of impermanence, measurement and leakage[2]; fears of biodiversity loss, especially if plantations are allowed on areas of previous natural forest; the fear of perverse incentives to increase deforestation if forest conservation had been included in the CDM; fears of the loss of indigenous and poor forest users' tenure and access rights; and in general the concern that it will favour industrial forestry over the rural poor (Bass et al, 2000). Larger developing countries like India and China have been particularly opposed to the use of sinks in the CDM; while they also cite the above reasons, they will benefit more from a focus on renewable energy and technology transfer in the energy sector.

A significant alliance was made on sinks before COP-6 between the Umbrella Group and the Latin American GRILA group. The latter, led by such as Costa Rica and Bolivia, are better placed to benefit from sinks in the CDM than the African countries due to the administrative and information demands (for example, in establishing baselines and measuring and verifying

[1]This section draws mainly on Agarwal et al (1999), Grubb et al (1999), Gupta (2000a) and Mwandosya (1999).

[2] Leakage occurs when carbon is released due to an action taken elsewhere but in consequence of a carbon project, e.g., a loss of livelihood rights due to a CDM reforestation project leads to forest clearance elsewhere. Leakage problems have to be planned for and compensated, e.g., through an intensive agroforestry programme with those whose rights are displaced.

carbon gains). Latin American countries, especially Costa Rica, have been most active in the voluntary phase of carbon sink projects – the so-called Activities Implemented Jointly phase. These countries also point to the importance of forests as a source of emissions; possibly up to 25% of anthropogenic carbon emissions are from deforestation, and a weakness of the KP is that it has not come up with a system of rewarding forest conservation. Some of the concerns of the opponents of sinks in the CDM have been allayed by decisions at Bonn and Marrakech to restrict sink forestry to afforestation and reforestation (excluding avoided deforestation), but there are still major concerns at the type of forestry which will be encouraged by the CDM market. This will provide an early test of the governance of the CDM, and its stated commitment to the objectives of sustainable development.

Emissions trading is seen by developing countries as a loophole and a way of 'exporting' pollution. Developing countries have supported the EU 'supplementary' position of limiting the use of emissions trading and other flexible mechanisms to a given percentage (at COP-6 part 1, the EU argued for 50% supplementary but this was dropped at COP-6 part 2 in Bonn, so that there are now no quantitative limits on the flexible mechanisms). Another concern is that emissions trading will create property rights in pollution. The distinction is drawn between creating an obligation to reduce emissions and creating rights in the atmosphere which could jeopardise the right to emit in order to reach a basic level of development. In the longer term, emissions trading need not only be between Annex 1 countries. In a contraction and convergence approach, emissions trading could take place between developed and developing country around a 'sustainable' per capita emissions quota.

Another issue of hot debate has been compliance by developed countries of their emissions targets agreed at Kyoto. Some developing countries have seen this an opportunity to penalise the rich polluter, and the generally favoured method is a fixed penalty for non-compliance. Figures discussed at COP-6 part 1 ranged from $14 to $600 per tonne of carbon, the extremes showing how far apart the protagonists are. Although developing countries resisted the original US suggestion that any shortfall in meeting emissions targets in the first reporting period should be added to target levels for the next reporting period (seen as yet more borrowing from the future to pay for the present), the agreement reached at COP-7 was basically this, with the penalty being 30% of the shortfall and suspension from use of the flexible mechanisms until it has been met.

A further important issue is technology transfer. Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC states that it is the responsibility of developed countries to provide technology transfer and financial resources for developing countries to carry out UNFCCC commitments. At Kyoto, China presented a list of specific technologies it wanted to improve its contribution to climate change abatement. Discussions to set up Technology Assessment Panels, intended to identify the technology needs and aspirations of developing countries in collaboration with investors, foundered on disagreements about who should participate and whether technology should be transferred at subsidised rates (Grubb et al, 1999). Another initiative (largely of Japan) was to set up the Climate Technology Initiative which involved research, information and technical assistance support by the country members of the International Energy Agency. But such approaches have had little impact in comparison to private investment flows. An initiative at COP-4 called for developing countries to submit prioritised technology needs, but Frost (2001) points out that African countries lack the capacity to decide what technology is required.

