Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds

Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000

Volume I

Peter Wiles

Mark Bradbury **Manuela Mece**
Margie Buchanan-Smith **Nicola Norman**
Steve Collins **Ana Prodanovic**
John Cosgrave **Jane Shackman**
Alistair Hallam **Fiona Watson**



Overseas Development Institute

In association with

VALID

Valid International

August 2000

Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000

The evaluation consists of three volumes, of which this is the first.
Volume I: Main Findings of the Evaluation
Volume II: Sectoral Sections (including a section on War-Affected Populations and Beneficiaries)
Volume III: Individual DEC Agency Summaries

Overseas Development Institute

111 Westminster Bridge Road
London
SE1 7JD
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7922 0300
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7922 0399
Email: hpg@odi.org.uk
Website: www.odi.org.uk

Disasters Emergency Committee

52 Great Portland Street
London
W1N 5AH
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7580 6550
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7580 2854

Further details about this evaluation can be found on the DEC website at :

www.dec.org.uk

Cover: Roma refugee children from Kosovo, now living in Sarajevo. Photograph taken by Peter Wiles during the evaluation fieldwork, March 2000.

© Disasters Emergency Committee

Acknowledgements

Many people have made this evaluation possible. The ODI team wishes to acknowledge the support given to the team by DEC member agency staff, both in the UK and in the Balkans. The staff of the Oxfam offices in Belgrade, Pristina, Sarajevo, Skopje and Tirana, CARE International in Pristina and World Vision in Montenegro deserve special mentions, particularly Ollga Cipa, Sonia Cakovic, Merita Mehman, Liz Sime, Tatjana Masic, Samira Krehic and Natasha Kurashova for their tremendous logistical support to the team. Thanks also to Mariola Xhunga and Besiana Belaj for their interpreting work in Albania and Kosovo respectively.

In the UK, Heather Hughes of Oxfam and Jamie McCaul and Kate Robertson of the DEC Secretariat provided continual support.

The team also wishes to thank all those many people in other agencies and organisations who submitted to our questioning and those directly affected by the crisis who were prepared to talk about their experiences.

Debora Kleyn performed great works in establishing the huge document database and keeping up a steady flow of analysis and information. Joanne Aitken worked long hours on the formatting and production of the report.

Finally, our great thanks to Nicola Norman for her enormous contribution to making this evaluation possible, for her never-failing support to the team and her calm and unflagging attention to detail.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ..... **i**

Table of Contents ..... **iii**

Figures, Tables and Boxes ..... **vii**

Glossary ..... **ix**

Overall Conclusions and Findings ..... **xiii**

Executive Summary ..... **xv**

Maps ..... **xxxi**
Regional Map of the Balkans xxxi
Map of Kosovo xxxii

1. INTRODUCTION **1**
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Methodology 2
1.3 Limits to the Evaluation 4
1.4 This Evaluation in Context 5
1.5 About the Report 6

2. CONTEXT OF THE KOSOVO EMERGENCY **7**
2.1 Events Leading to the Emergency 7
2.2 The Humanitarian Crisis 9
2.3 The Humanitarian Response 14
2.4 Rehabilitation in Kosovo: An Uncertain Future 17
2.5 Constraints and Achievements 18
2.6 Lessons from Kosovo 19

3. PREPAREDNESS AND INITIAL RESPONSE **21**
3.1 Context 21
3.2 DEC Agencies 22
3.3 Situational Analysis 22
3.4 Prior Presence in Region 25
3.5 Organisational Commitment and Capacity 26
3.6 Conclusions 29
3.7 Recommendations 30

4. APPROPRIATENESS **33**
4.1 Context 33
4.2 Needs Assessments 33
4.3 Consultation with Beneficiaries 34
4.4 Appropriateness of Assistance 34
4.5 Programmes Outside Areas of Competence 38
4.6 Innovation 39
4.7 Conclusions 39
4.8 Recommendation 39

5. COVERAGE **41**
5.1 Affected Populations 41
5.2 Targeting 46

5.3 Conclusions 47
5.4 Recommendations 47

6. PROTECTION 49
6.1 Introduction 49
6.2 A Crisis of Protection 49
6.3 Protection Issues During the NATO Bombing Campaign 49
6.4 Protection in Post-War Kosovo 51
6.5 Conclusions 52
6.6 Recommendation 53

7. EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT 55
7.1 Monitoring 55
7.2 Evaluations 56
7.3 Effectiveness 56
7.4 Conclusions 57
7.5 Recommendation 58

8. COST EFFICIENCY 59
8.1 Findings 59
8.2 Conclusions 60
8.3 Recommendation 61

9. CONNECTEDNESS 63
9.1 Impact on and Support for Local Populations 63
9.2 Strengthening of Local Capacity/Working with Local Partners 64
9.3 The Longer Term Context – from Relief to Rehabilitation 66
9.4 Conclusions 67
9.5 Recommendations 67

10. COHERENCE 69
10.1 Overall Coordination 69
10.2 Coordination between DEC Agencies 71
10.3 Advocacy Work 71
10.4 Conclusions 74
10.5 Recommendations 74

11. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 75
11.1 Introduction 75
11.2 Sphere Minimum Standards 76
11.3 People in Aid Code 76
11.4 Impartiality and Humanitarian Need 77
11.5 DEC Agencies and Impartiality 78
11.6 Military Humanitarianism and Neutrality 79
11.7 DEC Agencies and Neutrality 81
11.8 Conclusions 81
11.9 Recommendations 82

12. THE DEC 85
12.1 Context 85
12.2 Overall Strengths and Weaknesses of the DEC Kosovo Appeal 85
12.3 Guidelines for Expenditure 86
12.4 The Six-Month Expenditure Rule 87
12.5 Phasing 88

12.6 Dealing with Large Appeals 88
12.7 Planning and Reporting 89
12.8 Agency Capacity and Allocation of Funds 90
12.9 Role of the DEC Evaluation 91
12.10 Recommendations 92

13. RECOMMENDATIONS 95

REFERENCES 101

APPENDICES 105

APPENDIX 1: Terms of Reference 107

APPENDIX 2: Team Members 113
Appendix 2.1 Core Team and Advisers 113
Appendix 2.2 Peer Reviewers 113

APPENDIX 3: Itineraries 115
Appendix 3.1 Team Itinerary: Preparatory Trip and Fieldwork 115
Appendix 3.2 Team Itinerary: UK, Ireland and Switzerland 118

APPENDIX 4: Table of Interviewees 121

APPENDIX 5: Kosovo Crisis Timeline to 31 January 2000 131

APPENDIX 6: DEC Agencies: DEC-Funded Programme Distribution by Country (Phases I And II) 139

APPENDIX 7: DEC Agencies: Types of Refugee Situation Assisted using DEC funds during the NATO Bombing Period 141

APPENDIX 8: Overview of DEC Agency Evaluations of the Kosovo Crisis and Post-Emergency Responses 143

APPENDIX 9: Other Balkans Evaluations 145

APPENDIX 10: DEC Reporting Framework – Some Proposals 147

APPENDIX 11: Background Documents 149

Figures, Tables and Boxes

Figures

Figure 1: Millions of pounds raised by DEC appeals 1
Figure 2: Refugee and IDP flows 10
Figure 3: Recruitment by DEC agencies through RedR as percentage of DEC total 28
Figure 4: Allocations from DEC for the 12 agencies 90
Figure 5: Geographical allocation of DEC funds: Phase I 140
Figure 6: Geographical allocation of DEC funds: Phase II 140
Figure 7: Allocation of DEC funds: Phases I and II 140

Tables

Table 1: Estimated numbers of refugees as a result of the Kosovo crisis 10
Table 2: Refugees and others of concern in FRY, 1998 12
Table 3: DEC agencies: presence in the region immediately prior to March 1999 23
Table 4: Examples of DEC agency protection activities in Kosovo 51

Boxes

Box 1: Determinants of good practice in monitoring the distribution of non-food items 55
Box 2: The Code of Conduct 75

Glossary

ACT	Action by Churches Together
ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ODI)
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ARC	Albanian Red Cross
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMI	Body Mass Index
BRCS	British Red Cross Society
CA	Christian Aid
CAD	Children's Aid Direct
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CDC	Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID
CICH	Institute for Child Health
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CMO	Civil Military Operations (analogous to CIMIC)
Concern	Concern Worldwide
CoC	Code of Conduct
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Corn/Soya Blend
CSW	Centre for Social Work
DA	Diakonia Agape
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DEM	Deutschmark
DFA	Irish Government's Department for Foreign Affairs
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DPT	Diphtheria, Pertussis and Tetanus Vaccine
DFID	Department for International Development
DRA	Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
DRT	Disaster Response Team (Tearfund's direct implementation arm)
EC	European Commission
ECEN	East and Central Europe Network
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDA	Edinburgh Direct Aid
EHO	Ecumenical Humanitarian Organisation
EMG	Emergency Management Group
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPC	Emergency Programme Coordinator (Oxfam)
EU	European Union
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
ExCom	Executive Committee (of DEC)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN)
FYROM	Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HAI	HelpAge International
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Handicap International
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HoD	Head of Delegation
HPN	Humanitarian Practice Network (formerly RRN – Relief and Rehabilitation Network), ODI
HR	Human Resources
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IACU	Inter-Agency Coordination Unit
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHE	International Health Exchange
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOCC	International Orthodox Christian Charities
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPH	Institute of Public Health
IRC	International Rescue Committee, a US NGO
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
JEFF	Joint Evaluation Follow-Up Monitoring and Facilitation Network
JTF	Joint Task Force
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice
KERP	Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KRC	Kosovo Red Cross
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MCIC	Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MEECA	Middle East, Europe and Central Asia Team (Christian Aid)
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
Mont RC	Montenegrin Red Cross
MRC	Macedonian Red Cross
MRE	Meals, Ready to Eat
MRT	Mobile Rehabilitation Team (BRCS-funded programme in Kosovo)
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MTS	Mother Teresa Society
MUP	Ministarstvo Unutrasnijh Poslova (Serbian Interior Ministry)
NAO	National Audit Office

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGHA	Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOVIB	Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation
NFI	Non-food items
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NPF	'Help the Children' a Roma NGO in Albania
NRCS	National Red Cross Society
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
ONS	Operating National Societies
OPD	Out-Patient's Department
OPV	Oral Poliovirus Vaccine
OSC	Operational Sub-Committee of DEC
OSCE	Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe
PJA	Period of Joint Action
PLO	Protection Liaison Officer
PNS	Participating National Societies (Red Cross)
PSF	Pharmaciens Sans Frontières
R&R	Rest and Recreation
RedR	Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief
REACH	Rehabilitation for Elderly and Children
RC	Red Cross
ROCC	Regional Operation Control Center (a coordination structure in Bosnia)
RRN	Relief and Rehabilitation Network (ODI). Now known as HPN (Humanitarian Practice Network)
SBASHK	Kosovo Teaching Staff Union
SC	Save the Children
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNI	Shelter Now International
SRC	Serbian Red Cross
ToR	Terms of Reference
UCK	Ushtrisë Clirimtare të Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA)
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, HCR
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNMACC	United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
VUSh	Vellazeria Ungjillore (Albanian Evangelical Alliance)
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

WV	World Vision
WVI	World Vision International
YRC	Yugoslav Red Cross

Overall Conclusions and Findings

This independent evaluation of expenditure of DEC Kosovo appeal funds covers the period between April 1999 and January 2000. The report describes the operational and policy issues, complexities and challenges faced by the 12 DEC member agencies in responding to the Kosovo emergency. The DEC agencies found themselves in the unique situation of working in a crisis in which the UK government was a leading player in the military conflict and also, as with other NATO governments, a major donor to and participant in the humanitarian response. For the agencies, this raised difficult issues of impartiality and neutrality.

The Kosovo emergency was regional in nature and comprised three distinct but interlinked phases: the rapid flight of Kosovo Albanian refugees into neighbouring countries, the almost equally rapid return of the majority of those refugees to Kosovo and the subsequent flight of Kosovo Serbs and Roma from Kosovo, mainly into Serbia and Bosnia. The international humanitarian response met most of the basic needs of affected populations in terms of food, shelter and water supplies, in spite of the speed and scale of these population movements, the threat of a hard Balkan winter and, in some cases, the difficulties of access. There were very low rates of mortality and an absence of starvation and epidemics.

The evaluation notes that many factors contributed to this outcome, of which humanitarian aid may not have been the most important. However, international assistance did improve the conditions of the affected populations and the DEC agencies undoubtedly made a positive contribution.

In particular:

- The assistance given by the DEC agencies was broadly relevant and appropriate to people's needs.
- The evaluation found many examples of good practice by the DEC agencies.
- In a context of sometimes poor coordination by international agencies, the DEC agencies mostly supported efforts to coordinate assistance and avoid duplication.
- The evaluation expresses some concerns about programme quality, particularly in areas such as assessment, monitoring and evaluation and gender analysis.
- The evaluation found that the DEC agencies have not yet all incorporated internationally agreed guidelines and standards on humanitarian assistance into their operations.

Given the highly politicised and militarised context in which the agencies worked, the evaluation found that:

- DEC agencies avoided excessive alignment with NATO and governmental donors in their responses, but rarely had procedures to guide field staff in their relations with the military.
- DEC agencies resisted the over-concentration of assistance on refugees in the camps in Albania and Macedonia by also responding to the needs of refugees in host families and host families themselves.
- The major proportion of DEC funds was spent in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. However an important strength of the DEC money was its availability for use throughout the region and some DEC agencies were able to increase their response to growing needs in Serbia after the NATO bombing ended.

- The evaluation notes that the Kosovo emergency raised some important policy issues for the DEC agencies related to preserving independence, neutrality and impartiality in complex political emergencies and lessons need to be learnt from these experiences.
- Also noted was the lack of public advocacy by individual DEC member agencies on some key humanitarian issues, notably the plight of the one million people who remained in Kosovo during the NATO bombing campaign and the continued use of cluster bombs by the British government.
- The Kosovo crisis highlights how issues of protection can be just as important as the provision of material relief assistance in war-induced emergencies. DEC agencies need to pay more attention to this.

The scale of this most successful of DEC appeals challenged both the agencies and the DEC secretariat and the evaluation report makes recommendations about the strengthening of the DEC mechanism in future appeals.

Executive Summary

Introduction

On 24 March 1999, NATO forces launched air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after the Belgrade government refused to accept the terms of the Rambouillet peace agreement on the governance of the province of Kosovo. The war between NATO and FRY, following years of political repression, violence and forced displacement in Kosovo, precipitated a major humanitarian emergency, involving the largest and fastest movement of people in Europe since World War II. The international response that was launched mobilised political, military and humanitarian assets on an unprecedented scale.

The Disasters Emergency Committee in the UK (DEC) launched its Kosovo appeal on 6 April 1999. This appeal, the largest in the DEC's history, raised over £50 million. Twelve DEC member agencies participated: the British Red Cross Society (BRCS), CAFOD, CARE International UK, Children's Aid Direct (CAD), Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Help the Aged/HelpAge International (HAI), Merlin, Oxfam GB, Save the Children (SC), Tearfund and World Vision UK.

The Evaluation

The DEC commissioned this independent evaluation of Phases I and II of expenditure of the appeal funds. It covers the period between 6 April 1999 and 31 January 2000, and expenditure of £37 million. The evaluation has three related but distinct purposes: accountability to fundraising partners and the British public; promoting learning among DEC agencies; and monitoring of agencies' compliance to DEC rules and guidelines.

The evaluation took place between January and June 2000 with the evaluation team visiting Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Varying amounts of DEC funds were spent in each country or province. Over 400 interviews were conducted with DEC and other humanitarian agencies, relevant government departments and war-affected populations and beneficiaries. A series of meetings and workshops with DEC agencies in the UK and in the region were held. A database containing over 2,500 documents was compiled and reviewed.

The large scope of the evaluation, the limited time the team was able to devote to Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia, and the fact that the refugee emergency (of March to June 1999) was long past, were factors limiting the depth of investigation. The evaluation recognises that the agencies' responses in a particular sector or place cannot be measured by DEC expenditure alone.

In comparison to other evaluations of the Kosovo emergency, this evaluation offers an INGO focus, multi-agency coverage, review of a longer time frame and broad geographical and sectoral scope.

The Context of the Kosovo Emergency

The Kosovo emergency occurred at the end of a decade of humanitarian crises in the Balkans, arising from the wars of secession in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(SFRY) and the impact of post-Cold War political, economic and social transformations in eastern Europe.

In 1989, the Serbian Parliament revoked the SFRY Constitution of 1974, thus reducing Kosovo's autonomy and imposing control from Belgrade. This provoked a policy of non-violent resistance from Kosovo Albanians. They set up a parallel government in 1992 including education and health systems. When Kosovo's status was marginalised further in the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995, peaceful resistance turned into armed struggle in 1996 with the appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

By 1998 the flow of asylum seekers from Kosovo into the rest of Europe and the perceived threat to regional security provoked an international response. In September 1998, agreement was secured to establish the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), whose purpose was to monitor and mitigate violations of human rights while a political process was renewed. NATO first threatened air strikes in October 1998 in support of US diplomatic efforts to secure Belgrade's compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199.

In early 1999 a massacre of civilians in Racak, deteriorating security and a contraction of humanitarian access provoked renewed threats of NATO air strikes. Dialogue between FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership was resumed in February at Rambouillet. However, when Yugoslav delegates refused to sign the agreement, the talks collapsed. NATO carried out its threat and began air strikes against FRY. Yugoslavia's refusal to sign was partly due to the controversial Military Annex of the Rambouillet agreement which included conditions for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the presence of a NATO-led peace implementation force with substantial autonomy of movement throughout FRY.

NATO's military campaign, known as Operation Allied Force, lasted for 78 days. It was suspended on 10 June 1999 when the Yugoslav army and paramilitary units began withdrawing from Kosovo, following Belgrade's acceptance of various 'principles' to resolve the crisis, including a '*substantial NATO participation'* in an international security force in Kosovo 'under UN auspices'. Once the air strikes stopped, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 authorising the establishment of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The NATO peace implementation force — Kosovo Force (KFOR) — entered Kosovo on 12 June. The legality of NATO's action against FRY has been subject to intense debate.

The Humanitarian Emergency

Although NATO air strikes were intended to end the violence in Kosovo, the immediate effect was the opposite. FRY security forces expelled Kosovo Albanians *en masse* from the province. The extent to which air strikes precipitated mass displacement or whether 'ethnic cleansing' was pre-planned is disputed. At the start of NATO's military campaign, UNHCR estimated there were up to 260,000 persons internally displaced (IDPs) inside Kosovo. Following the commencement of the air bombardment over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians sought refuge in neighbouring countries. This refugee crisis and the return of these refugees to Kosovo after June became the focus of the international humanitarian response, and of this evaluation. Since NATO entered Kosovo in June 1999, more than 200,000 people — mainly Serbs, Krajina Serbs and Roma — have left the province, most fleeing to Serbia and

Montenegro. Meanwhile, several thousand Albanians from southern Serbia have sought refuge in Kosovo and Macedonia.

The countries that bore the brunt of the Kosovo crisis are among the poorest in Europe. The impact of the crisis and the capacity and readiness of these countries to assist varied, depending upon their political stance, their ethnic composition, the presence of refugees from other conflicts and the prevailing socio-economic situation.

Albania provided refuge for the largest number of refugees — over 470,000 — having recognised Kosovo as an independent entity in 1991 and supported the liberation struggle. Macedonia, which took in the second-largest number of Kosovo Albanian refugees, was a reluctant host. Concerned at the impact that the Kosovo Albanian refugees would have on the country's ethnic balance, and on trade and diplomatic relations with Serbia, the government initially closed its border with Kosovo, leaving 40,000 refugees stranded without shelter for a week. Eventually it was persuaded by NATO governments to open the borders. Some 80,000 refugees were transferred to 28 other countries via the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme, and a smaller number by the Regional Transfer Programme, supported by NATO governments. This 'burden sharing' was controversial, potentially undermining the principle of first asylum, but was important in persuading Macedonia to open its border with Kosovo.

During the bombing some 100,000 people sought refuge in Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia, fleeing from Kosovo and from the bombing in other parts of FRY. Over one million people remained in Kosovo during the war. Of these it is estimated that half were displaced.

Impact of the War

Kosovo was FRY's poorest province, with a GDP per capita of less than US$400 in 1995 and unemployment of over 35 per cent. The province was heavily indebted. In addition to mass displacement, the war between NATO and FRY compounded the physical and economic damage that Kosovo had already suffered in the violence since 1989. An estimated 120,000 houses were damaged, 50,000 beyond repair, and over 90 per cent of schools and health facilities were damaged or destroyed.

The suffering of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced was the most visible consequence of the war, but the crisis has had broader regional impacts. Albania hosted a refugee population that was equivalent to 14 per cent of its own population, threatening to upset the progress that had been made in stabilising its economy since the 1997 civil disturbances. In Macedonia, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Romania, disruptions in trade and transport, foreign investment and tourism have all had an impact on balance of payments and structural reforms. Macedonia claims the crisis has cost them US$1.5 billion in lost trade and commerce.

FRY was already in a state of deep economic shock since the break-up of SFRY. The war inflicted further economic damage and humanitarian stress: inflation is over 100 per cent, official unemployment is at 40 per cent, and there are an estimated 500,000 'social cases'. Bomb damage to infrastructure and industry caused pollution, unemployment and disrupted trade. Sanctions have inflicted a severe energy crisis affecting 75 per cent of households. Tensions between Montenegro and Serbia have increased since the war, encouraged by the West through the lifting of sanctions on Montenegro, and the imposition of a trade blockade on Montenegro by Serbia in March 2000.

The International Humanitarian Response

The refugee crisis in the wake of NATO air strikes precipitated a huge international humanitarian response. Particular features of this international response include:

- A general lack of readiness, but rapid scaling up by agencies to provide shelter, food and health services.
- The unprecedented scale of the international response in terms of the financial resources available, and the number of agencies involved — as of 1 December 1999, two hundred and eighty-five NGOs were registered in Pristina (Guest, 2000)
- The critical role played by local NGOs and other organisations, assisting refugees accommodated in private housing and collective centres in Albania, Macedonia and Serbia.
- Weak coordination of the international response, particularly during the refugee phase of the crisis.
- The involvement of a number of commercial companies in camp construction, de-mining and security services, sometimes competing with voluntary humanitarian organisations.
- A strongly bilateral approach, fuelled by NATO governments, which saw the humanitarian and strategic military concerns as interconnected.
- The involvement of NATO forces in the humanitarian response while also being a party to the conflict, creating a dilemma for NGOs that collaborated with them.
- The politicisation of the humanitarian response in what was described by NATO leaders as a war of 'values' and in which humanitarian aid became a tool serving agendas and strategies that were not purely humanitarian.

A year after the refugee crisis, greatest progress has been made in meeting emergency needs inside Kosovo but reconstruction requirements remain immense. The Serb, Roma and other people who fled Kosovo have little prospect of returning home and constitute a long-term problem. The political 'end-state' is also uncertain: no time-limit has been set for UNMIK, and UN Resolution 1244 does not define the legal status of the UN Administered Province of Kosovo. Kosovo's future will depend upon establishment of a credible governance structure that meets the aspirations of Kosovo's population and promotes sustainable recovery.

The DEC Kosovo Appeal

Preparedness and initial response

In the period before NATO bombing began, some observers and some DEC agencies had predicted a crisis and the general possibility of refugee outflows from Kosovo. But there were few predictions of the speed and scale of the refugee exodus that would be triggered by NATO bombing. Indeed, comparable refugee flows had only occurred twice in the past 10 years, during 1991 in the Kurdish-Iraq war and during 1994 out of Rwanda.

Although some analysts have pointed out that the terms of the Rambouillet Accords were bound to be unacceptable to the Yugoslav government, there was a sense that predicting and preparing for an emergency was tantamount to admitting that the talks would fail. International agencies faced other political constraints to preparedness and contingency planning, such as the Macedonian government's refusal to establish refugee camps and their

restriction on agency registration, concerned that the presence of INGOs would attract refugees and that the agencies were only there to help Albanians. Thus, the international community, including DEC agencies, was not well prepared and the scale and speed of the refugee exodus into Albania and Macedonia took them by surprise. By contrast, some governments in the region directly affected by the crisis had warned of refugee outflows, and some local humanitarian agencies were prepared. These agencies played crucial roles in receiving refugees before the international aid effort geared up.

There are three broad aspects to preparedness relevant to DEC agencies — access to, and use of, political analysis; presence in the region; and organisational capacity — that enable agencies to respond quickly to crises wherever they happen. In terms of the first, some agencies had carried out assessments and scenario planning in 1998 and early 1999. But warnings were rarely translated into specific preparedness actions. Indeed, some agencies faced financial constraints in doing so, because of limited donor funds for such activity, a particular problem for smaller agencies.

Other factors that determined the DEC agencies' speed of response include:

- Good relationships with effective local partners.
- Organisational commitment to emergencies: for example, investment in a permanent emergency response team.
- Well-designed and stockpiled kits that facilitate rapid response to a sudden refugee crisis: for example health and water kits, or emergency management kits.
- Central emergency contingency stocks: regional stocks in the Balkans mattered less because of the relatively easy supply routes from elsewhere in Europe, and some regional stocks had been looted.
- Well-defined and recognised expertise in a particular niche sector, supported by appropriate skills and materials within the agency.
- Ability to find and employ skilled and experienced staff at short notice: this was a major constraint for many agencies, and a variety of recruitment approaches was used, ranging from extensive use of specialist registers to advertising on the internet and in trade journals.