8. Problems and Constraints for Developing Country Negotiators

8.1 Lack of transparency

Developing country negotiators feel that the negotiation process is not transparent according to interviews by Gupta (2000a). Too many important decisions are made over lunch, at late night meetings, over phone-calls and in the corridors. There is therefore a lack of open and transparent debate on many issues. Accusations were even made at COP-6 part 1 that Chairs of Contact Groups deleted text against the wishes of developing country delegates (Equity Watch Newsletter, 15 November 2000, Centre for Science and Technology, New Delhi).

8.2 The small size of national delegations

Table 2 and Figure 1 present a breakdown of the number of COP-6 part 1 delegates per country for the main alliances (these are overlapping in Table 2 in terms of countries and delegates). It shows great differences in delegates per country between the two main developed country groupings (over 40) and the rest, especially the most vulnerable AOSIS countries (3.3 delegates) and Africa group (5.2). The Asia group would average 5.6 without the seven OPEC members, while LAC would average 7.5 without Brazil (65 delegates – by far the largest for a 'developing country') and Mexico (35). Many of the smaller African and AOSIS countries had only two or three person delegations and a few just one, whereas the US had 99 delegates, Canada 81, the European Commission 76, Germany 74, France 72, etc.

Due to the informal negotiation process (3.2), many key issues are discussed simultaneously. Countries with large delegations are able to participate in all the negotiations, while developing countries can only follow them through a coalition. This inevitably means a reduced focus on national interests. One of the meetings of the Working Group on Compliance at COP-6 was adjourned following concerns expressed by G-77 about the limited capacity of small delegations and transport facilities (Earth Negotiation Bulletin, 21 November 2000).

There is also an imbalance in civil society representation; at COP-6 part 1 there were some 3,000 NGO representatives present, the vast majority from the North, and only 42 out of 663 media representatives were from the South (Equity Watch Newsletter, 15 November 2000, Centre for Science and Technology, New Delhi).

Table 2: Delegates per country for the main alliances at COP-6, The Hague				
Alliance 1/	**Countries in alliance**	**Total delegates**	**Average Delegates per country**	**Average of largest 3 Delegations**
Umbrella group	10	403	40.3	83.0
EU group 2/	16	649	40.6	74.0
Economies in transition (EIT)	14	133	9.5	21.7
G-77 & China 3/	130	846	6.5	40.0
Africa group 4/	53	275	5.2	18.7
Asia group 5/	45	313	7.0	22.7
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)	33	333	10.1	40.0
AOSIS group	42	140	3.3	9.0
OPEC group	11	142	12.9	22.7

Source: Final list of delegates at COP-6. UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn
Notes:
1/ The alliances are overlapping, e.g., G-77, AOSIS, OPEC and the three main developing country regions. Therefore the number of delegates cannot be added together or a percentage calculated.
2/ Includes European Commission (76 delegates)
3/ Excludes Mexico (35 delegates) and Korea (23) among 10 other non G-77 countries in Africa, Asia and LAC groupings. All the African group are members of G-77.
4/ Includes three OPEC countries
5/ Includes seven OPEC countries

8.3 Lack of negotiating knowledge and experience

In training courses for developing country participants organised by the Climate Change Knowledge Network, various constraints were identified associated with negotiating knowledge, experience and skills (Carpenter & Kallhauge, 2000). These included a poor understanding of:

- rules of procedure including the rights of country representatives
- the informal negotiating process
- procedural motions and points of order
- voting arrangements
- the role of the COP Chair and President
- how documents are elaborated and how they influence the negotiating process
- the nomenclature of UN and UNFCCC documents
- the various coalitions of interests

Figure 1: Number of delegates per country in main UNFCCC alliance.



8.4 Lack of a range of skills in negotiating teams

There is widespread recognition that climate change issues are highly complex, both scientifically and politically. Developed country negotiating teams contain several lawyers, economists, scientists, diplomats, etc. to ensure all the key skills are covered, with legal drafting and communication skills at a premium. Developing country teams tend to be composed of scientists, especially meteorological specialists, who are less adept at negotiating with lawyers and economists, and diplomats or politicians who are often naturally cautious about committing themselves and suffer from a superficial understanding of the issues (Gupta, 2000a).

8.5 Lack of information and support

In global governance negotiations, information is almost synonymous with power. The lack of information, both at the national and global level, is highlighted in several reports (e.g., IUCN, 2000, Selrod et al, 1995). They suffer from very limited NGO, scientific and private sector support which help provide such information in developed countries. Developing countries often lack the resources to carry out multidisciplinary climate change baseline and monitoring studies. While much of the missing information is of a technical nature, it also includes a sound understanding of the thinking and objectives of opposing negotiators necessary to adopt a more realist negotiating strategy (Gupta, 2000a).