Appropriateness

Within the overall humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis, little emphasis was put on assessments. While this might have been acceptable in the first few days of the emergency, it is contrary to good practice and to the Sphere Standards. Needs were sometimes assumed rather than real. The reasons for lack of attention to assessments included the pressure to spend money within a short time frame, the easy availability of funding and the lack of pressure from donors to undertake assessments. These factors discouraged assessments, targeting and monitoring compared with situations of more limited resources. In Serbia, assessment of the IDP population was hampered by the sensitive position of humanitarian agencies whose activities could have been interpreted as spying or intelligence gathering.

The performance of the DEC agencies in relation to assessment varied. Sometimes it was overlooked, although there are also examples of good practice and assessments which proved to the agency concerned that needs were already adequately met and further assistance was

not necessary. DEC agencies usually delivered appropriate assistance when they focused on sectors where they had expertise, or coordinated closely with other actors and filled gaps.

Beneficiaries interviewed by the evaluation team reflected a diversity of experience and situation. But beneficiary consultation does not seem to have been prioritised nor the diversities taken into account in programme design. For example, although standard kits were appropriate for a rapid response at the earliest stage of the refugee emergency, little attention was given subsequently to whether needs varied between refugee groups.

a) Food: malnutrition was not a major problem and there was generally an over-supply of food aid in Albania and Macedonia. The percentage of DEC funds spent on the provision of food appropriately fell from about 17 per cent of expenditure in Phase I to less than 3 per cent in Phase II.

b) Non-food items: many refugees fled with few possessions and many returnees to Kosovo faced the approaching winter with little in the way of material possessions, warm clothing or shelter. In these circumstances, the decision by all the DEC agencies to use some of their DEC funding for non-food items was generally appropriate.

c) Health: given the low risk of starvation or epidemics, the DEC agencies were correct to give health interventions a low priority.

d) Water and sanitation: in the emergency refugee phase in the camps in Albania and Macedonia, DEC funds were used in the water sector and the work was of a high standard and contained many examples of good practice. The main weakness was that water was not always part of an integrated public health approach. Where sanitation and public health education were the responsibility of other agencies in the camps, poor coordination weakened an integrated approach.

e) Shelter: given the scale of damage inside Kosovo and the onset of winter after the Albanian refugees returned, shelter was an appropriate intervention for the DEC agencies. Seven agencies used DEC funds for shelter programmes, not only in Kosovo, but also in Bosnia and Montenegro.

f) Mine action: the danger of mines and unexploded ordnance tended to be over-estimated, although fear of mines certainly slowed down the humanitarian response in the early days of the return. It was therefore appropriate that two DEC agencies funded mine action programmes.

g) Schools and education: a high proportion of schools were badly damaged during the war. It was therefore appropriate that five DEC agencies supported school rehabilitation, although rehabilitation is an area which, strictly speaking, does not fall within DEC spending guidelines.

h) Community services: DEC-funded community services supported disabled and women's groups from Kosovo before, during and after the war, although again, strictly speaking, the long-term nature of some of this work in Kosovo may mean it falls outside DEC guidelines for use of emergency appeal funds.

i) Psychosocial projects: this area of work is dogged by definition and conceptual problems. Although the label was used by the DEC agencies, much of the activity referred to

community service projects. The cultural appropriateness of psychosocial work seemed to be insufficiently addressed in practice.

j) Information services: Kosovo Albanian refugees often expressed the importance of getting information in situations where families had been separated and when relatives living outside the region were desperate for news. Information services particularly focused on refugees in the camps, for example the provision of mobile phones for tracing.

k) Agriculture: DEC agencies gave limited support for agriculture programmes in Kosovo after the refugee return. At the time of the evaluation it was too early to judge the impact of these programmes.

Some innovative interventions were introduced by DEC agencies: for example, the introduction of a voucher scheme in Montenegro instead of kits, in order to give beneficiaries a little more choice and dignity; and the use of mobile and satellite telephones for tracing purposes.

Coverage

During the NATO bombing, affected population groups that were not well covered by the international humanitarian response included:

- the population left inside Kosovo;
- refugees/IDPs in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro as the focus was on Albania and Macedonia;
- refugees in host families as opposed to those in camps; and
- host families, particularly in Albania.

After the return of the Kosovo Albanians to Kosovo, affected population groups that were not well covered included:

- minority groups (mainly Serbs and Roma) inside Kosovo;
- Roma (IDPs, refugees and residents) throughout the region; and
- 'poor/social cases' in resident populations who had less access to assistance than IDPs/refugees.

Over 60 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian refugees who fled to Albania and Macedonia were housed in private accommodation — a trend that should have been anticipated based on past experience in the region. Generally, refugees in host families were less well served by the international community, partly because the high visibility of refugee camps was a magnet to NATO forces, donors, NGOs and the media. Consequently, refugees in camps received a disproportionate level of assistance. As refugees in Macedonia did not obtain refugee status but were *Humanitarian Assisted Persons*, access to free health services for refugees in private accommodation was often problematic. To a large extent, DEC agencies resisted the aid bias towards refugees in camps with a number supporting assistance to refugees in host families.

Although the majority of DEC expenditure (nearly 80 per cent) in Phase I went to Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, a number of agencies were careful to respond to the needs of refugees/IDPs, albeit at lower levels, in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia. As humanitarian

needs grew in Serbia, with increased numbers of IDPs, some DEC agencies increased their programmes. In DEC Phase II, just over 70 per cent of the money went to Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia (all but 7 per cent of it to Kosovo) and the balance to Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia. An important strength of DEC money was its availability for use throughout the region.

Some DEC agencies have attempted to provide assistance to ethnic minorities within Kosovo, although usually proportionately less than inputs provided to Albanians. In terms of reaching the Serb population in Kosovo, the DEC agencies appear to have a mixed record, although there are clearly difficulties of security and access.

Roma IDPs are a particularly vulnerable group throughout the region, partly because of their poverty and the discrimination they suffer. Some DEC agencies have been aware of their special needs and have prioritised assistance to them.

The refugee/IDP population, particularly in Albania, was sometimes perceived as being 'better-off' than the local population. There was great pressure on local organisations to provide assistance to their 'own' poor. There were differing judgements, and therefore practice, among DEC agencies about whether DEC funds could be used to support local 'social cases'. However, the Sphere guidelines do call on agencies to take account of and, where appropriate, assist local host populations.

There was little disaggregated information or analysis about the situation of women in general and female-headed households in particular. Issues about registration of women for relief materials or issues of female property rights in Kosovo were generally overlooked by DEC agencies, with one exception, or not addressed. This runs counter to established humanitarian guidelines, such as the Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards.

Targeting appears to have been determined by resources available, rather than empirical need and made more complex by the large number of agencies operating with different criteria. Within Kosovo, targeting is particularly difficult, partly because aid is often seen as a reward for suffering during the war and a right due from the international community, rather than a response to needs. Also, remittances play a large part in the Kosovo economy but are very hard to monitor when assessing humanitarian need.

Protection

From the beginning, the crisis in Kosovo has been articulated as a '*crisis of protection*' rather than as a conventional emergency that can be relieved by the provision of relief aid alone. Thus, human rights promotion and monitoring were central to how the international community sought to manage the conflict before NATO's military action which, in turn, was justified as a 'humanitarian war'. However, this selective response to human rights abuses in Kosovo, compared with the virtual silence by the same governments over abuses in Chechnya, lends weight to those who argue that NATO military action in Kosovo was as much to do with European and US concerns to contain the threat of regional instability.

The forced expulsion of over 800,000 civilians from Kosovo during the NATO military campaign was the biggest and most visible protection issue. DEC agencies contributed to refugee protection in many ways, including: supporting UNHCR's protection role through staff secondment; advocating on asylum and registration issues, particularly in Macedonia; enhancing security of refugees in camps; and targeting assistance to refugees outside camps.

The biggest gap in the international protection framework during the war was in Kosovo itself. All international humanitarian aid agencies and human rights observers withdrew from Kosovo, so even a minimal protection strategy of witnessing was not feasible. There was a collective failure of protection until ICRC re-negotiated humanitarian access on 24 May. A few DEC agencies took some limited action, for example one called for urgent humanitarian access in April, another for a cease-fire and negotiation. A possible response would have been to inform the Alliance governments, in particular the British, of the potential humanitarian consequences of NATO's military campaign. Importantly, however, several DEC agencies continued humanitarian work in Serbia and Montenegro, directly or through partners, throughout the NATO military campaign.

Since the return of Kosovo Albanian refugees, the most critical protection issues have revolved around the protection of non-Albanians in Kosovo from physical violence, intimidation and discrimination. DEC agencies have been less active on these issues than they were about refugee protection despite the context of weak state institutions that are unable to fulfil their role in terms of welfare, justice and policing. This is partly because of the presence of other institutions that are mandated and better able to provide protection than NGOs. However, it is disappointing that protection issues appear in few agency assessments and that actions are not evaluated internally in terms of impact on protection. Instead, the primary focus has tended to be on relief, physical rehabilitation and the restoration of social services. Collaboration with human rights organisations has also been weak.

Effectiveness and impact

Most agencies have focused on monitoring output indicators relating to material distribution. Health and shelter programmes, for example, were monitored for the number of items distributed and roofs built. As is common in humanitarian programmes, these indicators are regarded as proxies for impact monitoring, despite the inadequacies. The monitoring of output indicators has been variable among DEC agencies. In Serbia, external restrictions inevitably decreased the amount of monitoring possible.

Few evaluations undertaken by DEC member agencies or their related networks have looked at the impact of their programmes, instead focusing on organisational and management issues. This is surprising, given that the Kosovo refugee crisis was the biggest mass movement of people in Europe since World War II. At the very least, opportunities for learning have been missed. However some end of contract reports and internal evaluations were of high quality and made important contributions to assessing the effectiveness of programmes.

The effectiveness of the DEC agencies' work has been very varied. There are examples of good practice in the refugee camps, for example in the water sector, but the evaluation questions the quality and effectiveness of some rehabilitation work inside Kosovo. Some agencies seemed to concentrate on their 'bit', paying insufficient attention to that fact that the impact of their interventions could be reduced by the non-performance of others, for example in infrastructure projects. Although this is an inevitable risk in situations where numerous agencies are jostling for work and coordination is weak, it is important that agencies take a broader and more integrated view of their work. This was particularly important during the refugee phase of the emergency. In Albania and Kosovo, the divide between camp management (including sanitation and environmental health) and the water, health promotion and medical agencies, detracted from integrated public health interventions.

In the context of large amounts of money from the DEC appeal and from other donors, several agencies commented that the pressure to spend funds within a limited time frame meant that some factors that would have contributed to greater effectiveness were overlooked.

Given the weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation noted above, it is difficult for the evaluation to make any detailed statements about impact. It is also difficult to differentiate the impact of DEC funded activities from others by the same or other agencies.

DFID has claimed that *'the overall impact of humanitarian assistance is reflected in the simple facts that no refugees died from lack of food, warmth, or acquired illness'*. In the evaluation team's opinion, the humanitarian response was probably not the most important reason behind this positive outcome on refugee morbidity and mortality. Although international assistance undoubtedly improved the conditions of affected populations, several other factors served to mitigate a major catastrophe, including: the good pre-crisis health and nutritional status of the refugee population; the short duration of the emergency and quick return of the refugees; the fact that two-thirds of refugees stayed outside the camps and were supported by the local population; and the assets retained by refugees (savings and remittances) which enabled them to pay for food and accommodation.

Efficiency/cost-effectiveness

Expenditure data from DEC agencies suffer from inconsistent labelling, insufficient breakdown, a lack of sectoral information and varying levels of detail. Thus, it has proved very difficult to make comparisons across agencies.

Almost no agencies have made any attempt to calculate cost-effectiveness indicators. Only one agency explicitly calculated expenditure per beneficiary. Nor have agencies made internal comparisons, whether in the same country, across other countries in the Balkans or across other countries world-wide. But this is not unusual and there are methodological difficulties, for example to compare the unit cost of roofs for very different types and size of house. However, making comparisons could have helped agencies to identify problems early on and may have helped in monitoring bias and impartiality. The abundance of money available to the agencies may have undermined any incentive to look at cost effectiveness issues.

Nevertheless, most agencies appear to have reasonably well-established procurement systems and there is no evidence of conspicuous over-expenditure.

As a number of DEC agencies increasingly work through international networks, accountability needs to be protected as money may be passed onto sister agencies. It is also important that a more complicated funding hierarchy does not increase overhead and management costs.

Connectedness

a) Local populations: The impact of the emergency on local populations in the region was mixed. In Albania some people may have benefited through charging rents and some infrastructure, such as hospitals, were upgraded. But a common sentiment expressed by host families was a sense of abandonment by the international community once the refugees departed. Most agencies left Albania and Macedonia precipitately as soon as the refugees

started to return to Kosovo, although the majority of DEC agencies did not follow this trend and have continued to work in both these countries, albeit on a much reduced scale, with DEC funds and other resources.

Since the end of the war, several DEC agencies have continued to assist local organisations and populations in Serbia who are hosting large numbers of displaced people, in a situation of severe economic decline, high unemployment and the infrastructural and environmental damage caused by NATO bombing.

The population in Serbia was hosting IDPs and refugees in a difficult context of economic decline with rising levels of unemployment and poverty. The local population has also had to deal with damaged infrastructure as a result of NATO bombing with some long-term environmental, health and social consequences.

b) Local capacity building: NGOs in the Balkans have grown up only in the last 10 years and therefore the need for institutional support is still substantial. Most of the DEC agencies have to some degree worked with local partners. The advantages of this approach included local partners knowing the communities and being able to draw upon a large force of local volunteers, thus potentially ensuring wider coverage. Local partners were sometimes able to respond faster than international agencies in the initial stages of the emergency, and continued to provide most of the support for refugees in host families. By working with local partners, DEC agencies thus supported the building of local disaster response capacity.

There were also some difficulties of working with local partners not unique to the Balkans. For example, some partners had little or no experience of emergency work and most were unaware of Code of Conduct principles, Sphere or other technical guidelines. Local organisations with a political or religious basis could jeopardise the impartiality of humanitarian assistance.

Collaboration was most successful where a partner had existing emergency capacity, or where an INGO had a previous capacity-building relationship with its local partner. It was also important for the INGO to provide close support to, and monitoring of, a local partner's work. Several DEC agencies have successfully used the emergency experience to strengthen the continuity of their programmes through the development of their networks of local partners.

c) Relief to rehabilitation transition: DEC Phase II funds have been spent within a political framework that defines the context as being one of 'rehabilitation' rather than 'emergency'. The start of the reconstruction phase in Kosovo was signalled at an international level by the July 1999 donors' conference. Given donor support for salaries, pensions and other social welfare benefits, opportunities to support a relief-development transition are better in Kosovo than in most countries in crisis. But there are some major obstacles: the lack of clear political framework for the province; the existence of two political systems (for example, Belgrade continues to pay welfare benefits in Serb enclaves); the underlying political complexity which means that all interventions risk being appropriated by different parties within the majority community; lack of coherence among multi-lateral structures and between donors.

As the flood of donor funding begins to dry up in 2000, this may threaten the connectedness of humanitarian interventions. Despite this, DEC agencies are often an exception to this trend of poorly connected emergency operations, and have maintained a presence in Albania and Macedonia, and/ or continued to work with local partners and local government.

Coherence

Coordination difficulties and weaknesses during the refugee crisis period have been well documented elsewhere, particularly in the UNHCR evaluation. Factors that undermined coordination included: huge input and competition between bilateral donors, combined with their unwillingness to submit to UNHCR coordination; the weakness of key UN agencies; the large number of agencies involved in the response; the large number of camps in Albania; and intense media scrutiny and pressure for profile.

Despite this context, most DEC agencies showed a commitment to coordination and were generally supportive of UNHCR's coordinating role. The DEC's Operations Sub-Committee (OSC) put great emphasis on coordination in its feedback to agencies on their 48-hour and four-week plans of action. DEC agencies also avoided some of the excesses of rampant bilateralism, for example the pressure from donors who wanted 'their' national NGOs to work in 'their' camps, particularly in Albania. But DEC agencies asserted that a DEC field-based coordination mechanism would not have added value in this emergency.

There is an increasing trend for DEC agencies to work through international networks for implementation. This can be positive for coordination if it rationalises the operations of INGOs in the field. But it also means that agencies need to spend increasing amounts of time on internal rather than external coordination. And in the pressure of a major high profile international emergency, network partners tend to break ranks and go bilateral as some did in the Kosovo emergency.

In Kosovo, there has been good coordination of humanitarian mine action work. In contrast, DEC agencies felt that coordination of shelter and school rehabilitation work was problematic. In both Albania and Kosovo, humanitarian information centres appear to have played important roles and facilitated coordination within the NGO sector and with UN and other agencies. Lessons could be learnt from these examples and DEC agencies should consider support for such ventures in the future.

Given the scale and the profile of the Kosovo crisis, those DEC agencies with an advocacy remit appear to have carried out limited public advocacy work during the Kosovo crisis. This ranged from calls for UNHCR's lead role to be respected and supported, to calls for a cease-fire and urgent humanitarian access during the NATO bombing campaign. It seems that agencies were limited in their scope for advocacy, partly because of the potential risk to staff on the ground — especially in Serbia — if controversial public statements were made. Also, some agencies found it difficult to agree internally on positions on which to base advocacy work.

There are two humanitarian issues on which agencies might have been able to do more advocacy work: access to and protection for the population inside Kosovo during the NATO bombing; and the use of cluster bombs by NATO airforces. Lack of advocacy on the latter is particularly surprising as a number of DEC agencies have been active in the anti-landmine campaign, and British forces continued to use cluster bombs after the US had stopped following concerns about the danger to civilians. Indeed, unexploded cluster bombs now represent almost as much of a danger in Kosovo as landmines laid by the Serb security forces.

As the NATO bombing campaign was widely described and justified as a 'humanitarian war', it is surprising that the NGO sector has apparently done little to analyse or challenge this concept.

Although the DEC presented both written and oral evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee hearing on Kosovo in May 1999, there was very little discussion or common ground on advocacy work among DEC agencies. Some have argued that it would have been impossible for any agreement to have been reached by the DEC grouping.

Performance standards

a) Code of Conduct, Sphere Standards and People in Aid: Over the past decade the humanitarian community has introduced innovations to govern the provision of aid in complex emergencies, in efforts to improve both quality and accountability. The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response of the Sphere Project, are two such innovations.

The evaluation team found that awareness and application of the Code of Conduct principles and of Sphere Standards was poor within most DEC agencies, their international networks and local partners. Although all DEC agencies are signatories to the Code of Conduct and most have participated in the Sphere Project, there was no monitoring of adherence to the Code in the planning and implementation of their programmes. There was no requirement from the DEC to report against the Code.

Kosovo was the first emergency in which Sphere minimum standards in water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health could be 'field tested'. Some DEC agency staff questioned the relevance of Sphere Standards in a European setting. Somewhat contentiously, some aid agencies argued that maximum rather than minimum standards needed to be set, given the level of assistance provided in sectors such as shelter. However, the evaluation team felt that most of the Sphere Standards were applicable, particularly those relating to assessment, monitoring and information systems.

The humanitarian intervention in Albania and Macedonia met most of the Sphere health indicators, but the evaluation team found that sanitation standards were often poor and standards of food and non-food items varied greatly from agency to agency and even within the same agency. Weak coordination meant that overall monitoring of standards was poor, although one DEC agency applied and monitored Sphere Standards in the provision of water to refugee camps, and another fielded a 'Standards Consultant' in Albania to draw up guidelines for operationalising standards in food provision and camp management.

Although five of the 12 DEC agencies are signed up to the pilot People in Aid 'Code of Best Practice' in the Management and Support of Aid People, some senior staff in DEC agencies were unsure whether their agency was a signatory or not. It is not possible to say how well agencies conformed to the code.

b) Humanitarian Principles: The Code of Conduct emphasises the fundamental principle of impartiality. But this was challenged by the nature of the international intervention in Kosovo and by the disproportionate scale of the international response compared with resources allocated to emergencies elsewhere in the world. While donor governments gave US$207 per

person through the 1999 UN appeal for Kosovo, those in Sierra Leone received US$16, and those in the Democratic Republic of Congo little over US$8. This indicates that at a global level the humanitarian system is not impartial, but selective and influenced by political factors as much as by humanitarian need. Most DEC agencies identified this as an 'uncomfortable' issue and noted how the Kosovo emergency had sometimes diverted their staff and resources from other emergencies elsewhere in the world.

Similarly, the withdrawal of humanitarian agencies from Kosovo and the massive support given to Kosovo Albanians as refugees and returnees, gave the impression of a selective and biased response by the international community within the region. In line with this trend, the largest proportion of DEC assistance in Phase I went to support refugees in Albania and Macedonia and in Phase II to relief and rehabilitation in Kosovo. However, several DEC agencies did increase their assistance outside Kosovo, particularly to Serbia, after the end of NATO bombing.

The last decade has seen increasing military involvement in humanitarian activities. Kosovo was the extreme. For NATO and donor governments humanitarian and political objectives were blurred, not least in the assertion by NATO governments that they were waging a '*humanitarian war'*. In the words of the British Secretary of State for International Development: '*our humanitarian and military objectives are completely intertwined'*. This was most apparent in the bilateralisation of aid provision, and in NATO's support for and participation in humanitarian activities. For example, refugee camps were funded by donors, constructed by military contingents and managed by NGOs of the same nationality. The institutionalisation of military and humanitarian collaboration was apparent in the employment of military liaison officers by some agencies, and the secondment of humanitarian advisers to the military. Military participation in humanitarian activities in terms of logistical support is now common and, of itself, is not a bad thing. The key issue for humanitarian agencies in deciding if and how to work with the military in the Kosovo crisis, was that NATO was a party to the war, and that their military action increased the incidence of humanitarian need.

In contrast to NATO leaders, the UN Secretary-General noted the importance of respecting the distinction between humanitarian and military activities, stating '*if these lines are blurred, there is a grave risk of irreparable damage to the principle of impartiality and humanitarian assistance'*. The DEC attempted to define an appropriate division of labour between the military and aid agencies in its written submission to the House of Commons International Development Committee. That distinction was harder to maintain in practice. Most DEC agencies collaborated with NATO forces in implementing their programmes, taking advantage of their logistics or security to deliver assistance. Some implemented projects jointly with the military. Although several DEC agency staff expressed unease about too close an association, pragmatism ruled, probably to a greater extent than in many other emergencies where maintaining neutrality may be essential for sustaining humanitarian access and securing donor funding. Only two DEC agencies had established policies to guide staff on working with the military in Kosovo.

That neutrality was compromised was apparent to DEC agency staff in Serbia who felt threatened seeing their organisations on CNN in the Albanian or Macedonian camps, when civilians in Serbia were also suffering.

The DEC

This appeal demonstrates the success of the DEC as a fund-raising mechanism, raising record amounts for the Kosovo Crisis. One of the most positive features of DEC Appeal funds is the flexibility of their application. Thus, funding gaps could be filled, and DEC money could be spent in Serbia where it was difficult to raise donor funds. In this sense DEC money was politically 'neutral'. DEC funds also enabled some agencies to get up and running while raising money from donors.

Weaknesses that appeared during this very large appeal included the lack of forecasting of appeal income and therefore uncertainty about how much money would be available to the agencies. Some agencies found that this, together with a complicated phasing system, made planning difficult. The evaluation team also noted the limited capacity of the DEC secretariat, for example, to monitor agency reporting or to share information.

The DEC is a collective mechanism for raising public funds to meet 'acute human suffering', and DEC agencies are expected to spend appeal funds within six-months of their receipt, or return money to the pool for redistribution. In the case of the Kosovo appeal, however, substantial amounts of DEC expenditure have been committed to rehabilitation activities. With such large sums of funds available, agencies found the six-month rule restrictive, constraining community participation and preventing slower implementation through local partners where capacity was an issue.

The decision of the Executive Committee of the DEC to a phasing of expenditure was welcomed by the agencies as an *ad hoc* way of dealing with the scale of the appeal income, but was complicated because phases overlapped. In practice, however, it has meant expenditure has stretched over a period of 18 months. As generous donor funding in the early stages is now drying up, it would be unfortunate if the DEC rules encourage a similar short-termism as needs continue. Currently the DEC approach does little to broaden understanding of crises within the media and general public, and does little to counteract a view that these are one-off events in which the problems will be solved quickly by money.

The DEC planning and reporting system comprises a 48-hour plan of action, a four-week plan of action and then financial and narrative reports to be completed one month after the end of the six-month period. The evaluation team found a number of difficulties with this structure. For example, the four-week plan of action is intended to provide the baseline information for the evaluation. But agencies often made substantial changes to their DEC expenditure plans later, in response to changing circumstances in the field and/or to changing fundraising needs. This may sometimes be unavoidable, for example, in the case of the sudden and unexpectedly rapid return of refugees to Kosovo. But there is currently no standardisation of procedure about informing the DEC secretariat of changes of plan. Final reports submitted by agencies were of varying quality and did not always follow the DEC format, making it difficult to aggregate how DEC funds had been spent both geographically and sectorally.

The experience of this evaluation indicates that all the three functions — audit, control and lesson learning — do not sit well together. For example, the scale and range of the DEC-funded programmes in a major appeal can be huge. It is not possible to carry out effective evaluations of those programmes, unless the agency itself has its own well-established monitoring and evaluation system in place. In this evaluation, the work of the team was facilitated when the agency had carried out its own evaluation. But this was not the case for

all DEC agencies and monitoring and evaluation systems were often weak. The DEC evaluation cannot achieve sufficient detail to be a substitute for individual agency evaluations, and an external evaluation can be a weak vehicle for promoting institutional learning and for monitoring compliance within the DEC system.

For a full list of recommendations refer to Chapter 13.

Maps

Regional Map of the Balkans



Map of Kosovo



1. INTRODUCTION


1.1 Background

On 24 March 1999, NATO forces launched air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), after the Belgrade government refused to accept the terms of the Rambouillet peace agreement on the governance of the province of Kosovo. The war between NATO and FRY, following years of political repression, violence and forced displacement in Kosovo, precipitated a major humanitarian emergency, involving the largest and fastest movement of people in Europe since World War II. The international response that was launched mobilised political, military and humanitarian assets on an unprecedented scale.

The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) launched its Kosovo appeal on 6 April 1999. It proved to be the largest and most successful appeal in the DEC's history, raising over £53.8 million. Figure 1 shows the scale of the appeal in relation to those for previous emergencies.

Figure 1: Millions of pounds raised by DEC appeals

Adjusted for Inflation to April 1999 pounds



Twelve DEC member agencies participated in the appeal: the British Red Cross Society (BRCS), CAFOD, CARE International UK, Children's Aid Direct (CAD), Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Help the Aged/HelpAge International (HAI), Merlin, Oxfam GB, Save the Children (SC), Tearfund and World Vision UK.[1]

DEC rules require an independent evaluation of the expenditure of appeal funds to be initiated in the eighth month following an appeal launch. '*The key purpose of the evaluation*

[1] ActionAid, Christian Children's Fund and Médecins Sans Frontières did not participate in the appeal. MSF has since left the DEC.

is to provide an independent assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the DEC agencies' response to the Kosovo crisis'.[2]

The evaluation is intended to:

Provide a mechanism for DEC transparency and accountability to fundraising partners and the British public.
Enable DEC agencies to extend individual and collective learning on good practice in response to humanitarian emergencies.
Provide an internal monitoring mechanism for the DEC to ensure that agencies have performed in accordance with DEC rules and guidelines.

1.2 Methodology

Because of the size of the British public's response to the DEC appeal, expenditure was spread over four phases.[3] This evaluation covers Phases I and II of the DEC Kosovo Appeal expenditure, the period from 6 April 1999 to 31 January 2000 covering the spending of approximately £37 million. The work of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) evaluation team[4] took place between January and July 2000, with the main field work taking place in March and April 2000.[5]

Evaluation approach
The multiple objectives of accountability, quality control and lesson learning were considered in designing the evaluation. In addition, the approach emphasised:

Involving the DEC agencies and keeping them well informed by means of workshops and preparatory visits to their headquarters and field offices.
Obtaining the views of beneficiaries and war-affected populations by assigning two team members almost full time to this aspect of the fieldwork, with support from other team members.
Adopting a regional approach, visiting all the countries and territories affected by the emergency where DEC funds were spent, in order to develop a comprehensive overview of the humanitarian needs and responses.

The main report, Volume I, generally follows the structure of the Terms of Reference (ToR). The team has given additional emphasis to a number of areas that were thought to be relevant and important, including protection (Chapter 6), advocacy (Chapter 10) and the functioning of the DEC system (Chapter 12). Some attention has also been given to human resource issues in Chapters 3, 6 and 11.

---

[2] DEC Terms of Reference for the Kosovo Appeal Evaluation (refer to Appendix 1).

[3] Phase I, 6 April-4 October 1999; Phase II, 1August 1999–31 January 2000; Phase Iib, 1 August 1999–30 March 2000; Phase III, 1 January 2000–31 June 2000. A Phase IV is expected to cover the expenditure of any final funds remaining in the appeal.

[4] In association with Valid International. For a full list of team members refer to Appendix 2.

[5] Details of the evaluation team's timetable and informants interviewed can be found in Appendices 3 and 4.

The definitions of terms such as coherence and connectedness used in the ToR and the chapter headings follow the generally recognised definitions in the Relief and Rehabilitation Network Good Practice Review, Number 7 (Hallam, 1998) and the guiding questions in the ToR.

Information sources

The evaluation team drew on many sources of information, enabling it to cross-check data and clarify any contradictory information. The team endeavoured to discuss and check findings with DEC agency staff as the evaluation progressed.

Agency and key informant interviews: the evaluation team conducted over 420 interviews. In addition to the DEC agencies, over 30 partner organisations and 11 government departments were interviewed. Over 30 interviews were conducted with multilateral agencies, donors and INGOs. The interviews were semi-structured, guided by a standard check-list of questions based on the criteria and themes outlined in the evaluation ToR (refer to Appendix 1). Sectoral check-lists were also used and a questionnaire on cost-effectiveness issues was sent to each agency. Following the fieldwork, additional time was spent identifying further documents which were required, cross-checking facts and clarifying financial reports. Agency feedback on the draft report was an integral part of the evaluation as an opportunity to clarify data and to fill gaps.

Interviews with beneficiaries and affected populations: over 100 interviews were conducted with people directly and indirectly affected by the crisis (refer to the Section 7 in Volume II). This included 15 interviews with Albanian and Macedonian families who hosted refugees, 12 interviews with refugee/IDP families and 77 interviews with people who had received assistance provided by DEC agencies in Kosovo. Interviews were conducted with individuals, families or in groups. For practical reasons, the interviewees were mostly identified by the DEC agencies or their partners.

Documentation:[6] key DEC-related documents that were consulted by the evaluation team included the agencies' 48-hour and four-week plans of action, final reports, internal reviews, monitoring reports and end-of-contract reports written by key staff. Due to the DEC reporting line of the end of February 2000, the evaluation team did not see Phase II reports until well into the fieldwork, and in some cases not until after the fieldwork had been completed. The evaluation team also placed a particular emphasis on studying the findings of other evaluations such as the UNHCR and Red Cross Movement evaluations (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000; Suhrke et al., 2000).

Observation: emphasis was placed on visiting projects in the field, for purposes of verification and appraisal. A cross-section of DEC-funded projects were visited, so that at least one project by each agency was covered. The time spent with different agencies and in each country was guided by the amounts of DEC money spent and committed.

[6] The evaluation database includes over 2,500 documents, including those inherited from the DEC Lesson Learning report.

Meetings and workshops with DEC agencies: prior to the fieldwork, meetings were held at DEC agency headquarters.[7] Joint meetings were then held with DEC agencies during the preparatory visit and fieldwork in each country, to clarify the purpose of the evaluation and to finalise logistical arrangements. These meetings provided opportunities for agency staff to identify issues which they thought the team should take into account.[8] Four workshops with DEC agency staff were also held:

Workshop 1: held in London prior to the fieldwork, to update DEC agency staff on the progress of the evaluation and to feedback and discuss issues which had come up during headquarters visits and the preparatory visit to the field.
Workshop 2: held in Pristina at the end of the fieldwork, to review the strengths and weaknesses of the emergency response and issues arising from the fieldwork with DEC agency staff.
Workshop 3: held in London after the fieldwork, to present the draft report to DEC agency staff.
Workshop 4: held in London with senior DEC agency staff and DEC Secretariat staff to discuss feedback from the agencies on the draft report and key issues arising.

Peer reviewers: a peer review team of regional and humanitarian experts briefed the evaluation team on regional and thematic issues at a workshop prior to the fieldwork. A second workshop was held after the fieldwork for discussion and comments on the draft report.

1.3 Limits to the Evaluation

There were, inevitably, some limits and constraints to the evaluation team's work:

- The large scope of the evaluation (12 agencies, £37 million, six countries and territories, 10 months of operation in very varied contexts involving many different sectors) meant compromises in terms of depth of investigation. The team was particularly aware that less time was available for fieldwork in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia, although this partly reflected the balance of allocation of DEC funds.
- The scale of the response tested the DEC and agency systems to the limits. This resulted in, among other factors, expenditure reports of very variable quality, with some only being received towards the end of the evaluation period.
- The refugee emergency (March to June 1999) was long since over by the time of the evaluation, making it difficult to obtain the views of beneficiaries linked to the work of any particular agency. Unfortunately the earlier DEC Lessons Learning Study (Hallam, 1999) had only been able to interview a few refugees before they returned to Kosovo.
- A high turnover of international agency staff, particularly in the field, made it difficult to interview key informants with first-hand experience.
- The focus of the evaluation was on the use of DEC funds. In many cases, however, DEC funds contributed to larger programmes using money from other sources. The evaluation

[7] Time limitations for these preparatory visits meant that three initial HQ meetings were by telephone and the preparatory field visit was to Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia only.

[8] Time constraints meant that these meetings were not held in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia.

team therefore looked at those larger programmes, sometimes drawing on the findings of other evaluations. As is common in such situations, it was often not possible to identify the final end use of DEC monies.

- The focus on the utilisation of DEC monies means that this evaluation does not give a full picture of all of the work of the DEC member agencies during the Kosovo emergency.
- The practices of member agencies in informing the DEC Secretariat of the changes in programme plans varied considerably. In several cases it remained unclear to the evaluators exactly which programmes were covered by DEC expenditure and intensifying the difficulties of focusing the evaluation study.
- Within the constraints of readability, it is not always possible to fully differentiate between agencies when findings are described in Volume I. The evaluation team was aware of the many differences between the 12 participating DEC member agencies, in particular their sizes, which again raises the difficulties of making collective assessments. Volumes II and III of this report provide the opportunity for more detailed and differentiated information on each of the agencies.

Some factors were less problematic for the team than expected, most notably the weather conditions, security, possible disruption caused by the first anniversary of the start of NATO bombing and the obtaining of visas for Serbia. In addition, logistic arrangements were generally smooth due to the great efforts of the ODI Administrator and host agency staff in the region.

Further discussion on the role of this DEC evaluation can be found in Chapter 12 on the DEC.

1.4 This Evaluation in Context

A significant number of other major evaluations have been undertaken following the 1999 Kosovo/Balkans emergency (refer to Appendix 9). This undoubtedly reflects the scale, the profile, the political interest and significance of this particular emergency. It may also reflect agencies' response to increasing pressure for public accountability.

This DEC evaluation may differ somewhat from some of the earlier evaluations:

- It has an INGO focus.
- It has multi-agency coverage.
- It has a broader time frame and geographical scope than many earlier evaluations which have tended to concentrate mainly on the refugee exodus into Albania and Macedonia and not looked at other countries and territories of the region, nor at the start of rehabilitation work in Kosovo itself.
- It has a broad sectoral scope, including areas such as psychosocial work. It also includes a focus on beneficiaries in contrast to a number of the major evaluations that have tended to concentrate on institutional issues.

1.5 About the Report

Volume I of the report stands alone and contains the full findings and conclusions of the evaluation. The Executive Summary in Volume I is designed to be read alone and gives a substantial overall summary of the evaluation's findings and conclusions. Volume II contains appendices on sectoral issues and on beneficiaries. Volume III contains a summary of each DEC agency's activities and comments on performance.

The size and structuring of the report is a reflection of the multiple objectives of the evaluation as described in Chapter 1 (section 1) above and discussed in Chapter 12 (section 9), as well as the scale and complexity of the Kosovo emergency and the DEC member agencies' work.

Recommendations can be found at the end of each chapter and these are brought together in Chapter 13.

Place names and maps used in this report do not imply any political judgements or statements. Generally, place names used have followed common usage by the agencies (for example, Kosovo instead of Kosova). Macedonia is used for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Serbia is used to denote that part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia excluding the Republic of Montenegro and the province of Kosovo; Bosnia is used to denote Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. CONTEXT OF THE KOSOVO EMERGENCY

2.1 Events Leading to the Emergency

The Kosovo emergency occurred at the end of a decade of humanitarian crises in the Balkans, arising from the wars of secession from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the impact of the debt crisis in the 1980s and the rigours of adapting the socialist economy to the requirements of the global market (Woodward, 1995). The post-Cold War transformation of east European states from socialist economies and single-party institutions to free market economies and democratic political institutions, and the role that Western aid interventions have played in this, forms part of the context of the Kosovo emergency and the international response.

As a province of Serbia, Kosovo[9] had a significant degree of autonomy under the 1974 SFRY Constitution. When this was revoked in 1989 by the Serbian parliament, and approved by the other Yugoslav republics, protests by miners, students and other Kosovo Albanians led Belgrade to assume control over the province's police, courts, and social, economic and education polices. In July 1990, Kosovo Albanians proclaimed Kosovo's independence. A policy of non-violent resistance was adopted, with a parallel government elected in 1992 and parallel education and health systems financed through a 3 per cent tax on remittances from the Kosovo Albanian diaspora and domestic economic activity. By 1996 peaceful resistance had turned into an armed struggle. When the issue of Kosovo's status was not addressed in the November 1995 Dayton Peace negotiations to end the war in Bosnia, support for those proposing violence grew. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which first engaged in terrorist attacks on police in 1992, emerged in 1996 to lead the armed resistance and was assisted in its cause by weapons looted during civil disturbances in Albania in 1997. As late as March 1998, an American envoy for Kosovo accepted Belgrade's characterisation of the KLA as 'terrorists' and Western vacillation until September 1998 gave the impression of tacit support for Belgrade's counter-insurgency campaign.[10]

By 1998, Kosovo could no longer be ignored, as political violence and human rights abuses by the Yugoslav authorities against civilians increased the flow of asylum seekers in Europe.[11] In the spring of 1998, when action by Serbian internal security forces in western Kosovo forced 20,000 Kosovo Albanians to seek refuge in Albania, the threat to regional security drew an international response.[12] The Contact Group called for negotiations on Kosovo's autonomy and in March, the North Atlantic Council stated, '*NATO and the international community have a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo, inter alia*

[9] After 1989 called in Serbia by the province's pre-1968 name, Kosovo and Metohija (the latter referring to the 'church lands' of the western part).

[10] US Special Envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, quoted in Pristina in February 1998 (Chomsky, 1999).

[11] Between 1990 and 1995, 350,000 Kosovo Albanians sought asylum in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and other European countries — almost half the total that fled in 1999 (ICG, 1998). In 1996, when Germany signed an agreement with Yugoslavia to repatriate Kosovars, it had been asked by the Council of Europe to grant them 'temporary protection'.

[12] Between 1997 and 1998 the number of asylum seekers in Europe from FRY increased by 200 per cent, most from Kosovo (Suhrke et al, 2000).

because of their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern to the Alliance' (ICG, 1998).

Western European governments' concern about asylum seekers was apparent during the 1999 refugee crisis when Italy, for example, asked UNHCR to establish a '*first line of defence*' and spoke of '*humanitarian containment'* (Suhrke et al, 2000).

Failure to resolve the conflict through dialogue drew NATO increasingly along a path of military confrontation. As early as June 1998, NATO Defence Ministers threatened air strikes in support of US diplomatic efforts. In October, NATO tasked planners to draw up military options to secure Belgrade's compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199. Adopted in September 1998, this had demanded a cease-fire, dialogue and an international presence to monitor the withdrawal of security forces to their pre-March 1998 levels. When agreement was secured on the establishment of an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), a 2,300-strong international 'extraction force' for the KVM was also deployed in Macedonia. The declared purpose of the OSCE-KVM was to monitor and mitigate violations of human rights while a political process was renewed (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999).

A massacre of civilians in Racak in January 1999, deteriorating security and a contraction of humanitarian access provoked renewed threats of NATO air strikes. In February, shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade and Pristina was replaced by direct negotiations, under joint US and EU auspices, between FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership at Rambouillet in France. The first round of talks was over an agreement drawn up by American negotiators on substantial autonomy for the province for three years; the disarming of the KLA; the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces; and the presence of a 30,000 strong NATO-led 'enabling force' to maintain the cease-fire. A second round of talks in March collapsed when Yugoslav delegates refused to sign the agreement. Interpretations for the failure differ, but revolve around the Military Annex of the agreement covering conditions for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the presence of a NATO-led peace implementation force with substantial freedom of movement throughout FRY. Some have argued that the terms of the agreement were designed to be unacceptable to the Belgrade leadership (Pugh, 2000). The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee concluded that, '*NATO was guilty of a serious blunder in allowing a Status of Forces Agreement into the (Rambouillet) package which would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav side, since it was a significant infringement of sovereignty*' (House of Commons, 2000).

On 24 March 1999, after an ultimatum from US envoy Richard Holbrooke to Slobodan Milosevic failed to persuade Belgrade to reduce its forces in Kosovo to the pre-March 1998 levels and accept the Rambouillet agreement, NATO began air strikes against FRY. The military campaign, known as Operation Allied Force, lasted for 78 days. it was suspended on 10 June when the Yugoslav army and internal security units began withdrawing from Kosovo. This followed the June 9 Kumanovo Agreement (the Military Technical Agreement) between military officers from NATO and Yugoslavia military officers by which Yugoslavia accepted various 'principles' to resolve the crisis, including a '*substantial NATO participation'* in an international security force in Kosovo '*under UN auspices'*.[13] Once the

[13] The agreement differs from that of Rambouillet by requiring the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces form Kosovo but limiting NATO's freedom of movement in Yugoslavia and placing Kosovo temporarily under UN administration.

air strikes stopped, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 authorising the establishment of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).[14] The NATO peace implementation force — Kosovo Force (KFOR) — entered Kosovo from Macedonia on 12 June.

The legality of NATO's action against Yugoslavia has been subject to intense debate. War was never declared and a peace agreement was never signed, only the Military Technical Agreement. Some argue that the intervention was necessary to protect people's rights (Ignatieff, 2000). Others assert that NATO's unilateral action, conducted without UN Security Council Authorisation effectively undermined the UN Charter and other international statutes and legal frameworks (Coates, 2000).

2.2 The Humanitarian Crisis

Although NATO air strikes were intended to end the violence in Kosovo, the immediate effect was the opposite. Yugoslavia expelled Kosovo Albanians *en masse* from the province. The extent to which air strikes precipitated mass displacement or whether 'ethnic cleansing' was pre-planned is disputed.[15] In response to the massive forced displacement, however, NATO's action was redefined by Alliance countries as 'humanitarian war' to end repression and the mass violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and to reverse the expulsions.

Population displacement

Over one million people were driven from their homes during the war. There were at least three large-scale movements of population, engendering different humanitarian needs and responses:

- The flight of Kosovo Albanian refugees, mainly to Albanian and Macedonia.
- The return of Kosovo Albanian refugees to Kosovo.
- The flight from and displacement within Kosovo of, mainly, Kosovo Serbs, former Krajina Serbs, Roma, Gorans and other non-Albanian minorities.

At the start of NATO's military campaign UNHCR estimated that there were up to 260,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kosovo and several thousand refugees in Albania and Macedonia. Following the commencement of the air bombardment, over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians sought refuge in neighbouring countries (refer to Table 1). Since NATO entered Kosovo in June 1999, over 200,000 people, mainly Serbs, Krajina Serbs and Roma have left the province, most to Serbia and Montenegro. Several thousand Albanians from southern Serbia have also sought refuge in Kosovo and Macedonia.

[14] This consists of four 'pillars': the UN-led interim administration UNHCR-led humanitarian affairs, EU-led reconstruction and OSCE-led institution building.

[15] The organised expulsion of Kosovo Albanian civilians from Kosovo suggests that the so-called 'Operation Horseshoe' by the Yugoslavian army and paramilitary forces was planned in advance of the NATO bombings. The expulsions, aimed at defeating the KLA and keeping NATO occupied, made tactical military sense.

Table 1: Estimated numbers of refugees as a result of the Kosovo crisis


Location	Origin	Estimates: June 1999	Estimates: March 2000
Albania	Kosovo	444,200	-
Bosnia	Kosovo	21,000	-
	Sandzak*	22,000	-
	FRY**	800	-
Republika Srpska	FRY**	30,100	-
Macedonia	Kosovo	247,200	-
Montenegro	Kosovo	69,700	30,000
Serbia	Kosovo	-	199,600
Humanitarian Evacuation Programme	Kosovo	79,979	-

Source: UNHCR statistics

*Muslims seeking protection from NATO bombing campaign and general tension in the Sandzak area of Serbia.

**FRY Serbs, refugees from Croatia and returnees to Bosnia. This category includes refugees who fled as a result of Kosovo plus 'old' refugees/IDPs.

Figure 2: Refugee and IDP flows



A defining feature of the Kosovo emergency was the rapid movement of populations during and after NATO's bombardment. As illustrated in Figure 2, within the first two weeks of NATO air strikes alone, some 250,000 people entered Albania with, at one time, 4,000 crossing the border each hour (Suhrke et al, 2000). Within a month of KFOR entering Kosovo, 650,000 refugees had returned. The need to protect remaining household assets, to

harvest crops and to reconstruct properties before winter, and a deterioration in camp security were incentives for this rapid return (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000).

The majority of the Kosovo Albanian refugees went to Albania and Macedonia and became the focus of international humanitarian efforts. A smaller number went to Montenegro and Bosnia, including families fleeing the bombing of Serbia. In Albania and Macedonia, some 60 per cent of refugees were accommodated with host families and relatives, with the remainder staying in camps and collective centres serviced by host governments and the international community. In Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia most refugees and displaced stayed with private families or in collective centres.

These countries which bore the brunt of the Kosovo crisis are among the poorest in Europe.[16] The impact of the crisis and the capacity and readiness of these countries to assist varied, depending upon their political stance, their ethnic composition, the presence of refugees from other conflicts and the prevailing socio-economic situation.

Albania provided refuge for the largest number of refugees, many of whom initially came from western and central Kosovo, the most heavily contested areas and from where the KLA drew most support. In Albania, which had been hosting Kosovo refugees since 1998, they were welcomed by the population and a government that in 1991 had recognised Kosovo as an independent entity and had supported the liberation struggle. Albania did not commit forces in the war, but it supported NATO by making military bases available to them and facilitating their involvement in humanitarian activities.[17]

Macedonia, which took in the second-largest number of Kosovo Albanian refugees, was a reluctant host. Concerned at the impact that the Kosovo Albanian refugees would have on the country's ethnic balance, and on trade and diplomatic relations with Serbia, the government closed its border with Kosovo. For a week, 40,000 refugees were stranded at the border without shelter. A combination of diplomatic pressure, financial assistance, the deployment of NATO troops to construct refugee camps and an offer by Alliance countries to share the burden of refugees by arranging evacuations to third countries eventually secured government cooperation. Some 80,000 refugees were transferred to 28 other countries through the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme, and a smaller number through the Regional Transfer Programme. Burden sharing was controversial, potentially undermining the principle of first asylum. However, UNHCR's evaluation concludes that it '*generally enhanced protection'* by enabling more refugees to enter (Suhrke et al, 2000). In August when the numbers of Kosovo Albanian refugees had declined to 20,000, new refugees arrived — Roma and Serbs from Kosovo and Albanians from Preshevo valley (over the eastern border of Kosovo in Serbia proper).[18]

Between 1998 and 1999, Montenegro had provided refuge for 30,000 displaced Kosovo Albanians and took in a further 85,000 IDPs during the bombings. Mostly Kosovo Albanians, they were settled in municipalities near the Albanian border. Although Montenegro did not

[16] Albania, the poorest, is ranked 105 and Macedonia ranked 80 on the Human Development Index.

[17] The Albanian army did fight off a Serb incursion into Albania in May with NATO support.

[18] Macedonia also has a small refugee caseload from Bosnia.

take sides, it was hit on several occasions by NATO air strikes, including Podgorica airport.[19] Only three expatriates stayed in Montenegro during the bombing campaign leaving offices to be run by local staff.[20] As the Kosovo Albanians returned to Kosovo in June, Serbs, Montenegrins and Roma from Kosovo started to arrive.

At the time of the Kosovo crisis, Bosnia was still recovering from three and a half years of crippling war that had left a large refugee and IDP caseload. Prior to March 1999, there were reportedly some 13,000 refugees from Kosovo in Bosnia. The division of Bosnia into two entities – the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska – determined where Kosovo refugees went. Kosovo Albanian refugees stayed in the Federation. Serbs fleeing the bombing in Serbia and from Kosovo after June 1999 went to the Republika Srpska, where the NATO bombings sparked demonstrations in Banja Luka, and where only seven humanitarian agencies reportedly kept their offices open.[21] Up to 90 per cent of refugees were privately accommodated with 10 per cent placed in collective centres. One motivation for going to Bosnia was the belief that it was easier to travel from there to a third country.

Prior to the war in Kosovo FRY was hosting over 600,000 refugees from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia (refer to Table 2) and IDPs, 95 per cent of whom were privately accommodated. The new IDPs from Kosovo after June were initially contained by the government within the southern half of the country, although by the autumn this unofficial policy was relaxed.

Table 2: Refugees and others of concern in FRY, 1998

Refugees	*Asylum seekers*	*Returned refugees*	*IDPs*	*Returned IDPs*	*Total population of concern*	*Total population*
502,000	6,000	1,900	225,000	110,000	844,900	

Source**:** UNHCR statistics

Civilians in Kosovo

Over one million people remained in the province during the war. Of these it is estimated that half were displaced (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999). The withdrawal of international humanitarian agencies on the eve of the bombing meant there were no international witnesses to the conditions of these people. The OSCE report 'As Seen, As Told' probably provides the most detailed description of violations of humanitarian and human rights law in Kosovo during this period (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999). As the Red Cross acknowledged, '*the absence of any international humanitarian agencies drew a veil over the plight of more that one million civilians'* (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). UN Security Council Resolution 1239 (1999) which invited

[19] In total about 12 –13 people were killed. Reported in interviews with ICRC, SC and IOCC in Podgorica, March 2000.