8.6 Low political priority

For many developing countries (but not AOSIS countries) global warming does not have a

high priority and the environment minister has limited political clout. If the latter speaks out too strongly about climate change, it is often seen as being in conflict with more powerful government departments. Weak political support results in limited financial resources, with often only part-time work being carried out on climate change issues, weak coordination between ministries, etc. There is also a political problem of rapid turnover of negotiators and the use of political criteria to select them (Gupta, 2000a).

8.7 Language problems

Although all the key documents are supposed to be available in all the UN languages, when things are very rushed (i.e., towards the end of the COP) a key document may only come out in English (Gupta, 2000a). This is also the case for much of the background information, miscellaneous documents, revised documents, Conference Room Papers, unofficial documents, in-depth reviews of national communications, technical papers and national communications. No translation arrangements are available for the various informal working groups.

8.8 Fatigue and inferior office facilities at COPs

Several of the developing country delegates at The Hague (COP-6 part 1) looked exhausted. Stepping off a plane from a different time zone and going straight into late night or sometimes all-night sessions, even in the first week, and being faced with a heap of complex papers to read, provides little chance for recuperation from jet-lag.

Developed country delegations had extensive offices and administrative facilities at The Hague, e.g., for meetings to prepare themselves for negotiations, to monitor progress, work on drafts, ring legal specialists, etc., while there was one small G-77 office in the most remote part of the building. G-77 also had one of the large meeting rooms at its disposal for consultations, but this was less convenient for confidential discussions and lacked the administrative facilities of an office.

9. Capacity Building and Training Needs

Guidance on capacity building to assist developing countries achieve the objectives of the Convention and to participate effectively in the Kyoto Protocol has been provided in a series of COP decisions over the years. This guidance was consolidated into a Framework for Capacity Building in Developing Countries (Annex to FCCC/CP/2000/CRP.11). Table 3 from GEF (2001) reproduces the list of developing country needs contained in this FCCC Annex document.

Table 3: Guidance on Capacity Building from the UNFCCC

Scope of Capacity Building Needs in Developing Countries	Specific Needs for Capacity Building in Developing Countries
(a) Institutional capacity building, including strengthening or establishment, as appropriate, of national climate change secretariats or national focal points	(a) Same
(b) Enhancement and/or creation of enabling environments	
(c) National Communications	(a) Same
(d) National Climate Change Programmes	(b) Develop integrated implementation program which takes into account research and training
(e) Greenhouse Gas Inventories, emissions database management, and systems for collecting, managing, utilizing activity data and emission factors	
(f) Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment	(c) Integrate V & A assessments into sustainable development programs
(g) Capacity building for implementing adaptation measures	(c) Develop national adaptation programs of action
(h) Assessment for implementation of mitigation options	
(i) Research and systematic observations, including meteorological, hydrological and climatological services	(e) Strengthen capacity of met. and hydrological services to analyze, interpret and disseminate weather and climate information to support implement national adaptation programs of action
(j) Development and Transfer of Technology	
(k) Improved decision making, including assistance for participation in international negotiations	
(l) Clean Development Mechanism	
(m) Needs arising from implementation of Arts. 4.8, 4.9	
(n) Education, Training and Public Awareness	(f) Enhancing public awareness
(o) Information and networking, inc. database establishment	
	(d) Strengthen existing, and where needed, establish national research and training institutions to ensure the sustainability of capacity building programs.

Source: GEF, 2001

The GEF (2001) report also lists a set of priorities emerging from a series of GEF-funded regional assessments and regarded as common to three MEAs – the Convention on Biodiversity Conservation, the Convention to Combat Desertification and the UNFCCC. These are listed in Table 4 (GEF, 2001).