[20] Interview with IOCC, Podgorica, March 2000.

[21] ADRA, ICRC, IRC, LWF, Oxfam, PSF, SC, UNICEF, ADRA. Interview with SC, Banja Luka, March 2000.

assistance to displaced persons in Kosovo, Montenegro and other parts of the FRY was largely unmet until after the cease-fire.

Impact of the war on Kosovo

Kosovo was the poorest territory in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and international economic sanctions on FRY, it is thought Kosovo's GDP had contracted by 50 per cent between 1990 and 1995, falling to less that US$400 per capita (lower than Albania) (The World Bank, 1999). Economic activity, centred on mining, the production of raw materials, semi-finished products and agriculture, had stagnated. In 1995, unemployment was over 35 per cent and disproportionately high among ethnic Albanians. The province was also heavily indebted. In addition to mass displacement, the war between NATO and FRY compounded the physical and economic damage that Kosovo had already suffered in the violence since 1989. An estimated 120,000 houses were damaged, 50,000 beyond repair and over 90 per cent of schools and health facilities were damaged or destroyed (OCHA, 2000).

Regional impact of the war

The suffering of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced was the most visible consequence of the war, but the crisis had had broader regional impacts.

In Albania, the arrival of over 470,000 refugees (equivalent to 14 per cent of Albania's population) threatened to upset the progress that had been made in stabilising its economy since the 1997 civil disturbances, as the government diverted considerable resources to support the refugees. The impact on individual households, where over 60 per cent of refugees were initially accommodated, was partially mitigated by the relief assistance. In Macedonia, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Romania disruptions in trade and transport, foreign investment and tourism have all had an impact on balance of payments and structural reforms affecting those countries' longer-term development aims. Macedonia claims that the crisis has cost them US$1.5 billion in lost trade and commerce.

Prior to the war, the crisis associated with the breakup of SFRY, which led to war and international sanctions, had left FRY in a state or deep economic shock. Stagnating production and hyper-inflation had eroded living standards. The war inflicted further economic damage and humanitarian stress, with over 100 per cent inflation, 40 per cent official unemployment and an estimated 500,000 social cases. Bomb damage to infrastructure and industry caused pollution, intensified unemployment and disrupted trade. Sanctions have inflicted a severe energy crisis affecting 75 per cent of households (OCHA, 2000). Fewer than ten international humanitarian agencies kept their offices open during the NATO bombing and those that did kept a low profile. Following the cease-fire and an assessment by the UN in May 1999, agencies again strengthened their presence.

In Montenegro, the election in 1997 of the pro-Western reformer, Milo Djukanovic, as president has created divisions between Montenegro and Serbia. These divisions have grown since the war. For refusing to participate in the war, Montenegro was rewarded by the West through the lifting of all but the 'outer wall' of sanctions. In March 2000, Serbia imposed a trade blockade on Montenegro.

2.3 The Humanitarian Response

The refugee crisis in the wake of NATO air strikes precipitated a huge international humanitarian response. Government aid departments, NATO military forces, UN agencies and international humanitarian agencies were mobilised to assist the refugees who poured out of Kosovo. Several features of this international response stand out.

Readiness of the humanitarian system

Years of warnings by political analysts and human rights organisations, the experience of a smaller refugee crisis in 1998 and contingency planning by UN agencies and NGOs appear to have done little to prepare the humanitarian system for the scale and speed of the refugee flows. Whether humanitarian agencies could have been better prepared is debatable. They were not privy to NATO plans. The apparent political investment in the success of Rambouillet deterred agencies from worst-case scenario planning and reluctant hosts, like Macedonia, made preparedness work politically sensitive. Nevertheless, the weight of political analysis and experience should have anticipated a crisis. Even the Commander of NATO forces, Wesley Clark, considered the consequences of NATO's action to be '*entirely predictable'* (Chomsky, 1999).

Despite a lack of readiness, the humanitarian system was able to scale up quickly to provide shelter, food and health services. In this respect, the prior presence of international agencies in Kosovo and neighbouring countries helped. This included several DEC agencies running operational programmes or working through partners (refer to Table 3). Some of the DEC agencies and their partners were among the first to assist refugees in Kukes and Blace as they arrived.

Scale of the response

The humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis was unprecedented in terms of the financial resources available and the number of agencies involved. Given the huge resources committed, the Kosovo emergency must represent one of the most expensive aid operations ever mounted on a cost-per-head basis. There were several reasons for this. Having defined the war as a '*humanitarian war'*, NATO governments were forced to address its humanitarian consequences to maintain credibility, particularly in those countries where there was public unease over the air strikes. As NATO's campaign required logistical and political cooperation with Albania and Macedonia, it was also in the Alliance's interest to alleviate the impact of refugees on those countries. Governments were not only concerned to alleviate refugee needs, but also to contain asylum seekers — one reason the Italian government built 19 refugee camps in Albania (Suhrke et al, 2000).

In addition to government departments, UN agencies and NATO forces, the humanitarian arena was crowded with NGOs. In Albania alone there were reported to be 180 international NGOs during the refugee crisis (Suhrke et al, 2000). In Macedonia there were over 60, few of whom had previous knowledge of the country (Silkin, Kieffer & de Klerk, 2000). As of 1 December 1999, two hundred and eighty-five NGOs were registered in Pristina (Guest, 2000). The international attention on Kosovo meant that agencies were under enormous pressure to spend funds, leading to problems of quality control and wastage.

European context

In general, humanitarian agencies have more experience of emergencies in developing countries (particularly sub-Saharan Africa) than in Europe, although many have worked during the Croatia and Bosnia conflicts. Some operational guidelines are more relevant to a developing country context than to a European one. For example, in a European context there is little risk of starvation or epidemics of infectious diseases; the disease epidemiology means there is less risk of infections, but a large chronic disease burden; and vulnerable groups are more likely to be the elderly and the institutionalised, rather than young children and mothers. Agencies were therefore not necessarily well prepared to deal with a European emergency on the scale of Kosovo.

Local organisations

Throughout the Kosovo crisis, governments and local charities and religious organisations played a critical role. In Albania, Macedonia and Serbia they mostly focused on assisting refugees accommodated in private housing and collective centres. Their role in refugee camps was more restricted. In Kosovo, local organisations have also played central roles in relief and rehabilitation. The Mother Teresa Society (MTS) in particular, which was a significant NGO in the Kosovo Albanian parallel health system and has activists in most communities, has been prominent, assessing needs and delivering assistance.

Coordination

The scramble of agencies for space, resources and profile demanded good coordination. UNHCR, as the designated lead agency in the Kosovo crisis, has been heavily criticised for being unprepared, under-staffed and poorly coordinated. In its defence, others have pointed to the weakening of UNHCR prior to the crisis through donor policies and lack of funding (Pugh, 2000). The involvement of donor countries and NATO forces meant that UNHCR's role in the refugee crisis was circumscribed. For example, in Albania, the Emergency Management Group (EMG) established by the government and donors to coordinate the humanitarian response, while generally acknowledged as having performed well, also served to marginalise UNHCR.[22]

Standards

Like Rwanda, the influx of multiple humanitarian agencies raised questions of standards of relief provision. The application of Sphere Standards was limited. More contentious was the greater standard and quantity of assistance provided to Kosovo Albanian refugees compared to refugee situations elsewhere in the world, raising questions over the selectivity and impartiality of the humanitarian system.

Commercialisation and humanitarianism

A number of private companies were contracted by donors for camp construction, de-mining and security services. In some cases this led to competition. For example, a major French company sought to exclude Oxfam from a water source because it was seen as a business

[22] UNHCR is considered to have performed better in Kosovo, strengthened by staff seconded from OCHA.

rival. In a context where the objectives of the World Bank are to transform Kosovo from a '*socialist to a market-oriented economy'*, the humanitarian objectives of commercial organisations are questionable (The World Bank, 1999).

Bilateralism

From the perspective of NATO governments, humanitarian and strategic military concerns were interconnected. NATO governments not only provided vast resources for the aid effort, they also took a role in directing the humanitarian response, opening offices in the region, advising on site planning, establishing refugee camps, designing intervention strategies, providing logistics and assigning their military contingents to humanitarian duties. As the UNHCR evaluation remarks, '*The refugees, in a sense, became too important to be left to UNHCR'* (Christian Aid, 1999). Different refugee camps were funded by different donors, secured by their troops and serviced by NGOs from those countries, chosen on the basis of nationality, rather than ability. While bilateralism may have increased available resources, it weakened coordination and undermined the efforts of multilateral institutions like UNHCR, and led to duplication, wastage and inefficiency.

NATO

A feature of the conflict was the involvement of the military in the humanitarian response. In Albania, a special force of NATO troops (AFOR) with a humanitarian mandate was created. In Macedonia, at UNHCR's request, NATO's forces were deployed to construct the first refugee camps. In Kosovo, KFOR provided logistical support and security for NGOs and delivered humanitarian assistance. For humanitarian agencies, the military's participation was a 'mixed blessing'. Ostensibly, the objective of the military's participation in humanitarian activities was to support the humanitarian operation. They provided useful assets, and the rapid construction of camps in Macedonia did help alleviate a crisis at the Blace border. However NATO was a warring party with an overtly political role. Agencies' collaboration with the military therefore raised difficult questions over principles of neutrality and impartiality.

Humanitarian principles

The Kosovo conflict was both an internal war and an international conflict. The Geneva conventions pertaining to internal and inter-state wars guide the actions of warring parties in war. Humanitarian agencies in war are traditionally guided by principles of non-partisanship and impartiality of the humanitarian system and of humanitarian agencies were tested.

First an array of international political, military and humanitarian assets were mobilised in response to the Kosovo crisis and, according to the UK Secretary of State for International Development, military and humanitarian objectives were '*completely intertwined'*.[23] The reliance of aid agencies on donor countries who were parties to the war raised problems of *independence*. The dilemma was apparent in UNHCR's collaboration with NATO. Cooperation with one of the warring parties, whose use of force was unauthorised by the UN

[23] Statement by the Secretary of State for International Development to the House of Commons on 26 March 1999 and 27 May 1999.

Security Council, sat uneasily with UNHCR's non-political mandate. Yet, being dependent on funding by NATO countries, it pragmatically needed to cooperate in order to save lives.

Second, the scale of the international humanitarian response to the Kosovo emergency compared to other humanitarian crises, raised questions of the *selectivity* of the humanitarian system. For example, the donor response to the UN South-eastern Europe Humanitarian Operation was described by the UN as 'exemplary', with 78 per cent of the US$929 million requirement met by donors (OCHA, 2000). This contrasts to other emergency appeals that are hard pushed to receive 50 per cent funding.

Third and linked, the initial withdrawal of humanitarian agencies from Kosovo and the massive support given to Kosovo Albanians as refugees and returnees, gave the impression of a selective and biased response from which other 'victims' of war were excluded.

Finally, the Kosovo crisis raises questions about the politicisation of the humanitarian response. In Bosnia, Western politicians were criticised for using humanitarian aid as a '*fig leaf*' or substitute for political action. In Kosovo, a dilemma for humanitarian agencies in what was described as a war of 'values',[24] was that humanitarian aid became a tool which, as some have suggested, served agendas and strategies that were not purely humanitarian (Chomsky, 1999). This politicisation has been overt in the provision of rehabilitation and development assistance. Donors to the 'Stability Pact' in March 2000 made rehabilitation funds available to Montenegro, but not to Serbia until it fulfils certain conditions — a '*sustained effort to reform their societies and economies*' (Chairman's Conclusion, 2000).

2.4 Rehabilitation in Kosovo: An Uncertain Future

When the refugees returned to Kosovo, the international community's response combined emergency relief in the form of shelter, education, health and mine clearance, with reconstruction and development strategies. A year after the refugee crisis, emergency needs have been met but reconstruction requirements remain immense. The Serb, Roma and other people who fled Kosovo have little prospect of returning home and constitute a long-term problem.

Under UN resolution 1244, UNMIK was given responsibility for overseeing the establishment of 'substantial autonomy' for Kosovo within FRY and 'provisional democratic institutions' under an interim administration, 'pending a final settlement'. The UN resolution does not define the legal status of United Nations Administered Province of Kosovo and no time limit was set on the life of the interim administration. Kosovo's future will depend on the establishment of credible governance arrangements that can meet the aspirations of all Kosovars and promote a sustainable recovery.

Elsewhere in the region there are continued rehabilitation and development needs in the countries that bore the brunt of the refugee caseload. In Albania and Macedonia, some of the international agencies that arrived with the crisis have stayed to address the longer term rehabilitation and development needs. In Serbia and Macedonia, Albanian nationalistic aspirations continue to incite instability. In Montenegro, political tensions could spark further

[24] A claim made by Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton.

population movements. The crisis in Serbia is deepening with economic sanctions stoking a predatory shadow economy, and humanitarian needs likely to increase.

2.5 Constraints and Achievements

Humanitarian agencies faced many constraints responding to the refugee crisis:

- The speed and scale of the population movements meant that agencies were always on the back foot, and the fluidity of refugee movement in the region and within countries, between locations and camps and private accommodation, created problems for registration and assessing humanitarian need.
- Different groups of refugees and IDPs — Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, Roma, Gorani, Bosniacs, Krajina Serbs in Kosovo and Albanians from Serbia — were affected at different times and in different ways by the crisis.
- The remote northern region of Albania presented logistical and security challenges.
- The problem of poor coordination (see section 2.3 above).

Despite these constraints, the huge amount of resources available meant that overall the needs of refugees and the emergency rehabilitation and winterisation needs in Kosovo were generally met. There were no epidemics and mortality was significantly lower than most emergencies. During the refugee crisis, several other factors also served to mitigate a major catastrophe:

- The good pre-crisis health and nutritional status of the refugee population.
- The fact that two-thirds of refugees were supported by local populations, and that refugees/IDPs brought assets (savings or remittances) which enabled them to pay for food and accommodation.
- The short duration of the emergency and the quick return of the refugees which meant that host families were not burdened for an extended period, and refugee camps did not exist long enough to expose supply-line and public health problems.
- The return of the refugees to Kosovo in good time before winter.
- The generally good infrastructure in the region and proximity to Western Europe meant supply lines were relatively good.
- The availability of NATO logistics in the early stages of the crisis to construct refugee camps.
- The security ‘umbrella’ provided by NATO for aid agencies, particularly in parts of Albania and Kosovo.
- The political support for the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme that took refugees out of the region on a temporary basis.
- The strategic importance of Kosovo to NATO countries and the attention of the media and the public ensured funding for a large international response.

Given these factors and the relatively small size of Kosovo, the humanitarian operation had the opportunity to be exemplary. This report identifies many good aspects of the work of the 12 DEC agencies that were part of the international response. It also identifies areas for learning and improvement.

2.6 Lessons from Kosovo

The unique nature of the Kosovo emergency may make it difficult to apply lessons from Kosovo elsewhere. However, many issues and trends that have challenged humanitarian agencies over the past decade re-emerged in the Kosovo emergency. These included:[25]

- The blurring of civilian and military roles: the Kosovo emergency has seen the further institutionalisation of civilian liaison officers (CIMICs) in the military, while some NGOs employed military liaison officers.
- A growing bilateralism in aid provision.
- A politicisation of humanitarian aid, with the integration of political, military and aid objectives.
- The need for improved coordination in large-scale humanitarian emergencies.
- A trend towards the integration of human rights and humanitarian action.
- A proliferation of relief agencies and calls for greater regulation and monitoring.
- The need for standardisation of assistance and improved accountability.

In particular, the Kosovo crisis raised critical issues that should continue to provoke debate among humanitarian agencies:

- How to protect rights of citizens from massive violation of their human rights by states.
- How to monitor and safeguard the universal values and independence of humanitarian action.
- How to ensure that the international humanitarian system responds proportionally to global humanitarian need.

[25] These include lessons identified by DEC agencies at a workshop in Pristina, 7 April 2000.

3. PREPAREDNESS AND INITIAL RESPONSE

The Kosovo emergency was characterised by large and rapid population movements.[26] This section examines the preparedness of the DEC agencies for the Kosovo emergency and their initial response to the refugee crisis.

3.1 Context

The Kosovo emergency was a long time in the making. Kosovo's political crisis pre-dates the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. As the historian Malcolm has noted, '*the Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo and it will end in Kosovo'* (Malcolm, 1998). Throughout the 1990s human rights organisations monitoring Kosovo provided warnings of a refugee crisis and as early as 1995 UNHCR and WFP drew up contingency plans in Albania and Macedonia for such an eventuality (International Development Committee, 1999). From 1996, as the KLA became more active, political analysts reported on Kosovo's increasing threat to regional security (ICG, 1998). The first mass flight of people from Kosovo occurred in the spring of 1998, when over 12,000 Kosovo Albanians fled to Tropoje and Bajram Cuuri in northern Albania. During 1998 and early 1999, as security deteriorated and NATO threatened air strikes against Serbia, international agencies, including some DEC ones, withdrew twice from Kosovo.

Although the weight of analysis pointed to a deepening of the crisis threatening regional security, donors and international relief agencies did not anticipate that NATO would carry out the threat of air strikes. To have done so would have indicated a lack of confidence in the Rambouillet talks. Neither did they predict that Serbia would respond by expelling civilians *en masse*, as most people displaced by the war up to that point had remained within Kosovo. There were also political constraints to undertaking preparedness and contingency planning in Macedonia, where the government restricted the registration of agencies, concerned that the presence of INGOs would attract refugees and that they would only help Albanians. As long as they maintained a policy against establishing camps, UNHCR was reluctant to prepare for a refugee crisis. [27]

Nevertheless, governments of countries directly affected did warn about refugee outflows (Barutciski, 2000). Several humanitarian agencies in the region, such as El Hilal in Macedonia and the Association of Albanians in Sarajevo,[28] also predicted the crisis and were prepared for the refugee exodus. Their preparedness plans, based on supporting host families, reflected lessons learnt from previous experience of population displacements in the region. Furthermore, as the refugee crisis was not entirely unexpected by the commander of NATO (refer to Chapter 2), it appeared that the early warning and preparedness systems of donor

[26] Comparable refugee flows have occurred only twice during the past ten years, during 1994 in the Great Lakes area of Africa and during 1991 in the Kurdish-Iraqi war.

[27] Oxfam, for example, did undertake contingency planning in Macedonia, but was not supported by UNHCR who argued that if it did not an have office in Macedonia then it should not do such planning. In Albania there is still reported to be some reluctance to undertake contingency planning in anticipation of problems in Montenegro for fear it might '*stir up a fire*' (Interview with Albanian NGO forum, Tirana, March 2000).

[28] Both agencies had compiled lists of potential host families and in the case of El Hilal, had stockpiled food. These preparedness measures helped several DEC agencies access refugees with material distributions after March 1999.

governments and international relief agencies misread the situation. The International Development Committee in the House of Commons noted:

> *'We believe a very serious misjudgement was made when it was assumed that the bombing would not lead to the dramatic escalation in the displacement and expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population. Although we accept that the UK government could not have established refugee camps before NATO actions started, for fear of giving tacit encouragement to expulsion of refugees, equipment and supplies could have been stockpiled so that the refugees could have been housed more speedily once the exodus occurred. We are confident that NATO has undertaken an assessment of the reasons for its failure to predict Milosevic's response'* (House of Commons, 2000).

3.2 DEC Agencies

Overall, the DEC agencies were no better prepared in March 1999 than the rest of the international humanitarian community. Once the refugee crisis began, some were able to respond rapidly and were among the first international relief agencies to assist refugees as they came across the border. Others were still scaling up as the refugees began to return in June 1999.[29] Consequently, some materials purchased for the refugees had to be re-directed for use in Kosovo.

The evaluation team looked at three broad areas affecting the preparedness and timeliness of DEC agencies' response to the refugee crisis:

- Situational analysis, assessment and contingency planning.
- Established presence and experience in the region.
- Organisational commitment to emergency work and capacity for response.

3.3 Situational Analysis

Paucity of analysis has been a common criticism levelled at the preparedness of the humanitarian system. Over the past decade this has improved with the establishment of information networks such as IRIN, and individual humanitarian agencies have invested in improving their capacity for analysis. In the Balkans, there was a large amount of independent analysis available for agencies to draw upon. Several DEC agencies had a presence in Kosovo prior to the war and therefore had first-hand knowledge of the situation (refer to Table 3).

Concerned at the escalating violence in Kosovo and the flight of refugees to Albania 1998, several DEC agencies undertook emergency assessments and contingency planning. For example, BRCS undertook emergency assessments in the region in 1998 and early 1999 and engaged in scenario planning through the IFRC regional planning process. CARE commissioned an emergency assessment in Albania and Macedonia in July 1998. Oxfam sent emergency personnel into Kosovo to assess the situation in early 1999. In 1998, SC

[29] For example, HAI were not working until mid-May.

commissioned an emergency review in the region and in early 1999 predicted there would be mass population movement into Serbia. During the refugee exodus to Tropoje and Bajram Cuuri in May and June 1998, Tearfund supported its Albanian partner, VUSh, to provide training for their church volunteers in anticipation of future problems. Concern, who was new to the region, and HAI did not carry out any emergency assessments or contingency planning for Kosovo prior to the crisis.

Table 3: DEC agencies: presence in the region immediately prior to March 1999

Agency	Albania	Bosnia	Kosovo	Macedonia	Montenegro	Serbia
BRCS	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners
CAFOD	Through local partners	X	Through local partners	Through local partners	X	Through local partners
CARE Int'l UK	Some contact with local partners	✓	✓	X	X	✓
Children's Aid Direct	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	X
Christian Aid	Some contact with local partners	Through local partners	X	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners
Concern Worldwide	X	X	X	X	X	X
HelpAge Int'l	X	✓	X	X	X	X
Merlin	✓ (But left in late 1998)	X	X	X	X	X
Oxfam	✓	✓	✓	X (Only R&R flat and bank account)	X (Office 1993-1995)	✓
SC	✓	✓	✓	X	Office since 1994	✓
Tearfund	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners	X	X (Except assessment mission in 1998)	Through local partners
World Vision	X	✓	✓	X	✓	X

Despite the assessments and contingency planning by some agencies, all the DEC agencies acknowledge that they, like the rest of the international community, were caught out by the scale and speed of the refugee exodus. Several reasons are given by the agencies for this:

- Although large-scale refugee crises had occurred before in the Balkans, notably of the Krajina Serbs in 1995, up until NATO's bombing most displacement in Kosovo had been internal. [30]
- When NATO had threatened air strikes before, Milosevic had always backed down.[31]
- There was a general acceptance that the Rambouillet talks would succeed and that preparing for an emergency was tantamount to admitting that the talks were going to fail.
- Agencies were not privy to NATO's plans, but considered it unlikely that NATO would make the decision to start a bombing campaign. If it did, the expectation was that Milosevic would capitulate within a few days.
- There was little information available that could have predicted the speed and scale of the refugee exodus from Kosovo. UNHCR worst-case planning figures had predicted only 250,000 refugees.

In hindsight these assumptions proved to be wrong. It is possible to identify two reasons for this:

First, the situational analysis undertaken by agencies: One conclusion of IFRC's Balkan evaluation was the need to improve its early warning system with an '*enhanced professional capacity in political analysis'* (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). Such analysis needs to be broad based and independent. Aid agencies working in the region were informed about Kosovo, but were taken by surprise by NATO's decision to bomb. Although in 1998 ICG reported that '*Balkan observers are watching NATO closely'* (ICG, 1998), it appears that humanitarian agencies were not.[32] This suggests a need among agencies for better analysis of the policies of Alliance governments.

The independent evaluation of UNHCR's response to the Kosovo crisis noted that '*failure to 'think outside the box' for the 'worst case' rendered the planning process irrelevant to the emergency'* (Suhrke et al, 2000).

Second, the gap between analysis and response: The early warnings and recommendations of some emergency assessments were not acted upon.[33] General recommendations to upgrade emergency response capacity in the region were unheeded by one agency.[34] As late as February 1999, Oxfam and SC appointed country managers to Serbia with little emergency

[30] UNHCR estimated 260,000 IDPs at start of the bombing and a much smaller number of Kosovo refugees in the region.

[31] Similar NATO threats only four months earlier had seen Serbia accept the deployment of the OSCE-KVM.

[32] The assessment commissioned by CARE did consider the scenario of NATO intervention.

[33] CARE did not act on the findings of the emergency assessment and contingency plan it had commissioned in July 1998 (Fennell, 1998).

[34] SC management reportedly made little response to recommendations contained within a 1998 review of emergency capacity in the Balkans.

experience and predominantly developmental backgrounds. The unwillingness of donors to fund preparedness activities also restricted agencies investing in planning for something that might not happen. The lack of funds was particularly significant for the smaller DEC agencies who did not have a well-established presence in the region.[35]

Nevertheless, there are other areas where agencies could have been better prepared due to their previous experience in the region. For example, DEC agencies should have been alerted to the fact that significant numbers of refugees would stay in private accommodation in preference to refugee camps.

3.4 Prior Presence in Region

A pre-existing presence in Kosovo and in countries that hosted refugees was important in determining the relative speed and effectiveness of DEC agencies' initial response. Eleven of the agencies had a prior presence in the region, eight had worked in Kosovo and nine in Albania prior to the emergency, either directly or through partners (refer to Table 3).[36] CAD, for example, which already had offices in Kukes and Skopje was one of the first international organisations to assist refugees at the critical Kukes and Blace crossing points.[37]

Prior partnerships with local organisations also enhanced the capacity of DEC agencies to respond throughout the region. Local NGOs and the Red Cross societies in Albania and Macedonia played a crucial role in receiving refugees before the international aid effort geared up and provided the bulk of assistance to refugees in host families. The same was true in Serbia after the cease-fire.[38] The choice of local partner was important and prior emergency experience and emergency response capacity of local partners influenced their effectiveness.[39] Agency experience clearly demonstrates that investment in building up capacity in partner agencies can pay off. Tearfund's support for its partner during the 1998 refugee crisis in Albania helped them respond to the larger crisis in 1999. The IFRC had access to extensive networks of ONSs in all the Balkan countries, many of whom had previous emergency experience. The Albanian Red Cross (ARC) had supported people during the civil disturbances in Albania in 1997, and had worked with IFRC and ICRC assisting Kosovar refugees in 1998.

The DEC's OSC was therefore correct to ask agencies about their local knowledge and capacity. However, while a presence in the region was undoubtedly important, it was not an

[35] For example, Merlin wanted to maintain a strategic presence in Albania after the end of their ECHO-funded programmes in 1998 but was unable to find sufficient funding to do so. In 2000, it is again facing the same problem.

[36] CAD were well positioned in Albania and had prepared a strategic toe-hold in Macedonia; Oxfam was strong in Albania, Serbia and Bosnia; SC in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro; CARE in Macedonia. Local staff from previous Oxfam, CAD, SC, CARE programmes in Kosovo facilitated emergency responses in Macedonia.

[37] In both countries, CAD assisted other agencies to start up operations.

[38] Christian Aid's long-term partnership with EHO in Serbia facilitated DEC-funded programmes by mid-April.

[39] A comparison between ACT/DA programmes in Albania and ACT/MCIC in Macedonia, illustrates the problems of local partners' response to emergencies. DA was inexperienced in emergencies and had a low capacity. Consequently, the expatriates from other international ACT partners overwhelmed them. MCIC, a more experienced agency, was better prepared, fared well and was more effective.

essential prerequisite. Concern, for example, who had no previous presence, demonstrated this by mounting a creditable response. Their organisational capacity for mounting an emergency response was critical in this respect.

3.5 Organisational Commitment and Capacity

Among the DEC agencies, the organisational commitment to emergency work varied. For example, at the time SC appeared to have had a weak commitment to responding to emergencies.[40] CARE had scaled down its emergency response capacity.[41] Other agencies did demonstrate an organisational commitment to emergency work, with:

- permanent emergency response teams (Christian Aid, CAFOD, Merlin, Oxfam[42] and Tearfund);
- strong emergency management capacity (Oxfam);
- pre-designed modular responses/kits (Concern, IFRC/ICRC and Oxfam); and
- central emergency stores (BRCS, CAD, Concern and Oxfam).

Previous investments made by agencies in emergency management systems, logistics and recruitment proved vital. It is recognised that the smaller DEC agencies do not have the financial resources to match the investments of larger agencies such as Oxfam in building up and sustaining emergency response capacity. [43]

Management structure

Given the speed with which the refugee crisis evolved, a robust emergency management structure, emergency procedures and effective logistic systems proved vital for the ability of agencies to scale up. Oxfam performed well: its emergency management capacity at HQ was good. In addition to logisticians and engineers, they had a large number of emergency support personnel with specialised skills in administration, management, accounting and gender. In contrast, SC did not have managers with emergency experience in either its regional (Budapest) or London HQ. In Albania and Macedonia they relied on a series of managers who were only available on very short contracts. In Albania, line management was also complicated, being the first time that SC had to implement joint International Save the

[40] In March 1999, SC's emergency unit consisted of one adviser, it had no emergency staff on standby for rapid deployment, its recruitment procedures for emergency staff were under-developed and it had no standardised emergency response modules.

[41] Prior to the emergency, CARE had run down its emergency capacity in the UK and its emergency procurement system in Europe.

[42] Oxfam's strategic decision to invest in building up its emergency response capacity was vindicated by the speed and quality of its response in the refugee phase. In the words of one aid worker in Albania, '*Oxfam set the standard'* (Interview with IFRC, Tirana, March 2000).

[43] HAI for example has invested in building up its emergency response capability in UK, but at the time of the crisis its emergency desk was still very new and delayed their response during the refugee phase.

Children Alliance projects.[44]

Standardised packages and kits

The Kosovo crisis could be dubbed the 'Crisis of the Kit'. In addition to the usual water and medical kits there were kits for most interventions: public institution hygiene packs; warm room kits; shelter kits; augmented roof kits; pre-school kits; primary school kits; primary school start-up kits; family kits; hygiene kits and baby parcels. The label 'kit' was sometimes inappropriate. In some shelter kits, for example, the various items were not packaged together and logistic difficulties meant that they were not delivered as kits.

There were two types of kits: those for beneficiary facilities such as health, water and shelter kits; and those for agencies to facilitate operations such as office kits. Agencies that had well conceived, pre-designed kits were potentially better prepared. For example, several DEC agencies responded effectively to the most pressing needs of refugees within days of their arrival using modular kits. In a large-scale refugee crisis like this one having prepared kits made sense. However, they may not be suitable for all types of emergencies and for all needs. In this emergency, having kits *per se* did not necessarily facilitate rapid implementation, nor were they always appropriate.[45]

Central emergency stores

Prior to the emergency, there was little stockpiling of relief supplies in the region. The reasons for this were the history of looting of stocks in Albania,[46] political constraints preventing stockpiling in Macedonia, and the relatively easy supply routes into the region.[47] Limited donor funding for contingency stocks was also a factor, particularly after one million ECUs worth of UNHCR/ECHO contingency stores were looted in Albania in 1997.

In the Balkans, the presence of stocks locally was less important than the ability to move material swiftly into and out of the region and to have the capacity for effective local purchasing. Established central contingency stores, reliable pipelines, prior research into regional sources with adequate quality, purchasing procedures and banking arrangements were all important. Oxfam's stores in Bicester and Concern's stores in Rotterdam were important assets for the emergency response. On a smaller scale, the CAD warehouses in Reading also had a small stock of donated goods ready for immediate dispatch as soon as the emergency started. Its fast overland pipeline of only one week to Albania allowed it to implement donated aid programmes shortly after the crisis began.

---

[44] This joint operation of five sections came about partly as the result of lessons learnt in Bosnia, where there had been several different SC offices in many of the main cities. The impression is that because of the speed and scale of the Kosovo crisis, coupled with the absence of a strong SC presence in-country, this was a particularly difficult emergency for the SC Alliance to attempt to implement this new structure.

[45] World Vision's implementation of their shelter project was held up by late arrival of the kits. The complicated nature of the MCIC food parcels delayed the start of its complementary food distribution until 19 May 1999.

[46] In 1998, the Oxfam stocks in Albania were looted and were not replaced.

[47] ICRC stores were sited in Belgrade which made them difficult to access.

Niches and credibility


Having a recognised niche and expertise in a particular sector, helped agencies to become active and effective more quickly. While not ignoring the importance of integration, a recognised expertise facilitated access to resources and enhanced coordination. Oxfam in the water sector, CARE in camp management and food/non-food distribution and CAD in food/non-food distribution are examples of agencies that were able to capitalise on their expertise and credibility. Some other DEC agencies failed to grasp their niche roles during the early phases of operations.[48]

Human resources

The availability of high-quality staff was one of the biggest factors affecting agencies' response to the emergency. Most agencies reported difficulties in recruiting experienced international staff, especially senior managers on long contracts, given the large demand for personnel. Some devoted considerable energy and imagination to addressing these constraints, making extensive use of their databases and specialist registers including RedR and IHE. Some advertised widely, including on the Internet and in trade journals, and devoted extra staff to recruitment.[49] Those agencies that were familiar with these channels were able to recruit faster. Other agencies were less effective and made inadequate efforts to recruit during the initial phase of the emergency.[50] Some agencies also had problems filling HQ-level positions and had to second staff from other desks.

RedR played a key role, supplying 95 people to different agencies during the crisis. Ten out of the 12 DEC agencies recruited staff through RedR. Many other members of RedR were recruited directly.

Figure 3: Recruitment by DEC agencies through RedR as percentage of DEC total



[48] SC did not take advantage of their pre-eminence in family tracing. In Albania it was not able to carry out an assessment for nearly a month after the beginning of the crisis. In Macedonia, SC could not place an experienced person on the ground during the first month of the crisis and CARE took on much of the tracing activities (Shearer, 1999). World Vision, often associated with camp management, got up and running in Albania too late in the day to find a camp to manage. HAI did not set up operations in Macedonia until May.

[49] Oxfam, for example, employed one person for finding and vetting staff for the Kosovo emergency, thus freeing up technical advisers from that task.

[50] For example, SC reportedly only recruited from a limited pool of people who were known to them, did not use RedR or the Internet.

BRCS used DEC funds to recruit delegates for ICRC and IFRC field operations. The quality of the delegates, several of whom were placed in senior positions, was noted by ICRC and IFRC informants.

Funding for preparedness

All DEC agencies reported that there was little funding available prior to the emergency for preparedness. For example, at the end of 1998 Merlin had wanted to maintain a strategic presence in Albania but could not get funding for this. When the emergency erupted in March 1999, valuable time and resources were wasted re-starting operations. This absence of funding for preparedness contrasts with the situation between March and July 1999, when agencies, including Merlin, had to turn down funding because they could not spend it in time. Given the speed at which events unfolded, the DEC funds arrived relatively late in comparison with other donor money. Since the emergency, agencies have again found it difficult to raise funds for preparedness work.

Preparedness during the crisis

During the bombing, several of the larger DEC agencies took measures to prepare for the possibility of an escalation in numbers of refugees in Albania from Macedonia and Montenegro. This was more difficult for the smaller agencies that lacked the resources and capacity to maintain the level of flexibility required. The DEC agencies were also taken by surprise at the spontaneous return of refugees to Kosovo. However, some preparations were made with the refugees, such as mines awareness work, and there were reports of DEC agencies working well together to provide services at way stations *en route* back to Kosovo.

In late 1999 and early 2000, most DEC agencies undertook preparedness exercises in readiness for a deterioration in the situation in Montenegro, Serbia and the south-east Kosovo/Serbia border area. This indicates some positive learning among the agencies.

3.6 Conclusions

The level of preparedness among DEC agencies for the Kosovo emergency varied greatly in terms of investment in analysis and management and logistics systems. There were several examples of good practice in the more practical aspects of preparedness, although only Oxfam adequately addressed all the important elements identified above. Others performed less well. SC, for example, given its size and history in the region, should have performed better. One staff member noted, *'As an organisation we were at least 10 days too late, and for a high quality emergency response we were several weeks too late'* (SC fax, 23 April 1999).[51] The evaluation identified the following factors that influenced the readiness of agencies:

- The incorporation of political analysis in strategic and day-to-day management decisions.
- Well-formulated contingency plans coordinated with other agencies and including, where appropriate, identification of potential refugee camp sites, relief supplies and human

[51] The team has noted that SC appear to have learnt from their problems regarding emergency preparedness and have taken many steps to address the deficiencies identified.

resources.

- Local knowledge, including contacts with local officials, access to skilled local staff and relationships with local contractors and hauliers.
- Existing relationships with local partners with emergency experience, which requires an assessment of emergency expertise of local partners in advance.

The evaluation also identified the following, which facilitated a rapid response:

- In-house emergency staff, experienced and skilled in emergencies and available for deployment at short notice. The staff should cover the agency's core technical specialisations as well as management and administrative functions.
- Efficient recruitment procedures, including access to specialised registers.
- An expertise in a particular niche sector, for which the agency has appropriate material stocks, skills as well as credibility within the wider humanitarian system.
- Central contingency stocks and appropriate logistic systems to move materials quickly and efficiently.
- Pre-designed and stockpiled kits for use by beneficiaries and support programmes.
- Experienced emergency managers.
- Material and financial resources.
- Ongoing procedures to review, maintain and upgrade these systems.

Only the largest agencies can afford to fulfil all of these criteria. Nevertheless smaller agencies should be aware of the gaps in their preparedness capacity and identify how these can best be addressed at short notice.

3.7 Recommendations

(i) In complex political emergencies, effective preparedness and response plans depend on access to informed political analysis. Experience from the Kosovo crisis indicates that DEC agencies need to give more thought to how available independent political analysis can be used to inform decision-making. The DEC secretariat can play an important role, by facilitating information sharing and contingency planning among its member agencies.

(ii) The report identifies a number of factors that contribute to strong preparedness capacity, such as in-house emergency staff available at short notice, well-defined expertise in a particular sector, efficient recruitment procedures and good logistics systems. An established presence within the region and existing relationships with local partners were also important elements affecting an agency's preparedness and timely response. Each DEC agency should review its performance in the Kosovo crisis against the factors identified in this evaluation, and take steps to strengthen its preparedness capacity. Smaller agencies, which cannot afford a stand-by emergency capacity, need to have procedures for accessing resources, of all kinds, at short notice.

(iii) RedR plays an important role in supporting almost all DEC agencies, through training and especially through its specialist register of emergency personnel. The DEC should

explore with its members and with RedR how to support RedR's training programmes for future emergencies.

4. APPROPRIATENESS

This chapter looks at whether the actions undertaken by the DEC agencies were appropriate to the needs of the affected populations and to the operational context. The issue of protection is dealt with in Chapter 6.

4.1 Context

The agencies worked in very varying contexts. As defined in Chapter 2, there were at least three identifiable emergencies within the overall Balkans crisis:

- The flight of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo, mainly into Albania and Macedonia.
- The return of Kosovo Albanian refugees to Kosovo.
- The flight from and displacement within Kosovo of, mainly, Kosovo Serbs, former Krajina Serbs, Roma, Gorans and other non-Albanian minorities from Kosovo.

Within each of these phases there were very differing situations for affected populations, depending on whether they were in refugee camps, collective centres or private accommodation and, for returnees, whether they had homes to return to.

4.2 Needs Assessments

There appears to have been little emphasis put on needs assessments within the overall humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis.[52] While the lack of such assessments might have been acceptable in the first few days of the emergency, Sphere Standards (The Sphere Project, 2000) stress the need for assessment and analysis. It is widely accepted as good practice and an important part of planning and implementing the humanitarian response.

There are several reasons for the lack of attention to assessment:

Pressure to spend money within a short time frame and the ready availability of funding detracted from the assessment, targeting and monitoring of the humanitarian intervention as a whole.[53] In many emergency situations, resources are scarce and agencies have no option but to make assessments in order to target those resources.

The absence of registration and the limited information available on the refugee populations in Albania and Macedonia detracted from agency ability to tailor programmes according to need. The lack of data by gender and age was noted (Williams, 2000).

There was a general absence of information or discussion about the importance of remittances to the Kosovo Albanian population.

- In Serbia, assessment of the IDP population was hampered by the sensitive position of humanitarian agencies whose activities could have been interpreted as spying or

[52] The IFRC and ARC conducted no assessments and response was based upon numbers (IFRC interview, March 2000).

[53] '*Everyone was saying "Spend, Spend, Spend"…'* (Oxfam interview, March 2000).

intelligence gathering.[54] In addition, transport was hampered by lack of fuel, damaged roads, floods and commandeered vehicles.

The performance of the DEC agencies in relation to assessment has been varied. There were some examples of good practice in assessment by DEC agencies. CAD used Knowledge, Attitude, Practice (KAP) techniques in Macedonia and Kosovo, as did Tearfund in Kukes. Oxfam undertook some gender-specific assessments looking at the needs of refugee women in camps (Oxfam, 1999a). In some cases, assessments made by local partners with limited experience of such work were of limited value.

In some cases DEC agencies resisted the pressure to get involved without proper assessments. Merlin resisted UNHCR money to implement a programme for exceptionally vulnerable individuals, and instead carried out its own nation-wide assessment and found relatively little indication of need. SC performed a general health assessment in Albania in April 1999 that concluded there were no health needs that it could reasonably meet.

4.3 Consultation with Beneficiaries

Those beneficiaries of DEC assistance interviewed by the evaluation team reflected a diversity of experience and situation. It was not apparent, however, that a priority was given to beneficiary consultation and that the diversities were taken into account in programme design. Generally, material distributions were standard 'kits' or 'parcels'. While this was appropriate for a rapid response at the earliest stage of the refugee emergency, little attention was given to whether needs varied between refugee groups.

In the refugee camps there appears to have been consultation through camp structures, refugee committees, and specific interventions such as Oxfam-supported 'tea tents' and CARE-supported Mother Child Centres. In Macedonia, SC report that it used 'focus group' discussions in camps to involve women in programme design. Consultation with refugees outside the camps is less evident during the refugee crisis, although World Vision had a refugee forum for the refugees it was assisting in Sarande, Albania. In Serbia the political situation restricted agencies' freedom to consult with IDPs.

4.4 Appropriateness of Assistance

Details of agency activities are provided in Volume III. It is not possible to provide a useful summary of activities by sector because of the lack of reporting consistency between agencies.

The general lack of assessments, combined with the high levels of assistance, makes it difficult to judge the appropriateness of the aid delivered by the agencies. Needs were sometimes assumed rather than real.

In addition, measuring appropriateness and impact from beneficiary feedback can be problematic (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). Beneficiaries may report that they liked the

[54] It was possible to minimise this distrust by building relationships with local structures such as the Red Cross, Commissariat for Refugees and Centres for Social Welfare.

aid but did they really need it?[55]

DEC agencies usually delivered appropriate assistance when they focused on sectors where they had expertise, or coordinated closely with other actors and filled gaps.[56]

The main focus of the agencies' assistance to refugees in host families was on material relief. In contrast, in the refugee camps, the provision of non-material relief, such as information and community services, was considered important. No DEC agencies seem to have provided legal advice centres for those refugees outside camps, although some local partners did do this.

Food

Malnutrition was not a major problem and there was generally an over-supply of food aid in Albania and Macedonia. Eight DEC agencies were involved in the provision of food in Phase I, accounting for about 17 per cent of expenditure. This fell to less than 3 per cent in Phase II. This reduction in the priority given to food aid was appropriate given that malnutrition was not a major issue and needs were being met by other agencies.

As is noted in Chapter 1 of Volume II, it is important to clarify the objectives of providing food aid. The implicit assumption in the Kosovo crisis was that it was some sort of supplement or short-term income transfer, but this was rarely spelled out.[57]

In some cases inappropriate commodities were distributed because of lack of awareness of international guidelines or limited experience of emergency work. For example, a CAFOD partner in Belgrade, distributed milk powder to Roma IDPs living in conditions of poor hygiene, water and sanitation.[58]

Non-food items

Many refugees fled with few possessions and the returnees to Kosovo often faced the approaching winter with little in the way of material possessions, warm clothing or shelter. In these circumstances, the decision by all the DEC agencies to use some of their DEC funding for non-food items generally appeared appropriate.

However, it was difficult for the evaluation team to ascertain whether the amount and choice of the non-food items distributed was appropriate. Recipients generally appreciated the

---

[55] Beneficiaries in Nachet collective centre near Prizren received two family kits per family, one from Caritas and one from SC. They preferred the Caritas kits because the items were Swiss-made.

[56] For example: Oxfam on water; CAD on distribution; CARE on camp management; SC on education, tracing and supporting the development of primary health care intervention. In Djakova, SC liaised closely with other actors, including local authorities, UNMIK, local and international NGOs.

[57] In Albania, some host families interviewed felt that 'cash for shelter' would have been more useful than food parcels.

[58] CAFOD staff also had concern about this practice and raised it with their partner. The partner, citing UNICEF reports, noted that breast feeding was reported to be on the decline in Serbia and that the practice of distributing milk powder was currently regarded as acceptable by some major international agencies. The evaluation team noted the complexities of the situation but disagreed and felt that the distribution of milk powder was unwise.

distributions. All DEC agencies, apart from Concern and Merlin, distributed hygiene kits using DEC funding. In this case, there is an impression of over-distribution in many areas.

Health

Given the low risk of starvation or epidemics, the DEC agencies were correct to give health interventions a low priority. Health needs in the Balkans are very different from those in developing countries. Appropriate kits had been designed after the Bosnian war, but the humanitarian intervention in the Kosovo crisis was generally slow to import and utilise such kits. Two DEC agencies provided medicines with DEC money. Save the Children's provision to its clinics was appropriate, while the kits provided in Macedonia to the central pharmacy operation were more suitable for diseases seen in developing countries. In the case of CA's provision of cholera kits to its partner Diaconia Agape in Albania, the low risk of cholera epidemics among the refugees would have made one or two kits more appropriate than 20.

Water and sanitation

In the emergency refugee phase in the camps in Albania and Macedonia, Oxfam was the major DEC player in this sector and also more generally within the international response. This work was of a high standard and contained many examples of good practice. The main weakness of the Oxfam work was that it was not always possible to make it part of an integrated public health programme, with sanitation and public health education often being the responsibilities of other agencies in the camps. This issue is discussed in Volume II, Section 5.

Water and sanitation work carried out by CA, through MCIC, and Oxfam has also been an appropriate response in Kosovo, although, as Section 4 in Volume II points out the standard of some of this work has often been disappointing. There has again been a lack of integration into public health programmes.

Shelter

UNMIK estimated that nearly one-third of houses in Kosovo had been moderately or severely damaged or completely destroyed. In some areas more than half the houses were uninhabitable. Given the scale of damage and the onset of winter, shelter was clearly a highly appropriate intervention for the DEC agencies, of which seven used DEC funds for shelter programmes, not only in Kosovo, but also in Bosnia and Montenegro.

Faced with a wide range of shelter options, DEC agencies chose a variety of approaches which were generally appropriate. While distributing plastic sheeting for short term use before the oncoming winter, timber roofing beams were provided which would be strong enough for tiles in the longer term.

Humanitarian mine action

From June 1999 to the end of March 2000, 100 people had been killed in Kosovo and 370 injured by mines and unexploded ordnance. In the early days of the return, fear of mines slowed down the humanitarian response, although the mine and UXO problem proved to be more limited than anticipated and less still than in Bosnia. Nevertheless, it was appropriate that CARE and World Vision funded mine action programmes. The knowledge that areas

were free from mines and booby traps allowed humanitarian work, such as the rehabilitation of housing, water supplies and land for agriculture, to go ahead.

Schools and education

Given the political importance of the parallel education system in Kosovo since 1989, it was not surprising that a high political priority was given to school and education rehabilitation after NATO bombing ended. A high proportion of schools was badly damaged during the war – over 45 per cent moderately or severely damaged or completely destroyed, according to a UNICEF assessment. It therefore appropriate that five DEC agencies supported school rehabilitation,[59] although this is an area which strictly does not fall within DEC spending guidelines (refer to Chapter 12). With the exception of BRCS project work, there was relatively little community participation in this work and the issue of future maintenance and sustainability is a concern.

Community services

Coined by UNHCR, community services refers to an approach rather than a sector, with the emphasis on self-help, community-based assistance rather than individual case management. It can therefore cover a range of activities, including educational work, child- or gender-focused activities and psychosocial assistance undertaken by DEC agencies. The emphasis placed on self-help, raises questions over international responsibilities for refugee assistance. Using UNHCR's definition, the most notable examples of community services was the support provided to refugees by local NGOs in Albania and Macedonia.

DEC-funded community services focused on refugees in camps. A positive aspect of Oxfam's community services work was its sustained support for disabled and women's groups from Kosovo before, during and after the war.[60] In the camps, it provided a means of engaging with refugee women and a basis for both information dissemination and gender policy work. On return to Kosovo this provided a bridge to a more developmental response, although this may fall outside DEC guidelines for use of emergency appeal funds. An irony is that such community-based, 'self-help' work was made feasible with extra resources available in this emergency. The challenge in future emergencies will be whether agencies can undertake similar work with fewer resources.

Psychosocial projects

This area of work appears fashionable with donors and is discussed in Chapter 9 in Volume II. It is an area dogged by definitional and conceptual problems. Although the title was used by the DEC agencies, much of the activity referred to community service projects. The cultural appropriateness of psychosocial work seemed to be insufficiently addressed in

[59] Oxfam, BRCS and SC had large school programmes. Concern rehabilitated two schools and a CA partner, Islamic Relief, winterised three schools. Care rehabilitated one school in Korce with DEC funds and CAD worked on schools, but not with DEC funds.

[60] This contrasted with some non-DEC agencies which reportedly abandoned former partners from Kosovo during the refugee crisis, but returned to work with them later. (Personal communication, Susan Woodward).

practice. There are important questions about the Western-style counselling approaches in what is seen as a non-counselling culture.

Information services

Kosovo Albanian refugees often expressed the importance of getting information in situations where families had been separated and when relatives living outside the region were desperate for news. It was therefore highly appropriate that the BRCS funded a BBC radio programme for tracing purposes in Albania. In Macedonia, SC used new technologies by providing mobile phones in the camps for tracing.[61] Mother-and-child centres and 'tea tents' with TV and videos were also specially created 'spaces' for channelling information.

Less attention, however, was given to refugees outside the camps. Host families interviewed in Albania mentioned the important role that local TV had played in forming their response to the crisis. In Macedonia, host families noted the wide use of the media to communicate with refugees.

Agriculture

Agriculture was an important part of the pre-war economy and also contributes significantly to rural incomes in normal years through the sale of surplus products. Preliminary field data suggest that around 60 per cent of rural cash income was derived from the sale of crops and livestock/livestock products in 1997, with the balance coming largely from remittances (The World Bank, 1999); (FAO & WFP, 1999).

Support for the rehabilitation of agriculture therefore appears appropriate, although the economics of production have been severely affected by the closure of access to markets in the rest of the Serbia and high land prices.

DEC agencies gave limited support for agriculture programmes in Kosovo after the refugee return.[62] At the time of the evaluation it was too early to judge the impact of these programmes.