Table 4:Common capacity needs across regions and Conventions

1. Low levels of awareness and knowledge limit abilities for discussion, decision making, and action.
2. Paucity of information management, monitoring and observations hamper policy- and decision-making.
3. National policy, legal and regulatory frameworks tend to be unsynchronized leading to confusion between sectors and between national, regional and local levels.
4. Incentive systems and market instruments are inadequately developed.
5. Institutional mandates either overlap or have gaps, key institutions are not involved, and interactions between institutions are not always effective.
6. Science and technology are ineffectively mobilized in support of policy- and decision-making.
7. Preparing for, skill in participating in, and reporting back on, international negotiations and agreements is weak.
8. Coordination, and processes for interaction within the country are poorly developed.
9. Cooperation and networking within regions is often lacking.
10. Individuals tend to be ineffectively deployed, mobilized, motivated or given responsibility.
11. Institutional effectiveness is hampered by weak management and resource constraints.
12. Lack of financial resources and technology transfer.

Source: GEF, 2001

Other reports of developing country capacity building and training needs (Carpenter & Kallhauge, 2000; IUCN, 2000; GEF, 2000; GEF-UNDP, 2000; Gupta, 2000a; UNITAR, 2000) reveal the following priorities:

- funding for attendance at COPs,
- establishment and strengthening of permanent climate change institutions, including development of national and regional research capacity
- improved information dissemination and sharing at the national and regional levels, e.g., through networking, website development, fact sheets, briefing packages, on-line discussions, conferences/workshops, etc.
- improved coordination through inter-sessional meetings
- public education, training and information dissemination to improve the level of public interest and debate
- strengthening the horizontal and vertical linkages among government agencies and with NGOs, the private sector and civil society (including information exchange)
- skills, materials and software for carrying out technical studies
- capacity-building to take advantage of technology transfer and other opportunities through the CDM; this includes designing and appraising projects
- inclusion of operational and maintenance costs of capacity building

The training needs most often mentioned are, according to the same sources:

- negotiating techniques including drafting and through a better understanding of the rules of procedure
- administrative and technical procedures for participating in climate change activities

as baseline measurement, verification, record keeping, statistical analysis, etc.
- better understanding of cross-MEA synergies

The UNFCCC proposes national self-assessments of capacity building needs, while recognising that some countries need technical support to carry out such exercises (GEF, 2001). Feedback from the regional assessments of capacity building needs points out that national capacity statements would benefit greatly from the sharing of appropriate methodologies and tools. This can be fostered through regional fora, regional centres of excellence and informal networks of 'issue-based professionals' (GEF, 2001).

An evaluation of GEF capacity-building projects (GEF, 2000) concluded that too much emphasis has been placed on helping developing countries meet their official obligations under the UNFCCC, like the national communications, with insufficient attention being given to help the countries develop the policies and strategies necessary to deal with climate change (the latter is clearly much more difficult).

A particular aspect of developing country capacity, and one which has increased in prominence over the years, is the capacity to adapt to climate change. A major part of this is how to reduce a country's vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change. This has now become a priority for donors, and figures prominently in the new sources of finance under the UNFCCC and KP reported in 4. However in a recent workshop of the Potsdam Institute on this theme (reported at a COP-7 side event), developing country participants felt that adaptation to climate change was a lower priority than water and food scarcity, education and public health. But there appears to be important scope for coordination with the Convention to Combat Diversification (UNCCD), for example, national action plans prepared by countries affected by desertification could form the basis for climate change adaptation plans.

There is no doubt that the need for capacity building for more effective developing country participation in the UNFCCC and KP has become more fully recognised over time. For example, the Marrakech Ministerial Declaration lists as its third main resolution the importance of capacity building. This followed considerable discussion in the Ministerial segment of COP-7 of developing countries' needs for capacity building, adaptation and technology transfer (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 11 November 2001). Moreover the November 2001 SBSTA meeting agreed to request the UNFCCC Secretariat to organise a workshop specifically on Article UNFCCC activities covering education, training and public awareness (interestingly this was proposed by the US as a party to the UNFCCC).

Annex 1 presents a preliminary list of capacity building and training projects responding, to some extent, to the above-stated needs. Most of these projects have been funded through the GEF, although it is commented that GEF mechanisms for channeling resources to countries are restricted and limited (GEF, 2001). GEF projects have particularly involved establishing information systems for GHG inventories, public awareness, institutional sustainability and the integration of climate change concerns with national development priorities (GEF-UNDP, 2000).