4.5 Programmes Outside Areas of Competence

Pressure to spend money and to be visible, and competition between agencies[63] meant that there was pressure for agencies to work outside their normal areas of competence or normal modes of operation. The pressure was on to '*stake our claim and find something to do'*.[64] The BRCS schools programme, HAI's operational presence and Oxfam's support for the NOVIB educational programme were examples of this tendency. It is noteworthy that all these examples were in Kosovo, reflecting the particular dynamics of the humanitarian context

[61] This service was repeated in the first three months of the refugees' return to Kosovo using satellite phones.

[62] Christian Aid through support to MCIC and CARE.

[63] There is no evidence of competition between DEC agencies.

[64] Interview with DEC agency desk officer.

there. Such problems did not arise in Montenegro, Bosnia or Serbia where fewer agencies worked and there was little media interest.

4.6 Innovation

The evaluation team found a number of examples of innovative work by the DEC member agencies:

- Some agencies tried voucher schemes instead of handing out kits, in order to give beneficiaries a little more choice and dignity. For example: World Vision gave out vouchers for some beneficiaries in Berane, Montenegro (instead of food and hygiene parcels);[65] MedAir, a Tearfund partner, in Kosovo gave window and door vouchers accepted by four or five suppliers for people to go and choose their own windows and doors.
- CARE supported research for the Ombudsman project as an investment in longer term good humanitarian practice. It also fielded a humanitarian standards consultant in Albania.
- SC used mobile and satellite phones for tracing purposes. As a result, satellite phones are now a part of SC's standard tracing kits. The recruitment of a protection officer also appears innovative and UNHCR has now taken on the post.
- Oxfam put disabled-access latrines in its campsites.

Given the fact that funds for the Kosovo emergency were not a problem and humanitarian needs were mostly not of a life-threatening nature, there is a question of whether more innovative interventions from the DEC agencies may have been expected.

4.7 Conclusions

The lack of assessments and limited consultation with beneficiaries, combined in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo with high levels of assistance, often made it difficult to gauge appropriateness of the aid provided by the DEC agencies.

While much of the assistance was generally appropriate, the evaluation questions the relevance of the psychosocial programmes.

4.8 Recommendation

The general lack of assessments in the Kosovo crisis was a weakness. Paying attention to Sphere Standards, it is recommended that DEC agencies review their assessment skills and capacities, in order to give assessment a higher priority in future emergencies. When reviewing the 48-hour and four-week plans of action, it is recommended that the OSC look

[65] Recipients could get change, but could not buy alcohol or cigarettes.

for evidence that DEC member agencies are satisfactorily carrying out assessments and, as far as possible, consulting with beneficiaries.

5. COVERAGE

This chapter looks at the various populations affected by the Kosovo crisis and the extent to which needs were met. It also looks at the issue of 'social cases', those people identified by the local authorities as being poor or at risk in resident populations and at the responsiveness of agencies to gender and targeting issues.

5.1 Affected Populations

During the NATO bombing period much of the focus of assistance in the region was on Kosovo Albanian refugees in camps in Albania and Macedonia. Affected populations that were potentially less well covered by the international humanitarian response included:

- The population left inside Kosovo.
- Refugees in private accommodation, as opposed to those in camps and their host families.
- Refugees/IDPs in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro, as the focus of the humanitarian response was on Albania and Macedonia.

After the return of the Kosovo Albanians to Kosovo, affected groups included:

- Minority groups (mainly Serbs and Roma) inside Kosovo and Roma throughout the region.

In addition to the above groups, there were cross-cutting groups identified as vulnerable: for example, young children, women, elderly and disabled. As one would expect, there were considerable variations in background and wealth within these groups.

Population in Kosovo during the NATO bombing campaign

There was little information about humanitarian conditions of the population within Kosovo during this period until the UN Secretary-General's Inter-Agency Needs Assessment mission took place in the second half of May 1999 (OCHA, 1999). This referred to the internally displaced Kosovo Albanians living in appallingly miserable conditions.

During the NATO bombing campaign, the Focus Humanitarian Initiative was the major, highly politicised attempt at an international humanitarian assistance programme to the population in Kosovo.[66] In the later stages of the campaign, the IRC started airdrops of food aid.

In mid-April, the Yugoslav Red Cross sent a convoy of relief goods to Kosovo. The ICRC re-started relief distributions as soon as it was able to re-establish its operation on 24 May. Also on 24 May, World Vision was able to send trucks with clothing, cooking stoves and other

[66] The Focus Humanitarian Initiative was launched by the Swiss, Greek and Russian governments, later joined by Austria (Minear, Van Baarda & Sommers, 2000).

relief supplies from Bulgaria to Pristina where the distributions were being carried out in cooperation with the YRC.[67]

Refugees in private accommodation

Over 60 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian refugees who fled into Albania and Macedonia were housed in private accommodation. The likelihood that Kosovo refugees would stay in private accommodation in Albania should have been anticipated. In 1998, many of the refugees entering Tropoje were housed in private accommodation (Fennell, 1998). At that time, warnings were made about the capacity of families to provide for refugees in the long term and both NGOs and donors stressed the importance of providing assistance to host families as well as refugees. Some DEC member agencies did identify needs of refugees and host families early on, including BRCS,[68] Christian Aid and CAD in Albania.

Concrete evidence about conditions of refugees in host families, as opposed to those in camps, is sparse. A WHO survey of refugees with host families in Macedonia found that access to food was difficult (WHO, 1999).

Coverage of refugees in host families was problematic:

- The high visibility of refugee camps was a magnet to NATO forces, donors, NGOs and the media. Consequently, refugees in camps received a disproportionate level of assistance, given the fewer number of refugees, compared to those outside camps. This differential treatment of refugees goes against universal standards of refugee protection. *'Host family intervention was seen as low profile and certainly not seen to be a sexy caseload'* (Hallam, 1999).
- There is some evidence that only the poorest refugees who could not afford to stay in private accommodation stayed in camps.[69] If true, this would have justified some extra assistance to these refugees.
- In Albania, a breakdown in the joint ICRC/IFRC pipeline caused a delay in distributions to refugees in host families. Refugees were cared for by local people until international assistance kicked in.
- In Albania, lack of registration and the tendency of refugees to travel, meant that finding and identifying those in most need and monitoring of distributions was problematic. This led to inconsistent coverage. In Kukes town, for example, it was reported that assistance to host families was adequately covered, but not in rural villages.[70]

[67] World Vision was able on 30 April 1999 to send in some material assistance to Kosovo from Montenegro to IDPs in Istok using local NGO runners with backpacks.

[68] BRCS supported IFRC operations in Albania and Macedonia which were the major providers of assistance to refugees in host families.

[69] Interview with IFRC, Tirana, March 2000.

[70] Interview with CAD, Tirana, March 2000.

- As refugees in Macedonia did not receive refugee status,[71] but were *Humanitarian Assisted Persons*, access to free health services for refugees in private accommodation was often problematic.
- Several surveys of host families in Albania reported various problems among privately accommodated refugees, including lack of information about their entitlements, weak leadership structures and growing tensions among them.[72]

For host families themselves, again evidence about gains and losses is sparse. For refugees in private accommodation and for host families, the major disparity may have been between urban and rural situations.

To a considerable extent the DEC agencies resisted the aid bias towards refugees in camps with a number supporting assistance to refugees in host families (refer to Section 7 in Volume 2). For example, this group was the major focus of the BRCS assistance through the IFRC and National Red Cross Societies.

Refugees/IDPs in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro

While the majority of DEC expenditure (nearly 80 per cent) in DEC Phase 1 went to Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, a number of agencies were careful to respond to the needs of refugees/IDPs, albeit at lower levels in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia (refer to Appendix 6).

As humanitarian needs grew in Serbia with increased numbers of IDPs, some DEC agencies increased their programmes. The commitment of DEC funds to Serbia rose from 12 per cent in Phase I to 21 per cent in Phase II.

A strength of DEC funds was their availability for use throughout the region, including Serbia. Many donors concentrated their funding on Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia.

Minority groups

The pre-conflict population of Kosovo was 83 per cent ethnic Albanian, 9 per cent ethnic Serb, 3 per cent Gorani/Bosniac Muslim, 2 per cent Roma and 3 per cent other (including Montenegrins, Croats and Turks).[73] In February 2000, the WFP/UNHCR survey of minorities estimated that 104,000 Serbs remained in the whole of Kosovo with 75,000 living in enclaves in the Albania areas (Lawrence & Borrel, 1999). Estimates for other communities included

[71] There is no Macedonian Refugee Law to recognise refugee status. UNHCR is currently working with the government to try to draw up such a law (UNHCR, Skopje).

[72] Refugees International, May/June 1999; Oxfam, July 1999.

[73] Data from UNHCR and based upon 1991 census data quoted in Joint WFP/UNHCR Food Needs Assessment of Minorities in Kosovo, November–December 1999 (Lawrence & Borrel, 1999).

around 30,000 Roma (although more may be present but unreported) and up to 35,000 Muslim Slavs.[74]

Some DEC agencies have attempted to provide assistance to ethnic minorities within Kosovo. However, inputs have usually been proportionately lower than those towards Kosovo Albanians. There have been two approaches to supporting minority groups: direct or through advocacy/coordination. CAD has implemented programmes directly, registering 25,000 people from ethnic minorities in 52 separate communities and opening a sub-office in Gracinica, a Serbian enclave, in January 2000 in order to improve access.

SC adopted an advocacy-based approach to assist minority groups, appointing a Protection Liaison Officer who pioneered the formation of an inter-agency protection working group. UNHCR has since taken up and funded this post. The major problems with accessing minorities with assistance has been the relative absence of minority local distributing partners and the restricted travel preventing access to distribution points. The future plans to locate food and non-food distribution from the Centres for Social Welfare will increase these problems reducing the number of distribution points and increasing the necessity for minority groups to travel.

In terms of reaching the Serb populations in Kosovo, the DEC agencies appear to have a mixed record. Some have made considerable effort, including difficult and slow attempts to take on Serb workers. Others have seemed to go with the flow, bowing to the feelings of their 100 per cent Kosovo Albanian staff.

Roma IDPs are probably the most easily distinguishable vulnerable group within the region due to the following factors:

- Their poverty level/marginalisation before the crisis.
- They were less able to cope during/after the crisis. For example, Roma refugees in Macedonia have fared worse than Albanians because host Roma families are generally poorer and unable to provide generous assistance to other Roma. As a result, Roma are more likely to be paying for rent and services and having to sell their rations.
- They suffered most during the war. For example, in Serbia they did not have access to shelters from the bombing and poor-quality housing was easier to destroy.
- Their use by the Serbian authorities as a political tool. For example, allegations that they helped the Serbian military in 'cleaning-up' operations in Kosovo and attempts made by the Serbian Government to send them back to Kosovo. For example, in April - June 1999, buses were organised to return them to Kosovo.
- Discrimination from host communities including local Roma communities.

Some DEC agencies have been aware of special needs of the Roma and have targeted them. For example, a CAFOD partner in Serbia provided food, non-food and medical assistance as well as running workshops on psychosocial issues.

[74] In addition, there are estimated to be over 20,000 Turks, up to 12,000 Gorani, and some 500 Croats (UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe, 1999b; UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe, 1999a) .

A number of DEC agencies have worked with the Mother Teresa Society (MTS) as a partner, an important part of the parallel structures run in Kosovo prior to the war and therefore politically aligned. It is not clear that the agencies considered the bias that was inevitably involved in distributing through an organisation that had traditionally serviced the majority (Kosovo Albanian) population.

Local population: 'social cases'

The refugee/IDP population, particularly in Albania, was sometimes perceived as being 'better-off' than the local population. In Albania, refugees had free humanitarian aid (food and hygiene parcels) and free health care, which the local poor population did not. There was great pressure on local organisations to provide assistance to their 'own' poor. MCIC in Macedonia explicitly voiced the need to *'balance the refugee crisis with the social crisis'*.

There were differing judgements among DEC agencies about whether DEC funds could be used to support local 'social cases'. In some cases, local populations were included in distributions of material goods or rehabilitation programmes. For example, MCIC, Christian Aid small project fund in Albania, CARE and Oxfam in Albania.

Arguments for including 'social cases' in assistance programmes include:

- Justice: assistance should be given on the basis of need, regardless of grouping.
- Potential conflict mitigation: concerns in Macedonia about the delicate ethnic balance in the country being upset (perceived inequitable aid distribution might fuel ethnic tensions).
- Political expediency: assistance to local people can help to 'oil the wheels' of cooperation and acceptance of 'foreigners' within a community.

Arguments against including 'social cases' among the local population:

- Lack of continuity: DEC funds are short-term and 'social cases' need support in the long-term.
- Inappropriate forms of assistance: DEC funds are used for emergency types of assistance, for example, the distribution of parcels for defined periods of time. These are not useful in assisting the long-term poor and may be counter-productive. For example, they set up expectations which cannot be met and impede the development of alternative coping strategies.
- The 'social case' burden in the Balkans is huge and growing. Therefore, it would be necessary to target the most needy 'social cases'. Criteria for 'most needy' are very difficult to set.

The Sphere Standards call on agencies to take account of and, where appropriate, to assist local host populations. There is a need for clearer DEC guidelines on this issue.

Women and gender

The general lack of assessments has meant that there appeared to be little disaggregated information or analysis about the situation of women in general, and female-headed households in particular. For example, agencies did not seem to be aware of issues about registration of women for relief materials or consider the issue of female property rights in

Kosovo. It is not clear what rights many of the widows, whose houses have been rehabilitated by agencies, have to these.

A reason cited for this lack of attention to gender issues, which goes against the Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards, was culture: Albanian and Roma culture is patriarchal and an emergency is not a good time, it was stated, to start to challenge cultural norms. However, humanitarian standards clearly state that, cultural traditions not withstanding, agency programmes must be analysed in terms of impact on women and must respond to their needs.

The League of Albanian women in Macedonia reported some of the major problems for women refugees as being:

- Physical: lack of minimum conditions such as water in camps which meant women could rarely take a shower.
- Health: lack of health-care facilities. For example, pregnant Kosovar Albanian women were not accepted in hospitals and were only allowed to give birth in Tetovo hospital.
- Lack of access to aid: poor registration, with female heads of household having greater difficulty in going to collect rations, particularly at the beginning of the crisis when lists were not well prepared.

Williams (1999) refers to wider issues of the rights and protection of women refugees.

Oxfam put considerable effort into both analysing and responding to the needs of women throughout the region (Williams, 2000; Oxfam, 1999a)

5.2 Targeting

Targeting strategies included:

- All those in a specified group (for example, all refugees) ignoring differences in need and existence of poorer people within host population.
- Geographical targeting (for example, all shelter in a defined area in Kosovo).
- Targeting based on need.

Targeting in Kosovo is particularly difficult for several reasons:

- There is no general popular support in Kosovo for the targeting of assistance. The population often sees aid as recompense for suffering during the war and a right due from the international community, rather than as a response to needs.
- In the current economic circumstances of Kosovo, the apparent possession of capital is no guarantee of income and the capital may not be for disposal as it may actually belong to an absent family member.
- Remittances play a large part in the Kosovo economy. The WFP estimates that about 245 million DEM a month comes into Kosovo in remittances.
- The complexity of the family structures.

Linked with the lack of assessments (refer to Chapter 4) and monitoring (refer to Chapter 7), targeting appears to have been determined by resources available, rather than by empirical need and made more complex by the large number of agencies operating with different

criteria.[75]

In the food sector, DEC agencies targeted the neediest groups (refugees in host families, Roma and social cases, rather than refugees in camps) and Bosnia and FRY as well as Albania and Macedonia.

5.3 Conclusions

There is little evidence that significant groups of people in need suffered major hardship by being ignored during the Kosovo crisis, with the possible exception of some of the Kosovo Albanian population that remained in Kosovo during the NATO bombing. The Roma in the region have been and remain among the most disadvantaged. The level of assistance given to the Kosovo Albanians, both as refugees in neighbouring countries and on return, was generally far higher than that given to refugees and IDPs in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia.

The international humanitarian community, including the DEC member agencies, were mainly unable to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to the population in Kosovo during NATO bombing.

DEC agencies resisted the pressures to concentrate assistance on refugees in camps and provided significant amounts of aid to the majority who lived in private accommodation.

Some DEC agencies were able to respond to humanitarian need in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia and, in particularly, were able to increase their assistance to IDPs in Serbia as the numbers increased after June 1999.

Agencies have found it difficult to respond to minority group needs in Kosovo and, with some exceptions, more efforts could have been made in this area.

There were differing judgements by DEC agencies about whether DEC funds could be used for supporting 'social cases'.

With the exception of Oxfam, there was a serious lack of gender analysis and assessment.

5.4 Recommendations

(i) Gender analysis was weak in assessments and programme design by almost all agencies. This needs to be strengthened which may require additional skills. Opportunities for learning between DEC agencies should be explored. Again, this is an issue that the OSC should monitor and draw the agencies' specific attention to when reviewing 48-hour and four-week plans of action.

(ii) In complex political emergencies affecting multiple locations and population groups on both sides of the conflict, DEC agencies need to strengthen their systems for monitoring

[75] Concern have gone so far as to say that it will not participate in the reconstruction of Phase III houses because it is impossible to target assistance at the truly needy.

whether their programmes are responding to needs in a balanced and impartial way. At a minimum, better monitoring of expenditure and delivery of aid resources to different population groups would help.

(iii) The Kosovo crisis offers an important opportunity for the humanitarian system to learn lessons about assisting large numbers of refugees in private accommodation and with host families. DEC agencies and the DEC secretariat should explore ways of facilitating lesson learning on this topic with other agencies, such as UNHCR and IFRC in order to ensure that these lessons are not lost.

6. PROTECTION

6.1 Introduction

There is growing recognition that humanitarian responses to war-induced emergencies should not only be concerned with providing life-saving assistance, but also with ensuring the physical protection of people and the practical realisation of their rights as defined in international human rights and humanitarian law. The Valid Lesson Learning Study identified protection as an issue in the refugee crisis (Hallam, 1999). Although not specified in the evaluation ToR, the evaluation team considered it important to assess the extent to which DEC agencies incorporated protection strategies in their response to the Kosovo crisis. For the purpose of the evaluation, protection is defined as strategies to enhance the physical security of persons and groups under threat, and the practical realisation of their rights under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law (Paul, 1999).

6.2 A Crisis of Protection

The international response to the crisis in Kosovo served to define the emergency as a 'crisis of protection', the direct consequence of violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Prior to NATO's military action, human rights promotion and monitoring were central to the way the international community sought to manage the conflict. Alliance countries then justified military action as a 'humanitarian war' to protect the rights of Kosovo Albanians. Their concern with human rights in Kosovo sits uneasily with their virtual silence over the war in Chechnya. This apparent selective response to human rights issues lends weight to those who argue that NATO military action in Kosovo was as much to do with European and US concerns to contain the threat of regional instability, as it was with the protection of human rights.[76] Furthermore, despite the Alliance's stated commitment to human rights, the international community has failed to protect minority groups in Kosovo fully from discrimination, intimidation and violence. Over 200,000 people have left Kosovo since NATO entered the province.

6.3 Protection Issues During the NATO Bombing Campaign

During the war there were broadly three civilian population groups at risk: civilians expelled from Kosovo; civilians displaced within Kosovo, and civilians at risk from NATO air strikes in Kosovo and other areas of FRY.

Refugee protection

The forced expulsion of over 800,000 civilians from Kosovo was the biggest and most visible protection issue during the three-month NATO military campaign. In addition to the relief provision, DEC agencies contributed to refugee protection in several ways including:[77]

[76] Some have argued that NATO military action had more to do with the US asserting its geopolitical interests. For example, see (Gowan, 2000).

[77] See Section 8 in Volume II for more information.

- Supporting UNHCR's protection role through staff secondment.
- Advocating on asylum and registration issues, particularly in Macedonia.
- Enhancing security of refugees in camps.
- Targeting assistance to refugees outside camps.
- Providing tracing services for separated families and children.
- Targeting assistance to, and advocating for the needs of, women and older refugees.
- Supporting minority groups, such as the Roma.

Civilians in Kosovo

The biggest gap in the protection framework during the war was in Kosovo itself. NATO's decision to use air strikes against Serbia forced all international humanitarian aid agencies and human rights observers to withdraw from Kosovo. As a result the minimal protection strategy of witnessing was not feasible. There were few independent witnesses to the expulsion of civilians and little assistance for the estimated 500,000 displaced Kosovo Albanians and other civilians in Kosovo during the war.[78] The massive international focus on the protection needs of Kosovo refugees further served to deflect attention away from on-going violations of international humanitarian and human rights law inside Kosovo. Aid agencies' decisions to withdraw from Kosovo were based on their assessments of security and ability to continue working. The effect of humanitarian agencies, including DEC agencies, withdrawing *en mass* was that 'humanitarian space' collapsed. In the words of ICRC, there was *'a collective failure of protection'*.[79, 80]

By 24 May 1999, ICRC successfully re-negotiated humanitarian access to Kosovo.[81] The publicised meeting of the President of the ICRC and President Milosevic in April 1999 sent a strong message of independent humanitarian concern.[82] Of the DEC agencies, World Vision sent some assistance to civilians in Kosovo in April and May. SC in April called for urgent humanitarian access (Save the Children, 1999) and a staff member participated in a UN assessment mission in May. Christian Aid also called for a cease-fire and negotiation. While agencies' room for manoeuvre was clearly restricted by security considerations,[83] there is a question as to whether more could have been done or said by the DEC agencies about protection in Kosovo.

---

[78] The Humanitarian Law Center from Belgrade and some local journalists remained in Kosovo, but the only international witnesses were journalists.

[79] Interview, ICRC, Geneva, March 2000.

[80] After withdrawing from Kosovo, the OSCE-KVM and international human rights organisations did monitor conditions there by interviewing refugees. The OSCE report *As Seen, As Told* provides detailed information on violations of humanitarian and human rights law in Kosovo in this period, although clearly primarily based on the experience of Kosovo Albanian refugees (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999).

[81] BRCS, as members of the Red Cross Movement, were supportive of ICRC's access, negotiations and position on the Kosovo crisis, although this was not publicly expressed.

[82] A UN Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission visited Serbia in May. A joint Swiss, Greek and Russian government effort — the Focus Humanitarian Initiative — also managed to get relief supplies to Pristina on 13 May, although arguably it was protection from abuses rather than food that was required.

[83] Agencies working in Serbia were concerned about the impact of public statements on the security of staff.

Civilians in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Importantly, throughout the NATO campaign, several DEC agencies (BRCS, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, SC and World Vision) continued humanitarian work in Serbia and Montenegro either directly or through partners. The work, which was undertaken by local staff after most expatriates withdrew, consisted of distributing relief supplies to displaced and war-affected civilians. However the Red Cross did undertake protection work, gathering information on displacements and arrests and intervening with Yugoslav authorities on behalf of detainees and prisoners of war. Also Christian Aid's partner, EHO, disseminated information on the humanitarian impact of the bombing through postcards and bulletins.

6.4 Protection in Post-War Kosovo

Since the return of Kosovo Albanian refugees, the most critical protection issues in Kosovo have revolved around the protection of non-Albanians from physical violence, intimidation and discrimination in employment and access to humanitarian aid. Other protection issues include: the plight of missing Kosovo Albanians; the detention of Kosovo Albanians in Serbia; intra-Kosovo Albanian political violence and intimidation; organised criminal violence; gender-based violence; general property rights and property rights of women in particular.

Broadly, DEC agencies have been less active about protection issues in Kosovo than they have been about refugee protection. Reasons for this include: first, the presence of other institutions mandated and better able to provide protection than NGOs; and second, the presence of other organisations experienced in monitoring and reporting on human rights issues. The weakness of state institutions for welfare, justice and policing is also a constraint to protection work. However, it is this protection gap in the absence of the state that provides a rationale for NGOs to be pro-active on protection issues. Some examples of protection activities and strategies adopted by DEC agencies in their work are illustrated in Table 8 (for further details refer to Section 8 in Volume II).

Table 4: Examples of DEC agency protection activities in Kosovo

Protection strategies	DEC agency activities in Kosovo
Coordination and leadership	SC seconded a Protection Liaison Officer to UNHCR who chaired the Inter-Agency Working Group on Protection. BRCS provided delegates for ICRC in Kosovo with protection responsibilities.
Legal protection	BRCS has worked on issues of detainees. SC has advocated on social and legal policy to increase protection of children's rights and establishment of a juvenile justice system.
Human rights education	SC has disseminated information on children's rights.
Access	Various measures by BRCS, CAD, SC, CARE and Oxfam to ensure minority access to relief and other services.
Advocacy	Advocacy by CAD on the issue of minority access to Centres for Social Work.
Gender	Oxfam and Concern have focused attention on women's needs
Discrimination in employment	CARE, Oxfam and CAD have hired staff from minorities
'Extremely vulnerable persons'	HAI and Oxfam have assisted older people and disabled and have advocated for their needs to be addressed.

6.5 Conclusions

Adopting a protection approach does not require relief agencies to become human rights organisations. It does, however, require them to develop field-based strategies to prevent or mitigate violations of human rights and humanitarian or refugee law. This may involve assessing who is politically vulnerable and why and how the actions of agencies support and have an impact on people's rights. The following observations are made about the response of DEC agencies to the Kosovo crisis:

- Some DEC agencies articulated protection as an objective in their DEC proposals,[84] and most developed activities and strategies to address different protection needs at different times and in different places. However, protection was not always a conscious strategy.