10. Discussion

It has been established that developed countries tend to use realist and constructive negotiating strategies whereas developing countries, because of a range of limitations, resort to non-realist and defensive tactics. Gupta (1997) discusses two likely outcomes when these negotiating strategies meet in a situation in which there is a 'structural imbalance of knowledge'. The former may convince the latter they are right, or it may result in forced or 'non-decisions' – decisions which are forced through by stronger negotiators, often following a 'divide and rule' strategy by developed countries (a classic example of this was the approval of the CDM at Kyoto). These non-decisions cause developing countries to feel cheated by the negotiation process, and suspicious of developed country motives.

How national and wider interests interact with other factors to determine the development of an international regime was discussed in 2.1. Table 3, based on Gupta (1997), looks at what happens when a 'constructive' northern perspective meets a reactive southern perspective[1]. Table 5 lists five main interest types:

- common interests which may only be symbolic, but are based on a desire to cooperate, reciprocate and maintain the system. These promote regime formation
- different but converging interests, which is when interests are different but complement each other and therefore encourage cooperation. The CDM is supported in general because it conforms to northern cost-effectiveness and business interests, and southern interests in finance and technology, although it has some of the elements of a forced 'non-decision' (e.g., it involves financial inducements and was pushed through with limited information and discussion as discussed in Box 1)
- induced converging interests, which is when cooperation is involuntary and power is used to secure cooperation as in the 'non-decision' cases of the GEF as the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and approval of AIJ
- diverging interests when cooperation is difficult
- conflicting interests when cooperation is almost impossible

The conflicting interests surround how the problems are defined (for developing countries, equity issues dominate while developed countries are more concerned with cost-effectiveness and competitiveness implications) and how the principles and responsibilities under the UNFCCC are interpreted. But in general it is the developed countries who have the negotiating power and information to convert their interpretation of the principles and responsibilities into outcomes, for example through 'non-decisions' (Gupta, 1997).

[1]Table 3 clearly contains some gross generalizations; the southern perspective may be typical of some African countries, while the North perspective is more that of the Umbrella Group than the EU.

Table 5: Converging and diverging interests of the North and South in the UNFCCC		
Interest	**North-Perspective**	**South-Perspective**
Common	Concern for the climate problem	
Converging but different	Cost-effective reduction of emissions and the creation of markets for green technology	Transfer of technologies and accelerated development (through the CDM)
Induced converging	Support for the GEF, Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) and sinks in the CDM (on 'cost-effectiveness' grounds)	No alternative to the GEF, and for some countries sinks are one of the few ways they can see financial benefits
Diverging	Focus on global problems and benefits	Focus on national problems and benefits
Conflicting	1. Climate change problem can be resolved with no change in the international economic order 2. Dislike of discussions of emission allocations on historical or future basis 3. Responsibility seen to pursue cost-effective abatement and provide some financial support 4. Less interested in adaptation due to cost implications	1. Climate change problem involves addressing the international economic order 2. Focus on past responsibilities and equity: defend future rights to emit and develop 3. See developed country responsibility to cut domestic emissions 4. Focus on adaptation to climate change: costs should be paid by North

Source: based on Gupta (1997): 185

The defensive negotiating strategy of developing countries, as evidenced by G-77 positions, has arguably proved more in the interests of the larger developing countries and less in the interests of the most vulnerable developing countries, as the decision of the US to withdraw from the KP to some extent indicates. An important consequence of the US decision will be a reduction in the value of the certified emission reduction credits (or in other words the cost of carbon abatement) due to a greatly reduced demand for carbon abatement options, including the CDM. The combination of the inclusion of domestic sinks, sinks in the CDM, the supply threat of Russian and Ukrainian hot air, and the absence of the US means there is now a supply-demand imbalance. For many commentators it is now a question of whether Annex 1 countries want the KP to work equitably by allowing developing countries to benefit through the CDM, since they could swamp the market and satisfy the demand with non-developing country carbon offset options. For example some Annex 1 countries have indicated they do not intend to use their domestic sinks under Article 3.4.

Gupta's (2000b) view is that a more constructive strategy by developing countries is needed for 'successful' outcomes. Had they developed among themselves a system of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' involving 'meaningful participation' by key developing countries with reductions in emission levels linked to financing levels, they would have been better placed to demand demonstrable progress by Annex 1 countries and provided less

excuses for the back-sliding that has taken place.

The irony of G-77's adamant rejection of 'voluntary' participation is that the larger emitting developing countries have a strong record in terms of controlling per capita emission levels over the last 20 years, and would probably not have had major problems meeting their targets (see Box 6) – thereby placing them in a much stronger negotiating position. But their position was determined more on the basis of historical equity principles and the north-south divide. There is no doubt that there is a strong ethical justification for this line of argument, but it is one which seems to work against the best interests of the poorer, smaller and more vulnerable countries.