- During the bombing, DEC agencies were pro-active in enhancing refugee protection, in particular by ensuring refugees outside camps were assisted. It was also important that several DEC agencies continued working in Serbia and Montenegro during the NATO military campaign. However, during the war there was a protection gap in Kosovo, that few DEC agencies responded to. In the view of the evaluation team, a minimal response, individually or collectively, could have been to inform the Alliance governments, in particular the British, of the potential humanitarian consequence of NATO's military campaign. Refer to Chapter 10 for further discussion of advocacy work done by DEC agencies.

- Since entering Kosovo, the primary focus of DEC agencies, like other aid agencies, has been on relief, physical rehabilitation and the restoration of social services. Where relief has been linked to protection it has mainly revolved around ensuring people's access to relief and welfare assistance. Vulnerability, however, is largely defined in terms of material or economic well-being without linking this to social status. Protection issues appear in few agency assessments and actions are not evaluated in terms of impact on protection.

- Child-protection activities featured strongly in the general international response, and was a focus of some DEC agencies such as SC and CAD. The emphasis on child protection appears to have been disproportionate to their needs compared to other groups.

- Despite the high profile given to human rights in Kosovo, DEC agencies' collaboration with human rights organisations has been weak.
- In a divided society national staff undertook protection work at some personal risk. A lack of training in protection work increased these risks.

- With large resources available, meeting the needs of vulnerable groups, such as disabled access in refugee camps was feasible. The challenge to agencies will be to meet such needs in emergencies when there are fewer resources.

[84] For example: for the BRCS, protection was central to ICRC/IFRC's regional response; SC describe child protection as their core expertise in the region; Oxfam defines protection as an objective in their regional strategy (Oxfam, 1999c); HAI identified protection of older people in Kosovo as a need; CAD include child protection in their mission statement.

- DEC agencies have utilised KFOR security to gain access to minority communities. Working with the military on protection issues is complex. Collaborative action may, for example, compromise an agency's neutrality and may weaken other non-partisan protection strategies. However, choosing not to assist people in order to sustain a perception of neutrality could also do harm to those in need. Guidelines on working with the military would help field staff deal with such dilemmas.

6.6 Recommendation

In war-induced emergencies increasing prominence is given to the protection of vulnerable groups in addition to life-saving assistance. In such contexts, DEC agencies should give greater attention to protection objectives when designing and implementing their humanitarian response. This should be reflected better in the DEC reporting framework.

7. EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT

This chapter looks at the monitoring and evaluation carried out by DEC member agencies and the effectiveness and impact of the programmes.

7.1 Monitoring

The monitoring of process and the extent to which DEC agencies can account for the materials they used or delivered has been variable. Several examples of good practice exist. The common features of good practice in monitoring non-food item (NFI) distribution are presented in Box 1.

Box 1: Determinants of good practice in monitoring the distribution of non-food items

- Commitment of sufficient human resources and funding.[85]
- Structured sampling frames for collection of data concerning delivery of materials and some attempts at assessing coverage.
- The use of several sources and methods (triangulation) for constructing beneficiary lists and a computerised system for cross-checking lists from different sources.[86]
- Structured data collection instruments (questionnaires) including information on needs, end use of materials and actual quantities delivered.
- Local knowledge and experience in the areas in which they were working.[87]

As often occurs in humanitarian programmes, the monitoring of impact was problematic. In general agencies monitored process indicators (for example, number of items distributed, roofs built, etc.) relating to material distribution, health or shelter programmes. Most agencies appeared to consider these indicators sufficient as proxies for impact and few looked further.[88] The delivery of materials to a population, many of whom already had access to support from external remittances and savings is insufficient evidence that an intervention achieved humanitarian impact.

Although most agencies made some attempts to assess impact, few used a combination of methods or used monitoring techniques such as Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice (KAP) techniques. MedAir conducted focus group meetings with beneficiaries partly to review its past work.

---

[85] For example, in rural Pristina where CAD is the lead agency for food and NFI distribution it employs 28 full-time field monitors. In their sub-office for minority groups it employs a further seven local monitors and five international staff.

[86] In Kukes, CAD tried to use distribution lists from several sources including the municipality, prefecture, ARC, schools and banks.

[87] CAD have been present in Albania since 1991 and in Kosovo since 1995 implementing food and non-food distributions

[88] For example, HAI in Kosovo and Macedonia did not perform any systematic analysis of the results of their material distributions nor did they expect their partners to do so. Their report states that '*the distributions made to those beneficiaries … must result in the improvement of living standards for all of these people, therefore the impact that these distributions have made is noteworthy*' (HelpAge International, 2000).

Of the agencies involved in shelter, only Concern knew how many of the houses that it had roofed were actually occupied during the winter.

Monitoring was frequently carried out by partner organisations. There were examples of good practice among local partners. For example, EHO in Serbia employed an independent team from the Novi Sad University to interview beneficiaries about their satisfaction and the end use of items. Based on results from this evaluation it changed the contents of both food and hygiene parcels. However self-monitoring was inappropriate for partners that had little experience in the area of emergency intervention.[89]

In Serbia, external restriction decreased the amount of monitoring possible. Oxfam responded by implementing frequent smaller monitoring visits to build-up gradually a picture of the progress of programmes.

7.2 Evaluations

Given that the Kosovo refugee crisis was the biggest mass movement of people in Europe since World War II, there have been few detailed evaluations by DEC agencies on the impact of their work during this period.

Where evaluations have been done, they have tended to look at organisational and management issues in terms of lesson learning.[90] Few have looked at the impact of their programmes. There have also been few evaluations of or by partner organisations[91] (refer to Appendix 8).

Among the DEC agencies, only a livelihood study by CARE and IFRC/ICRC evaluations has sought to talk to refugee-affected people (CARE International, 2000; Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). At the very least, some opportunities for learning have been missed. For example, Oxfam advocated for disabled refugees to be included in the humanitarian evacuation programme, but have done no assessment of the impact of this, even though contact is retained with the former refugees.

In some cases, end-of-contract reports and internal evaluation reports have been of high quality and have made important contributions to assessing the effectiveness of programmes. Some of Oxfam's reports included formal evaluation against Sphere indicators.[92]

7.3 Effectiveness

Effectiveness of the DEC agencies' work has varied. Oxfam's water supply work in the refugee camps was a positive example, monitored against Sphere indicators. Early on in the

[89] For example, SNI's work in Macedonia, or some of MCIC's work in Kosovo.

[90] For example, SC conducted reviews of their preparedness and immediate emergency response in Albania and Kosovo and of their head office systems and has made changes as a result.

[91] Tearfund are planning a major evaluation of their Balkans programme.

[92] For example, the Evaluation of Kavaja and Rushbull Camps using Sphere Standards (Ferron, S. & Ceni, D.) .

emergency, Oxfam worked to develop indicators to assess impact in hygiene promotion programmes (Bibby, 1999) but was unable to do much dissemination before the refugees returned to Kosovo.

There are questions about the effectiveness of the agencies' rehabilitation work. Some agencies seemed to concentrate on their 'bit', apparently not taking into account that the impact of their interventions could be reduced by the non-performance of others. Oxfam built an excellent septic tank for a 'jerry-built' school at Gusovac. SC renovated some schools that had low quality toilets and no school furniture.

In situations where numerous agencies are jostling for work, it may prove more difficult for agencies to take a broader and more integrated view of their work.

Impact can also be diminished if an agency is not aware of the importance of taking an integrated approach, for example in public health.[93] Despite Oxfam's integrated approach to public health (implementing water, sanitation and hygiene promotion activities together), health and sanitation inputs occurred late in its large-scale rehabilitation project in Lushne. It is too early to determine whether these measures will overcome the danger of increasing public health problems in some villages.[94]

Of the 10 DEC agencies that distributed hygiene kits during the emergency, only Oxfam, CAD and Tearfund routinely accompanied these distributions with other public health interventions.

In the refugee camps in Albania and Kosovo, the divide between camp management (including sanitation and environmental health) and the water, health promotion and medical agencies, detracted from integrated public health interventions.

Several agencies commented that the pressure to spend funds within a limited time frame led to lower overall effectiveness.

7.4 Conclusions

The standard of monitoring and the lack of programme evaluations gave rise for concern. The lack of evaluations by the DEC agencies also raises questions about the role of the DEC evaluation, an issue that is discussed in Chapter 12. The danger of a plethora of evaluations and evaluation fatigue in major emergencies also needs to be recognised.

The effectiveness of the DEC agencies' work varied and in some cases was compromised by lack of monitoring and follow-up to check that other elements affecting successful outcomes were in place.

---

[93] Refer to section 3.6 for discussion on integrated public health interventions.

[94] In some villages the project has rehabilitated water to 'sectors', blocks of six to eight flats built during the communist regime. These flats have flushed toilets, for which the sanitation systems are broken. At present, due to the lack of water in the flats, little volume flows down the toilets and relatively little raw sewage escapes into the open. If the project succeeds in delivering water, this situation will change and the amount of raw sewage in the open will grow, increasing the public health risks.

Given the weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation noted above, it is difficult for the evaluation to make any detailed statements about impact. It is also sometimes difficult to differentiate the impact of DEC funded activities from others by the same or other agencies.

'The overall impact of humanitarian assistance is reflected in the simple facts that no refugees died from lack of food, warmth, or acquired illness' (DFID, 2000). In the team's opinion, the humanitarian response was probably not the most important reason behind this positive outcome on refugee morbidity and mortality. In many of the camps and in Kosovo after the return of refugees, sanitation and environmental hygiene were sometimes very poor. In an emergency context as is often found in Africa, epidemics and extensive loss of life would have probably occurred (refer to Section 3 in Volume II).

International assistance did improve the conditions of affected populations and the DEC agencies contributed to this.

7.5 Recommendation

The DEC agencies need to improve the standards of their monitoring and evaluation systems. The DEC Secretariat should support some collective work in this area, as part of work on developing future DEC evaluations (see Chapter 12).

8. COST EFFICIENCY

This chapter looks at issues of cost comparisons and controls as well as overhead costs.

8.1 Findings

It has proved difficult to classify DEC agency expenditure by sector due to a lack of sectoral information, insufficient breakdowns, inconsistent labelling and varying levels of detail provided by the agencies. Some expenditure data related to overall projects, some just to DEC expenditure. As a result, it has been problematic to make comparisons from the data provided by the agencies.

Almost no agencies have made any attempt to calculate cost efficiency or cost-effectiveness indicators. The BRCS explicitly calculated expenditure per beneficiary, but was the only agency to do so.

Agencies have not made internal comparisons, whether in the same country, across other countries in the Balkans or across other countries worldwide. This is not unusual and there are methodological difficulties involved in doing so. However, making comparisons could have helped agencies to identify problems earlier. Concern and MedAir both paid 20 DEM per square metre for roofing in Peje at the same time as Tearfund were paying 12 DEM per square metre in nearby Gjakova.

Methodological problems in trying to make cost-effectiveness calculations are illustrated by trying to compare the unit costs of shelter work done in Kosovo. The unit cost of a roof varies enormously from £533 to £4,260 but little can be said about cost-effectiveness, given that different agencies repaired different size houses, in different condition and in areas with different transport constraints. In addition, some agencies provided labour to vulnerable families, some provided tiles, while others provided just timber and plastic sheeting.

The evaluation found large differences in the cost per calorie of food rations purchased by the DEC member agencies and their partners (refer to section 1.7 in Volume II).

Controlling costs

A more limited approach to cost analysis is to look at costs and see where these could have been cut. This has also proved difficult with the lack of data available, but some conclusions are possible.

Most agencies appeared to have reasonably well-established procurement systems and systems for monitoring costs on a regular basis. There was no evidence of conspicuous over-expenditure. However, between Phase II and Phase IIb, Tearfund was able to cut the cost of the roofs in Kosovo from £4,051 per house to £1,372 per house for a variety of reasons.

Local vs. international purchase

In some situations, local purchase can be more appropriate and cheaper than importation.[95] MCIC in Macedonia stated that one of its three emergency objectives was '*to support the economy in Macedonia through local purchase'*.

In Serbia, external purchase was probably better due to the following factors:

- Concern about the consistency and quality of goods provided by local producers.
- Hard currency transfers cannot be made into Serbia because of sanctions.
- All officials have 'dual' activities, so the risk of corruption/confusion with suppliers is greater.

However, these factors could be offset by the danger of delivery delays because of import procedures[96] and the fact that local manufacturers and workers do not benefit. Principle 6 of the Code of Conduct includes the statement that, '*where possible, we will strengthen these (local) capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies'*.

Modes of operation

There appears to be an increased trend for agencies to work through international networks. (for example BRCS, CAFOD, CARE, Christian Aid, SC, WV and, increasingly, Oxfam). Some network arrangements can be quite complicated and can increase accountability problems — one agency that was funded by another agency with DEC funds was surprised that the evaluation team wanted to talk to them. There is a danger that each layer of a network or funding hierarchy may increase overhead and management costs.[97]

8.2 Conclusions

It seems likely that the abundance of money available to the agencies weakened what incentive there might have been to look at cost-effectiveness issues.

Most agencies appeared to have reasonably well-established procurement systems and systems for monitoring costs on a regular basis. There was no evidence of conspicuous over-expenditure.

An increasing tendency for DEC member agencies to work within networks may lead to higher overhead and management costs.

---

[95] Section 1.7 in Volume II shows that local purchases of foodstuffs are not always cheaper.

[96] For example, importation of winter clothing by BRCS was delayed until January/February 2000.

[97] In the case of the Oxfam funded NOVIB education rehabilitation project in Kosovo, overhead costs on the DEC-funded section amount to 22 per cent spread across three organisations and locations in Kosovo, Sarajevo, Holland and the UK (refer to section 5.3 in Volume II).

8.3 Recommendation

Most DEC agencies are understandably wary about coming together to procure items. They fear extra bureaucracy and delays. However, there may be a case for agencies — particularly smaller agencies — to have collective stand-by arrangements for the provision of commonly used items such as household kits.[98] This should be explored by the DEC agencies. There may also be scope for more information sharing between agencies (for example, transport routes, hauliers and sources, etc.). This should be considered once the DEC Secretariat has been strengthened.

[98] For example, BRCS was able to make considerable savings by bulk purchasing kits for the ICRC/IFRC joint logistics pipeline.

9. CONNECTEDNESS

This chapter covers the impact of the crisis and the aid effort on local populations, and the ways in which agencies have worked with local partners. It also looks at the context of a shift from relief to rehabilitation.

9.1 Impact on and Support for Local Populations[99]

Impact of the refugee emergency on local populations was mixed. In Albania, for example, there is some evidence that the local population gained through charging rents. In some cases, infrastructure such as hospitals was upgraded although the investment has tended to be in physical structures and capital items, rather than the 'soft' area of staff training and capacity building. [100]

The population in Serbia saw a 78-day NATO onslaught on infrastructure which gave a further twist to its economic decline, with rising levels of unemployment and poverty, while hosting IDPs and refugees. The bombing of Novi Sad oil refinery and Pancevo industrial complex, for example, has left long-term environmental, health and social consequences.

BRCS supported an ICRC programme to provide stand-by generators to hospitals in Serbia which faced the winter of 1999/2000 with expectations of extended power shortages.[101]

A common sentiment expressed by host families, particularly in Albania, was a sense of abandonment by the international community once the refugees departed. There was an expectation of economic investment in return for the support that Albania had provided for the refugees. Some agencies in Albania and Macedonia left precipitately as soon as the refugees started to return to Kosovo: *'NGOs are lining up in Kukes and Blace like cars on a formula-one grid, waiting for NATO to raise the flag'* (Oxfam, 1999b).

However, DEC agencies probably did better in this respect. The majority have continued to work in Albania and Macedonia, partly with DEC funds, and with other resources. Refer to Chapter 5 for discussion of assistance to 'social cases' in local populations.

By itself, community-based rehabilitation and development will do little to alleviate the long-term structural problems in these countries or offset other impacts of the war, such as Macedonia's loss of trade with Serbia and access to electrical power from Kosovo. Oxfam is the only DEC agency, however, to advocate on issues around the 'Stability Pact', which has implications on the future recovery and development of countries in the region.

---

[99] More detail about the situation of local populations can be found in Section 8 of Volume II.

[100] Skhodra district in northern Albania (population 400,000) has received almost US$7,000,000 of assistance since the emergency (interview with District Director of Public Health, March 2000). Most of this has been in materials and construction. When the evaluators visited the polyclinic they found an extremely impressive building that had obviously been completely renovated. There were, however, extremely few patients and few doctors, with most of the new consulting rooms locked.

[101] In fact, power shortages were less severe than expected due to energy import agreements with friendly countries and a less severe winter than usual.

INGOs have proliferated in Kosovo but there seems to have been little monitoring of the impact of their presence. For example, INGOs are one of the main sources of employment, but there have been only very limited attempts at coordination of salary scales. Agencies have been employing highly over-qualified people as drivers, watchmen and in other similar roles.

9.2 Strengthening of Local Capacity/Working with Local Partners

NGOs in the Balkans have grown up only in the last 10 years and therefore the need for institutional support is still substantial. Most of the DEC agencies have to some degree worked with local partners. Principle 6 of the Code of Conduct states, *inter alia*, '*We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities … Where possible, we will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and cooperate with local government structures where appropriate*.'

DEC agencies used a variety of approaches in the Kosovo crisis. These included:

- Direct implementation: Oxfam's water project; much of CARE's work.
- Funding local partners: CAFOD, Christian Aid and Tearfund.
- Funding international partners: World Vision funded MAG for mine clearance.
- Funding local network partners: Christian Aid funded Diakonia Agapes in Albania.
- Funding international network partners: CAFOD funded CRS; BRCS supported ICRC/IFRC programmes.
- Programme Implementation through contractors: CARE carried out its mine clearance project through MineTech.

In Albania and Macedonia, most of the support for refugees in host families was implemented through local partners, while the refugee camps were the preserve of the INGOs.

The strengths of working with and through local partners were seen to be:

- Local partners 'knew the communities', could draw on a large force of local volunteers and required less expatriate involvement, thus offering the potential of wider coverage. Knowledge of local communities and local organisations facilitated better targeting.[102]
- Local partners were sometimes able to respond far faster than international agencies in the initial stages of the emergency.[103]
- By implementing through local partners, DEC supported the building of local disaster response capacity. Prior to the crisis, IFRC had provided support to local Red Cross societies and Tearfund had provided training for local partners.
- In Macedonia, support provided to MCIC by Christian Aid was used to support chronic

[102] For example, the Association of Albanians in Sarajevo started to compile lists of potential host families for Kosovo Albanian refugees in 1998.

[103] For example: the Albanian Red Cross in Elbasan; El Hilal in Macedonia.

'social cases' in order to '*balance the refugee crisis with the social crisis'*.[104] Humanitarian aid was, therefore, being used to address chronic structural problems and also to avoid tensions developing between population groups.

There were also challenges of working with local partners:

- Some partners had little or no experience of emergency work and most were unaware of the Code of Conduct principles, Sphere or other technical guidelines. The appropriateness of some assistance packages was questionable.[105] In Serbia, Oxfam partners were not collecting health data in collective centres, despite a concern with health issues. While Roma NGOs played an important mediatory role in meeting needs of Roma refugees, problems arose from inexperience.
- The use of local partners increased the potential for duplication and required tighter, better coordination. El Hilal, for example, used its own distribution lists.
- Where part of the motivation of local organisations was political or religious, this could jeopardise the impartiality of humanitarian assistance.[106]
- Working with local partners had the potential to reinforce political and ethnic divisions and discrimination. Albanians in Macedonia, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the work of some Macedonian NGOs.
- Reliance on local NGOs can affect coverage. In Serbia, several DEC agencies support Roma IDPs. However, this was mainly around Belgrade and Central Serbia where Roma NGOs were more vocal, and less in the south of the country.

The features of successful attempts at collaboration included:

- The partner's previous emergency experience and some capacity, such as El Hilal, EHO and MTS.
- Previous capacity-building relationships with partners. For example, Oxfam with WRV; SC with MTS; IFRC with National Red Cross societies. This involvement can include staff training, disseminating information about existing guidelines, support visits and evaluation of a partner's capacity.
- Close support for and monitoring of partner's work. The ACT evaluation (Silkin & Bouman, 1999) notes how problems can arise if expatriate support for a local NGO in an emergency is not handled well, although the NGO in question, Diakonia Agapes, welcomed the expatriate inputs provided by Christian Aid. MCIC in Macedonia resisted an influx of expatriates.

[104] Interview, MCIC, Macedonia, March 2000.

[105] MCIC in Macedonia, a CAFOD partner in Serbia.

[106] Concerns were expressed, for example, about MTS in Kosovo and El Hilal in Macedonia, although many informants noted the importance and effectiveness of the work of these organisations.

Local partners reported a number of ways in which they had benefited from the crisis. These included:

- Experience in organising large emergency operations.
- More volunteers.
- Increase in material resources (for example, ARC gained six Fiat vans for transport of volunteers from DEC funding through BRCS) and computer equipment.
- More experience in writing proposals and reporting.

Several DEC agencies attempted to use the emergency as an opportunity to strengthen the continuity of their programmes through the development of their networks of local partners. (Oxfam in Albania; SC in Serbia). The experiences of these agencies appears to have been largely positive.

During the refugee emergency some INGOs who previously worked in Kosovo neglected their Kosovo partners. In this respect, the record of the DEC agencies is better. Oxfam, for example, worked with the same disabled and women's groups before, during and after the refugee emergency, while SC maintained its relationship with MTS.

9.3 The Longer Term Context – from Relief to Rehabilitation

DEC Phase II funds have been spent within a political framework that defines the context as being one of 'rehabilitation' rather than 'emergency'.[107]

The plentiful resources available during the Kosovo crisis, have led to high local expectations about what the international community will deliver. Concerns are being raised about whether this is creating a 'dependency syndrome' at a time when, after the flood, funds are already beginning to dry up.

Given donor support for salaries, pensions and other social welfare benefits, opportunities to support a relief to development transition are better in Kosovo than in most countries in crisis. However, agencies face obstacles to support the transition:

- The lack of clear political framework for the province.
- The existence of two political systems. For example, Belgrade continues to pay welfare benefits in Serb enclaves.
- The underlying political complexity means that all interventions risk being appropriated by different parties within the majority community.
- Lack of coherence among multilateral structures and between donors.
- Local NGOs have proliferated in Kosovo. As in other 'transitional' countries, in Kosovo they are perceived by some as representing 'civil society' in a more democratic context. To what extent are these agencies supporting democratic, multi-ethnic solutions for the

[107] Internationally, the start of the reconstruction phase in Kosovo was signalled by the Donors Conference in July 1999. DFID closed its emergency offices in the region on 30 April 2000.

future? Agencies appear not to be considering these issues when doing capacity building with local partners.

In the DEC context there is a lack of clarity and variation in practice over the use of DEC funds for rehabilitation work. This issue is discussed in Chapter 12.

Timing of funding

Poor continuity of funding can undermine the connectedness of humanitarian interventions and funds seem to be less available in 2000.

DEC agencies were under pressure to spend the money available to them during Phase I or return the unspent amounts to the DEC 'pot'. Substantial funds have been available in Phase II, but the restrictions of timing on the use of DEC money has been of little added value in promoting connectedness.

However, some DEC agencies have provided examples of exceptions to this trend of poorly connected emergency operations, through maintaining continuity or presence and through working with local partners and local government.

9.4 Conclusions

A number of the DEC agencies saw the importance of continuing to work in Albania and Macedonia. This compared favourably with some other INGOs that left those countries as soon as the refugees returned to Kosovo.

The DEC member agencies have wide and varied experience of working with local partners. In some instances, partners' lack of experience of emergency work, limited capacities and unawareness of international humanitarian standards were weaknesses, underlining the importance of support to those agencies with training and capacity building.

The shift of work from relief towards rehabilitation in Kosovo underlines the importance for the DEC to develop and clarify its expenditure rules, in order that the early stages of rehabilitation work can be facilitated and member agencies' transition to longer term funding can be made easier.

9.5 Recommendations

(i) The DEC should clarify in its appeal publicity that money will be spent on emergency needs *and* on immediate rehabilitation needs — helping people to get back on their feet.

(ii) The DEC should modify the six-month rule for expenditure in order to provide more flexibility.

(iii) The DEC should consider the use of up to 5 per cent of funds for preparedness and capacity building work by member agencies for future emergencies.

Refer to section 12.12 for more details of these recommendations.

10. COHERENCE

This section looks first at coordination issues and then at the extent to which the DEC agencies complemented their emergency responses with advocacy work.

10.1 Overall Coordination

Coordination difficulties of the international response in Albania and Macedonia during the refugee crisis period have been well-documented, in particular UNHCR's poor performance (Hallam, 1999; Suhrke et al, 2000). Amongst other areas, the importance of sharing assessments and coordinating responses was exemplified in Kukes, Albania during April. Many agencies assessed hygiene needs but assessment reports were not shared, resulting in the over-distribution of hygiene kits (Herson, 1999).

In Kosovo, UNMACC was recognised as having done a good job in coordinating humanitarian mine action work, but DEC agencies felt that coordination of shelter and school rehabilitation work had been problematic. In Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia coordination has been to some extent less problematic, partly due to the lower numbers of agencies participating in the responses.[108]

Many factors undermined coordination:

- Huge inputs from NATO and bilateral donors, combined with their unwillingness to submit to UNHCR coordination.[109]
- Weakness of UNHCR and UNMIK (Grunewald & De Geoffroy, 1999).
- Marginalisation of UNHCR by bilateral donors and NATO?[110]
- Under-funding of UNMIK.[111]
- The high number of agencies that quickly became involved in the response.
- The large number of camps in Albania.
- Intense media scrutiny and pressure for profile.