Box 6: Climate Change Abatement Record of Developing Countries

Another aspect of developing country participation in the UNFCCC is what has been achieved in terms of limiting GHG emissions in spite of the reluctance to accept 'voluntary' emission targets. A UNDP-sponsored review (Goldenberg & Reid,1999) of the abatement efforts over the last 20 years of the five main emitting or 'key' developing countries (India, China, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina), as well as the African countries as a group, proved revealing. For example, China's achievements in curbing GHG emissions was noted as "surpassing all the OECD countries". China is the second largest emitting country after the US, but has reduced overall emissions over the last five years (New York Times, 1 April 2001). 55% of Brazil's energy production was from renewable energy resources including ethanol which reduced GHG emissions by 15%; India has succeeded in levelling off per capita emission levels and promoting renewable energy in rural areas; and several African countries have shifted towards natural gas and renewable energy technologies.

These policies have resulted in a considerable de-linking of economic growth and emissions, something which few developed countries have achieved. It is therefore incorrect at present to label the key developing countries as free riders of the UNFCCC, although there is a valid fear that the future emission levels from these countries could cancel out any emission reductions achieved by Annex 1 countries (Grubb et al, 1999).

11. Conclusions

This paper shows there are major challenges for effective participation in the UNFCCC negotiations by developing countries. The first problem is the sheer complexity of the issues, both technical and political, which make it more difficult to negotiate climate change issues in a transparent and democratic way. The big decisions are made behind closed doors, although the COP still has to ratify them.

The negotiation process and their lack of resources means that developing countries tend to adopt defensive or 'non-realist' strategies. These focus more on the issues than interests, and mainly consist of pre-defined positions based on equity arguments and the north-south divide. A hollow negotiating mandate involving policy uncertainties limits their capacity for constructive negotiation strategies and to form strong coalitions (Gupta,1997). Other constraints, many of them linked to the lack of financial resources, include the small size of delegations, lack of negotiating experience and the necessary range of skills for effective negotiation, lack of inter-sessional consultations, lack of information, lack of back-up support by NGOs and academia, low political priority at home, language and various logistical problems. Capacity-building efforts to date have focussed too much on fulfilling formal commitments under the UNFCCC, and too little on building policy analysis and strategy development capacity, for example policies and strategies to cope with climate change policies as well as for more effective negotiation in the UNFCCC process.

In spite of these constraints, which clearly need to be addressed to achieve a more level negotiating playing field, the negotiating strategies of developing countries may have been over-defensive, and a more constructive negotiating strategy would have put more pressures on the Annex 1 countries (Gupta, 1997). Reliance on the historical equity argument has not proved to be in the best interests of the poorest and most vulnerable developing countries.

The agreed design of the KP, the main outcome of the UNFCCC process to date, reflects the dominant ideology. While most commentators agree that a weak agreement is better than no agreement for developing countries, the reality is that the deal agreed at Marrakech (COP-7) represents a failure of the main developing country demands for equity and environmental integrity. With the inclusion of increased domestic (Annex 1 country) sinks and reliance on the flexible mechanisms, the net reduction in emissions by Annex 1 countries by the first commitment period of 2008-2012 may be less than 2% below 1990 emission level, or, depending on the method of calculation, could even result in a net increase of 2-3%.

On the other hand, a more optimistic assessment is that the KP agreement reached at COP-7 has provided humanity with a precedent for coordinated global action on climate change and the potential to catalyse a widespread voluntary but ultimately self-interested response[1]. But a key question will continue to be whether the powers that be in the international community want to address a global public goods problem on the basis of environmental and equitable principles or merely as an economic problem in search of a cost-effective solution.

[1] Even in a country not party to the KP, there have been some interesting knock-on effects; for example, the municipality of Seattle has committed itself to the original Kyoto emissions reduction target of 7%, and several major US utility companies have invested in new carbon efficient technology on the basis that eventual regulation is inevitable (Muller, 2001).

References

Agarwal A., Narain S. & Sharma A. (1999) 'Boiling point: the United Nations Framework Convention on CC/KP'. In Agarwal A., Narain S. & Sharma A. Eds. *Global Environmental Negotiations 1. Green Politics*. Centre for Science and Environment. New Delhi, India

Barrett S. (1999) 'Montreal versus Kyoto. International Cooperation and the Global Environment.' pp.192-219 in Kaul I., Grunberg, I. & Stern M. Eds. *Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century*. Oxford University Press/United Nations Development Programme. New York

Bass S., Dubois O., Moura Costa P., Pinard M., Tipper R. & Wilson C. 2000. Rural Livelihoods and Carbon Management. IIED Natural Resources Issues Paper 1. International Institute for Environment and Development. London

Carpenter C. & Kallhauge A. (2000) 'CC Capacity Project – Africa'. Report of the Workshop July 17-21, 2000, Dakar, Senegal. IISD. Winnipeg, Canada

GEF (2000) 'Review of Climate Change Enabling Activities' Global Environment Facility Evaluation Report #2-00. Washington, DC

GEF (2001) 'Elements of Strategic Collaboration and a Framework for GEF Action for Capacity Building for the Global Environment',Global Environment Facility document GEF/C.17/6/Rev.1 April 13, 2001. Washington, DC

GEF-UNDP (2000) 'Capacity Development Initiative. Country Capacity Development Needs and Priorities. A Synthesis' GEF-UNDP Strategic Partnership. Washington, DC:

Goldenberg J. & Reid W. Eds. (1999) 'Promoting development while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Trends & Baselines.' United Nations Development Program/World Resources Institute, New York

Grubb M., Vrolijk C. & Brack D. (1999) 'The KP. A Guide and Assessment. Energy and Environmental Programme', Royal Institute of International Affairs. Earthscan/RIIA. London

Gupta J. (1997) 'The Climate Change Convention and Developing Countries: From Conflict to Consensus?' *Environment and Policy* Volume 8. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht, The Netherlands

Gupta J. (2000a) '"On Behalf of My Delegation,...." – A Survival Guide for Developing Country Negotiators'. Institute for Environmental Studies, Free University of Amsterdam. Centre for Sustainable Development of the Americas. Washington DC, USA

Gupta J. (2000b) 'North-South aspects of the climate change issue.' *International Journal of Sustainable Development*. Vol.3 (2):115-135

Michaelowa A. (1998) 'Climate policy and interest groups – a public choice analysis'. *Intercencia* 33 (6): 251-9

Muller B. 2001. The Resurrection of a Protocol. The Bonn Agreement and its impact on the 'Climate Catch 22'. www.wolfson.ox.ac.uk/~mueller

Mwandosya M.J. (1999) 'Survival Emissions: A Perspective from the South on Global Climate Change Negotiations'. DUP (1996) Limited and CEEST-2000. Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania

Newell P. (1998) 'Who CoPed out of Kyoto? An Assessment of the Third Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change'. *Environmental Politics* 7 (2):153-159

OECD 'Undated. Action Against Climate Change. The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond' Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Paris.

IUCN (2000) 'Conclusions and recommendations from the 1st Consultative Meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)' on CC. 20 October 2000. Gaborone, Botswana

Selrod A., Torvanger A, Karani P & Ojwang.(1995) 'Joint Implementation under the Convention on Climate Change. Opportunities for Development in Africa'. African Centre for Technology Studies. ACTS Research Memorandum 12. Nairobi

Skodvin T. (1993) 'Science-policy interaction in the global greenhouse. Institutional design and institutional performance in the IPCC'. CICERO Working Paper 1999:3. Center for International Climate and Environmental Research. University of Oslo:

UNFCCC (2000) 'A Guide to the CC Process'. UNFCCC Secretariat. Bonn, Germany

UNITAR (2000. 'A country-driven assessment of capacity-building needs related to climate change and the Kyoto Protocol in 30 developing countries.' Side-event presentation at COP-6, 15 November 2000. The Hague, Netherlands

Annex 1

Identified Training and Capacity Building Initiatives[1]

The GEF Capacity Development Initiative

The Capacity Development Initiative (CDI) was an 18 month consultative planning process launched by the GEF with UNDP in January 2000 (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 30 October 2001). The objectives of the CDI were stated as follows: to prepare broad strategic elements for international support for capacity building to address climate change, biodiversity and land degradation, and to prepare an operation-oriented framework for focussed GEF action to assist capacity building. The CDI conducted an assesssment of developing country and economies in transition capacity building needs (reported in section 9 above).

It identified some operational principles for capacity building in developing countries and economies in transition including national ownership; multi-stakeholder consultation and decision making; integration into wider sustainable development efforts; a holistic approach; learning by doing; and the need for regional approaches. The initiative also involves new methods for accessing GEF finance for capacity building, e.g., through self-assessment of capacity needs. GEF will provide grants of $25,000 to least developed countries and small island developing states for the preparation of proposals to undertake self-assessment, and will then consider requests up to $200,000 for the self-assessment process itself. This is complemented by the UNITAR (see below) Guide for Self-Assessment of Country Capacity Needs for Global Environmental Management. More information can be obtained from www.gefweb.org and www.unitar.org.

Training courses organised by the Climate Change Knowledge Network

Two UNFCCC negotiation training courses were organised by the Climate Change Knowledge Network (a network of 14 research institutes including several in developing countries) in conjunction with the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Free University, Amsterdam, and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Canada.

The first course, jointly organised by the NGO ENDA-Tiers Monde of Senegal, aimed to enhance negotiating capacity in Africa following a request by Chair of African Group at CoP-4, 1998. It was held in July 2000 and attended by representatives from 20 African countries (Carpenter & Kallhauge, 2000). The focus was on how to prepare for negotiations, and the training involved negotiation theory, how to prepare for multilateral negotiations, discussion of major issues and the internal politics and challenges of G-77 and China. One concluding recommendation was that negotiation theory and practice needs to be introduced in African University curricula.

The second course, organised with the Centre for Sustainable Development of the Americas (CSDA), was attended by 19 LAC negotiators (Gupta, 2000a). The emphasis was on how they can have more influence in the negotiations through better negotiating techniques and strategies.

[1] This is not an exhaustive list; most of these were identified from handouts and publicity at COP-6.

UNITAR training and capacity-building projects

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) UNFCCC training project involves a network of research institutions involved in training and capacity building to implement the UNFCCC. UNITAR training courses covering policy and technical issues have been conducted in more than 100 training workshops involving over 40 developing countries. Covering policy and technical issues. The goal is to create a pool of experts and to foster regional information exchange. Courses have been introduced in several universities including Zimbabwe.

The CC:TRAIN programme is a bilaterally funded GEF and UNDP programme implemented by UNITAR in collaboration with the UNFCCC Secretariat, UNEP and regional partners in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. As part of UNITAR's CC:TRAIN programme, a handbook on preparing national climate change implementation strategies has been produced. This includes guidance on how to encourage national consultative processes in the development of national climate change policies. .

A recent UNITAR publication is called "Who needs what to implement the Kyoto Protocol. An assessment of the capacity building needs in 33 developing countries." Needs assessments have been carried out in over 30 developing countries under the UNITAR KP needs assessment project.

UNEP Collaborating Centre on Energy and Environment (UCCEE), Denmark

In the run-up to COP-6 part 1, UNEP with support from the Asian Development Bank ran 10 national and regional workshops involving 15 countries from the Asia-Pacific region. The objectives of these were to provide information and raise awareness on key issues for COP-6.

Caribbean: Planning for Adaptation to Global Climate Change (CPACC)

This initiative, supported by GEF, World Bank and the Organisation of American States (OAS), aims to strengthen national (in 12 CARICOM countries) and regional capacities to plan for the adaptation to climate change. It involves national pilot actions, training and technology transfer components. Much of the emphasis is on improved information collection and monitoring. A Caribbean Climate Change Centre has been established at the University of the West Indies.

African capacity-building initiatives and institutions

The IUCN has a project with the SADC Environment and Land Management Sector. Meetings have been held with eight countries to discuss their capacity building needs and how to improve regional coordination (IUCN, 2000). There are several notable African institutions promoting capacity development and policy analysis. The NGO Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA-TM) of Senegal has been active with the Climate Change Knowledge Network (see above), running courses and undertaking policy research on climate change issues. The Energy and & Development Research Centre of the University of Cape Town runs climate change science and technology training courses, and carries out policy research and networking, as does the Kumasi Institute of Technology and Environment in Ghana. A goal of the latter is to establish a knowledge network for

sustainable energy in Africa. Finally, mention should be made of the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) in Kenya. Since 1994 this has had a climate change policy programme, supported by NORAD and the Ford and MacArthur Foundations. Its aim is to establish policy analysis capacity of climate change issues in Sub-Saharan Africa.