Commentators have stressed the challenges of coordination when over 250 NGOs were present. There was an onus on agencies to support improved coordination. In this context, it appears that most DEC agencies showed a commitment to coordination and were generally

---

[108] In April 2000 there were approximately 36 international NGOs in Serbia and 50–60 NGOs in Montenegro (ICVA Belgrade). However, DEC agencies did point to coordination problems in Serbia, reportedly caused by poor leadership by UN agencies and the difficulties and sensitivities of relationships between state structures and NGOs.

[109] The Sphere Standards assume that *'There is a shared commitment among all those involved in humanitarian assistance to achieve the minimum standards, and to co-ordinate their response'* (The Sphere Project, 1998).

[110] The top six EU contributors to the Kosovo emergency together allocated US$278.8 million in public (non-military) humanitarian assistance in the March–June 1999 period; of this, UNHCR was allocated only US$9.8 million, or 3.5 per cent, directly, although halfway through the emergency it received ECHO funding (Suhrke et al, 2000).

[111] UNMIK was 50 per cent funded during 1999 and, at the time of the evaluation, there were less than 11 per cent of pledges for 2000 fufilled.

supportive of UNHCR's coordinating role and responsibility. Some examples of positive efforts to support coordination included:

- Tearfund seconded a water and sanitation engineer to UNHCR in Albania.
- BRCS provided a coordination delegate to ICRC in Pristina in response to the large number of National Red Cross societies setting up programmes in Kosovo.
- Oxfam lobbied publicly for more support to UNHCR although, unfortunately, this was mis-interpreted by some of the media and parts of UNHCR as an attack. Oxfam took a lead in contingency planning in Bosnia.
- CARE and CAD took on an 'Area of Responsibility' (AoR) in Kosovo.
- HAI took on the Cerentolovski old people's home at the suggestion of UNHCR.
- SC seconded a protection officer to UNHCR in Kosovo and was a lead agency in coordinating community services and education in Bosnia.

There was pressure for agencies from bilateral donors wanting 'their' national NGOs to work in 'their' camps, particularly in Albania. Tearfund was chosen by DFID in Elbasan because it was British, and Oxfam worked very closely with the British Army in Stenkovic in Macedonia and Korce in Albania. CARE managed the US-funded Camp Hope in Albania. However, the DEC agencies generally avoided the excesses of rampant bilateralism which were shown by some other INGOs. BRCS declined strong DFID offers to take on camp management of a British-run camp in Albania. In some cases, DEC agencies liaised between international agencies and local authorities.

More generally, DEC agencies also worked through their networks. BRCS resisted pressures to act bilaterally and supported the joint ICRC/IFRC operation in Phase I, although in Phase II it decided to become directly operational in Kosovo within the framework of ICRC programmes. Christian Aid worked through the ACT network, but also became operational in Kosovo.

The DEC's OSC put great emphasis on the importance of coordination in its feedback to the agencies on their 48-hour and four-week plans of action.

Inter-agency coordination is a costly activity in terms of senior staff time and has to be prioritised within agencies. Agencies may have to coordinate on a wide variety of axes:

- Geographical: district or prefecture coordination meetings.
- Sectoral: for example, shelter meetings.
- Donor: for example, EU, USAID, ECHO or other meetings.
- Philosophical: for example, advocacy groups.
- Network: for example, coordination between PNSs.
- Topic: special working groups on taxation, etc.

The increasing trend for agencies to work through their international networks is positive in coordination terms in one sense, as it can rationalise the operations of INGOs in the field. On the other hand, however, it also means that agencies may need to spend increasing amounts

of valuable time on internal, rather than, external coordination. Also, as has been noted above, in the pressure of a major high-profile international emergency, network partners tend to break ranks and go bilateral.

In Albania and Kosovo, humanitarian information centres appear to have played important roles and facilitated coordination within the NGO sector and with UN and other agencies. Lessons could be learnt from these examples. The DEC agencies should consider support for such ventures in the future (money, staff, materials, publications, etc.), leading to more on-the-spot dissemination of technical standards and lessons learnt to practitioners in the field.[112]

10.2 Coordination between DEC Agencies

Agencies had some informal contact in the field. The major example of cooperation which took place was in Kukes 2 camp where the following agencies played complementary roles:

- CARE: camp management.
- Oxfam: installed water supply and training of trainers in hygiene promotion for MSF and CARE workers.
- Tearfund: installed pit-latrines with support from Oxfam materials and provided solid waste collection.
- CAD: baby washing, nappies and baby food.
- SC: summer school activities.

This unplanned coordination of work by the DEC agencies raises the possible question of whether there would be merit in pursuing integrated collaboration in the future.

On the whole, coordination and contact between DEC agencies in the field was limited and there was general agreement by the agencies that a DEC coordination mechanism in the field in this emergency would not have added value.

10.3 Advocacy Work

The Terms of Reference (refer to Appendix 1) for this evaluation refer to advocacy activities, asking whether agencies undertook such work to '*complement their immediate relief actions'*. This section therefore outlines some of the public advocacy work undertaken by DEC agencies and raises some issues about the needs and opportunities for advocacy work during the Kosovo crisis.

As advocacy is only given a brief mention in the ToR and because of the limited team resources available, this report does not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of advocacy work undertaken by DEC agencies, nor does it look at the related areas of media and public communications work.

[112] ALNAP is considering establishing a Learning Support Office in the early stage of an emergency, to strengthen on-the-ground learning.

It should also be noted that not all DEC agencies undertake public advocacy work.[113] Furthermore, for those that do, it can often be undertaken within broader alliances and groupings, depending on the subject matter.

The following are some of the main advocacy issues which were raised by DEC agencies:

- CAFOD expressed deep concern about the humanitarian impact of the NATO bombing, warning of the dangers of the withdrawal of humanitarian agencies from Kosovo.[114]
- Christian Aid called for a cease-fire and continued negotiation.[115]
- Oxfam called for all parties to take a coherent approach to the humanitarian refugee crisis in Macedonia, that UNHCR's lead role be respected and supported and for UNHCR to appoint quality staff. It also called for NATO's logistical capabilities to be harnessed with greater effect.[116] Since the war, Oxfam has concentrated on advocacy work around the South Eastern Europe Stability Pact.[117] Recognising the imbalance between funding for the Balkans and for other emergencies in the world, Oxfam started a 'forgotten emergencies' appeal with its private donors in August 1999.[118]
- Save the Children called for urgent humanitarian access to Kosovo at the end of April 1999 and a SC staff member was the only NGO member of a UN assessment mission to Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro in May 1999.

Given the scale and the profile of the Kosovo crisis, those DEC agencies with an advocacy remit appeared to carry out limited public advocacy work during the Kosovo crisis. It seems that agencies were limited in their scope for advocacy by a number of factors:

- Agencies with staff on the ground had to weigh up the security risk to them from any public statements. This particularly related to staff in Serbia who worked under very difficult conditions, sometimes of harassment and surveillance.
- Internally some agencies found it difficult to find positions on which to base advocacy work.
- The overall intensity of media coverage and political activity surrounding the crisis may have made it doubtful that advocacy work would stand a chance of receiving any attention.

There appear to be two humanitarian issues on which agencies might have been able to carry out advocacy work:

---

[113] For example, this is not within the principles and approach of the BRCS, although advocacy is often carried out by the ICRC and IFRC.

[114] In March 2000, CAFOD called for a review of sanctions against Serbia.

[115] Policy statement on Kosovo, April 1999.

[116] In 1998, Oxfam had called for UN approved action to enforce a cease-fire in Kosovo as the 'least worst option'.

[117] Oxfam has published a number of policy and briefing documents on this topic.

[118] This initiative became a public campaign in May 2000 with the publication of 'An End to Forgotten Emergencies' briefing paper.

a) *Access to and protection for the population inside Kosovo during the NATO bombing.*
The Director of Save the Children, representing the DEC, pointed out the importance of access to and protection of the population inside Kosovo during the bombing at the House of Commons International Development Committee hearing on Kosovo in May 1999:

> *Anne Clwyd MP: Have you, as a (DEC) group, been pressing the Government on this point?*
>
> *Mr Aaronson: Not yet … To be perfectly honest I think it quite difficult for all of us in this country because this country has played such a leading role, which most people I think would regard as an honourable role, in pursuing the war. I think that puts us all in quite a difficult position. We might as well be honest and face up to it. I think it has taken us a while to try to work out for ourselves what does this really mean and are there aspect to this which if we took a couple of steps back we might say: 'Well, we are not actually totally happy'* (International Development Committee, 1999).

b) *The use of cluster bombs by NATO airforces.*[119]
Given that a number of DEC agencies have been active in the anti-landmine campaign, it was surprising that none raised the issue of the use of cluster bombs. These weapons are not covered by the 1999 Ottawa treaty, but now represent almost as much of a danger in Kosovo as landmines laid by the Serb security forces.[120] This became a particularly British issue, as British forces continued to use cluster bombs after the US had stopped, following concerns about the danger to civilians. Cluster bombs have killed 50 people since June 1999 and injured more than 150.[121] (for more information, see Section 6 in Volume II).

There was very little discussion or cooperation between, or common ground on advocacy work found by the DEC agencies.[122] Some agencies argued that it would have been impossible for any agreement to have been reached by the DEC grouping. The DEC itself presented both written and oral evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee hearing on Kosovo in May 1999.[123]

Mention should be made of advocacy work undertaken by DEC agencies in the field. There are a number of examples of good practice:

- Oxfam lobbied other agencies and the UN on standards and including gender and disability issues in the Macedonian camps.
- In Tirana, INGOs including CAD, CARE and Oxfam lobbied the UN Secretary-General on issues including the role of the UN agencies in coordination and the need to include the NGOs in consultations.
- Save the Children, in conjunction with UNICEF, lobbied successfully for UNMIK to ban the construction of large institutions for abandoned or separated children.

---

[119] Both humanitarian mine action projects funded with DEC money have cleared unexploded cluster bombs.

[120] CAFOD had a small reference to NATO's use of cluster bombs in a Landmines Update, August 1999.

[121] Report by UK Working Group on Landmines quoted in The Guardian, 8/8/00.

[122] Reportedly Merlin did call a meeting of DEC agencies to establish a common position, but this failed.

[123] The DEC Memorandum noted the importance of upholding international standards in relation to people's rights to humanitarian assistance, protection and return to their countries of origin.

Some local NGOs also undertook advocacy activities, notably MCIC in Macedonia and EHO in Serbia. MCIC conducted a public information campaign entitled *'Whole is when there is everything!'* aimed at encouraging inter-ethnic tolerance.[124]

In the broader context of the Kosovo crisis and the fact that the NATO bombing campaign was widely described as a 'humanitarian war', it is perhaps surprising that the NGO sector has apparently done little to analyse this concept or to contest it.

10.4 Conclusions

Both the DEC agencies and the DEC's OSC exhibited a commitment to supporting humanitarian coordination structures. Those agencies working within their international networks had to commit considerable time to internal coordination issues.

The low level of advocacy work by the agencies during the Kosovo crisis was perhaps surprising. The evaluation team felt that there were issues on which the DEC agencies could have worked on in an advocacy capacity.

10.5 Recommendations

(i) In the Kosovo crisis, humanitarian information centres appeared to play a positive role in information sharing, coordination, advocacy and standard setting. In future emergencies DEC agencies should consider support for such centres for the dissemination of technical standards, lessons learnt, etc.

(ii) The DEC Secretariat should play a more active role in the UK in facilitating the exchange of analysis and policy dialogue between agencies, with the objective of strengthening individual agency advocacy work, and identifying opportunities for collaboration between two or a small grouping of DEC agencies.

[124] This slogan came from a children's competition. The campaign included t-shirts in seven languages and was independently evaluated (MCIC, 2000b; MCIC, 2000a).

11. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

11.1 Introduction

Over the past decade the humanitarian community has introduced innovations to govern the provision of aid in complex emergencies (Leader, 1999). Three such innovations are:

- The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (IFRC, 1996).
- The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response of the Sphere Project (The Sphere Project, 1998; The Sphere Project, 2000)
- The People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel (Davidson, 1998).

All DEC agencies are signatories to the Code of Conduct, most have participated in the Sphere Project and several are signatories to the People in Aid Code. The evaluation examined how they were applied by the DEC agencies during the Kosovo emergency.

Box 2: The Code of Conduct

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy
5. We shall respect culture and custom
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects

Generally, the evaluation team found that awareness of the Code of Conduct and its principles, the Sphere Standards and the People in Aid Code was poor, and little attention was given to their application. The regional head of one DEC agency remarked, '*we have signed up to Code of Conduct and to Sphere, but what does that mean?*' Many local partners had never heard of either the Code or the Sphere Standards, and where DEC agencies worked through local or international networks, other agencies in the network did not necessarily share the same commitment to standards. There was very little monitoring of adherence to the Code and standards in agencies' planning and implementation of programmes and no requirement from the DEC to report against them.

11.2 Sphere Minimum Standards

Kosovo was the first emergency in which Sphere minimum standards in water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health could be 'field tested' . As a relatively new innovation it is perhaps not surprising that agencies did little to operationalise them during this emergency. An exception was Oxfam, who applied and monitored the Sphere Standards in the provision of water to refugee camps. CARE also fielded a 'Standards Consultant' in Albania to draw up guidelines for operationalising standards for camp and collective centre management and secondary distribution, and the supported research on the Ombudsman Project (Kelly, 1999).

Some DEC agency staff questioned the relevance of Sphere Standards in a European setting. However, the evaluation team felt that ensuring the application of minimum standards is an appropriate objective, and that those relating to assessment, monitoring and information systems are particularly important.[125] The humanitarian intervention in Albania and Macedonia met most of the Sphere health indicators, but operations were constrained by the failure to collect demographic data to the standards required. Sanitation often did not meet the Sphere Standards, and standards of food and non-food items varied greatly from agency to agency and even within the same agency. Most refugees stayed in private accommodation. Although Sphere Standards (under shelter and site planning) apply to this scenario, these were not referred to by agencies assisting those refugees. Weak coordination meant that overall monitoring of standards was poor. Without this there was no way of determining whether assistance did or did not meet acceptable standards. More contentiously, some aid agencies argued that maximum rather than minimum standards needed to be set, given the level of assistance provided in sectors such as shelter.

Some weaknesses with Sphere Standards were noted by DEC agency field staff, such as the lack of indicators relating to the needs of the disabled and older refugees. HAI are currently in discussions about including their 'best practice' guidelines on assisting older people in emergencies in Sphere Standards.

11.3 People in Aid Code

Five DEC agencies are signatories of the People in Aid Code. Some senior staff were unaware whether their organisation was a signatory or not. The People in Aid Secretariat reported that it had received a substantial number of complaints from aid workers returning from Kosovo. These included, inadequate inductions, debriefings and medicals, overwork and recruitment of inexperienced staff. It was not possible to link these concerns directly to DEC agencies. However, a few issues regarding staff management in DEC agencies were noted.

- The pressure to recruit staff quickly meant that induction processes were often minimal or non-existent. This meant that staff were inadequately briefed on issues such as Sphere Standards.
- In general, the security arrangements of DEC agencies for staff appeared adequate. A

[125] The Sphere mortality indicators were an exception, being inappropriately high for the good epidemiological profile and nutritional status of the population.

report of a safety and security workshop in Kosovo in November 1999 indicated there was room for improvement in agency security procedures (Van Brabant, 1999). However, no major security issues were brought to the attention of the evaluation team. Both CARE and World Vision employed full-time security officers. Oxfam had comprehensive security guidelines and deployed a security adviser during the initial return to Kosovo.

- In Kosovo, nepotism and ethnic tension means that agencies have faced particular constraints in implementing equal opportunity policies when recruiting national staff. It was noted, however, that many agencies have been slow to prioritise the recruitment of staff from minorities.

11.4 Impartiality and Humanitarian Need

The nature of the international intervention in Kosovo challenged humanitarian agencies' adherence to the principles of non-partisanship, impartiality and independence which are integral to the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct, and humanitarian action more generally.[126]

The Code of Conduct emphasises the fundamental principle of impartiality. That is, assistance will be prioritised on the basis of need alone independent of other considerations, and that relief programmes will reflect '*considerations of proportionality'*. The scale of the international response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999 raises questions about the selectivity of the international disaster response system on a global level and within the region affected by the emergency.

One aid worker who worked in Albania during the crisis writes: '*The response to the Kosovo crisis saw more money, more agencies and more media interest than any previous humanitarian operation'* (Porter, 2000). The DEC Kosovo appeal was the most successful appeal ever. The British government alone allocated £110 million for humanitarian aid. At a workshop in Pristina with DEC agencies, participants noted one consequence of this was an over-supply of aid and duplication of services.[127] Although the vast resources committed to the Kosovo emergency sits uneasily within a context of a global decline in aid budgets, the more important issue is whether the response was disproportionate compared to humanitarian needs elsewhere in the world.

In 1999, ECHO spent more money on humanitarian assistance in Kosovo than in the rest of the world put together (Oxfam, 2000). While donor governments gave US$207 per person through the 1999 UN appeal for Kosovo, those in Sierra Leone received US$16, and those in the Democratic Republic of Congo little over US$8 (Oxfam, 2000). The cost of Camp Hope in Albania for 3,000 refugees for two months was equivalent to the 1999 UN appeal for Angola (Porter, 2000). In Africa for the past 20 years, refugees have often had to survive on lower than basic food requirements. Kosovo refugees in some cases were receiving Turkish delight in complimentary food packages. In the emergency, 80,000 refugees were flown to other countries in Europe, something that would never be conceived of in an African crisis.

---

[126] The Code of Conduct incorporates the fundamental principles of the Red Cross — humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, universality, voluntary service and unity. Historically for the ICRC, these principles have served to legitimise their intervention in wars and position themselves with regard to the warring parties (Leader, 1999).

[127] Workshop, Pristina, 7 April 2000.

This disproportionate response was also apparent in donor investment in human rights protection and monitoring in Kosovo.

The lack of investment in needs assessment, noted elsewhere in the report (refer to Chapter 4), meant that the humanitarian response was not based solely on the assessment of need. The apparent disproportionate response to Kosovo indicates that at a global level the humanitarian system is not impartial, but selective and influenced by political factors as much as by humanitarian need.

This was also evident in the region. The withdrawal of humanitarian agencies from Kosovo and the massive support given to Kosovo Albanians as refugees and returnees, gave the impression of a selective and biased response by the international community. While the warring parties closed down humanitarian space in Serbia, there was an imbalance in the assistance given to refugees compared to Serbia and Montenegro; apparent not only in terms of quantity, but also the type of assistance.[128] In late 1999, there were 36 INGOs in Serbia and 50-60 in Montenegro compared to over 300 in Kosovo. Kosovo receives more humanitarian aid per capita than the rest of FRY.[129] This raises a question as to whether the casualties of the war were being treated equally according to need, or whether some were considered more deserving than others.[130] The latter would imply a discrimination that undermines the universality of humanitarian principles.

11.5 DEC Agencies and Impartiality

To what extent was the response of DEC agencies proportionate?

At the beginning of the Kosovo Appeal, the DEC-OSC noted that the scale of the response from members and the wider community 'may exceed the immediate needs of the affected population' (DEC, 1999a). The appeal was not capped. Global inequities of relief assistance were identified by DEC agency staff as an '*uncomfortable*' issue.[131] Several noted that the Kosovo emergency had consumed people and resources from other parts of the world. One aid worker expressed shock at seeing '*250 NGOs in a place the size of Wales'*. It appears, however, that only Oxfam took the step of cutting its Kosovo programme by 30 per cent, in order to focus on other emergencies. It has also used the case of Kosovo to draw attention to other 'forgotten emergencies' (Oxfam, 2000).

---

[128] International assistance to IDPs and refugees in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia has been limited mainly to the provision of minimal relief, while a range of non-material assistance has been provided to Kosovo Albanians. In one case reported to the evaluation team, OFDA decreed to an international NGO that seeds should be allocated to the Kosovo Serbs based on the size of the population, rather than on need.

[129] The UN funding requirements for 2000 are indicative, with US$199million requested for FRY and US$249million requested for Kosovo (OCHA, 2000).

[130] DFID noted with regards to Serbia '*There is no humanitarian crisis there'*. There have been no DFID visits to Serbia to assess the situation, and none is planned. (Interview, DFID, London, March 2000).

[131] Workshop, Pristina, 7 April 2000.

Like the international response generally, the largest proportion of DEC assistance in Phase I went to support refugees in Albania and Macedonia and in Phase II to relief and rehabilitation in Kosovo. The DEC agencies did no better than other agencies in assisting inside Kosovo during the bombing, although several did continue working in Serbia, Montenegro and the Republika Srpska on a reduced scale. How DEC funds were spent was correct in terms of how money was raised from the public — the media coverage was about Kosovo Albanian refugees. It is difficult, however, to conclude whether or not DEC funds were allocated proportional to needs in the region.

First, the ready availability of resources and lack of pressure from donors meant there was little requirement to prove needs.

Second, needs in Serbia and Kosovo differed and there were no comparative needs assessment.

Third, comparative expenditure was generally not monitored and reported on. Subsequent to the cease-fire, however, several agencies did increase their assistance outside Kosovo programmes, particularly to Serbia.[132]

11.6 Military Humanitarianism and Neutrality

The international intervention in Kosovo challenged the humanitarian principle of neutrality. For NATO and donor governments there was a blurring of humanitarian and political objectives. The British Secretary of State for International Development made this clear when she stated: '*It is clear that our humanitarian and military objectives are completely intertwined' and further '..in this conflict our humanitarian and military objectives are completely entangled'*.[133] NATO's General Jackson's also stated: '*We're all going down the same road. We are not rivals or competitors. There's a single mission with military and humanitarian dimensions*' (Humanitarianism and War Project & Humanitarian Law Consultancy, 1999). These objectives were entangled in the assertion by NATO governments that they were waging a 'humanitarian war'.

The blurring of humanitarian and political objectives was apparent in two ways: in the bilateralism of aid provision, and in NATO's support for and participation in humanitarian activities. Bilateralism was evident in operational actions of donor aid departments and the preference of donors to channel funds through NGOs. It was most marked in the refugee camps which were funded by donors, constructed by military contingents and managed by NGOs of the same nationality. Erseke camp near Korce, for example, was constructed by UK KFOR troops. Oxfam GB, Merlin and CARE UK which worked in the camp were offered DFID funding (Porter, 2000).

The military's participation in humanitarian activities and support to humanitarian operations reflected a trend stretching back over the past decade. In the Kosovo emergency they brought additional logistical resources, built refugee camps faster than NGOs, and provided a security

[132] BRCS, CAFOD, Christian Aid and Oxfam all made substantial commitments to needs in Serbia.

[133] Statements to the House of Commons 26 March 1999 and 27 May 1999.

umbrella that enabled agencies to work in Albania and deliver assistance to minority enclaves in Kosovo. The institutionalisation of the collaboration between military and humanitarian agencies was evident in the employment of military liaison officers by some agencies.[134] In Kosovo it is also apparent in the KFOR brigade areas which coincide with UNHCR designated AoRs, and in some municipalities KFOR chairs humanitarian coordination meetings.

Military participation in humanitarian activities is now common and of itself is not wrong. There are obviously risks to collaborating with military forces: of being coopted by military objectives, of becoming dependent on the military for access and thereby disempowering any alternatives (Pugh, 2000). The key issue in the Kosovo crisis, however, was that NATO was a party to the war and its military action increased the incidence of humanitarian need. The establishment of refugee camps, particularly in Albania, had a military as well as a humanitarian utility. While NATO professed to be on a '*humanitarian mission'*,[135] it also had political objectives:

> *KFOR and UNMIK are partners in an international effort to restore Kosovo and help the local population to transform the province into a free and democratic society open to all* (http://kforonline.com).

Agencies therefore needed to weigh up cooperating with the military to the benefit of refugees, over the potential loss of neutrality and impartiality.

In contrast to NATO leaders, the UN Secretary General noted the importance of respecting the distinction between humanitarian and military action, stating '*if these lines are blurred, there is a grave risk of irreparable damage to the principle of impartiality and humanitarian assistance*'. The UNHCR's evaluation also notes that its decision to work with NATO during the bombing was *a 'deviation from the traditional norm that humanitarians be impartial and neutral*' (Suhrke et al, 2000).

In a written submission to the House of Commons International Development Committee report on Kosovo the DEC sought to draw a division of labour between the military and aid agencies, arguing that '*military support should only be in logistics, infrastructure and security while humanitarian agencies should be responsible for refugee camps and programmes'* (International Development Committee, 1999). However, this distinction between humanitarian and military duties was difficult to maintain, especially in the glare of the international media. That neutrality was perceived to be compromised was apparent to DEC agency staff in Serbia who felt threatened seeing their organisations on CNN in the Albanian or Macedonian camps, in a situation where civilians in Serbia were also suffering.[136]

[134] CARE in Albania. In Pristina, UNMIK humanitarian Pillar I has a Special Civilian Military Officer attached to it.

[135] Interview, KFOR, Pristina, April 2000.

[136] Interview with Oxfam. Serbia, April 2000.

11.7 DEC Agencies and Neutrality

In this highly politicised and militarised environment how feasible was it for DEC agencies to sustain their neutrality and independence?

DEC agencies' views on the war differed, and within agencies there was often no consensus (see section 10.3). During the NATO air strikes, DEC agencies made little comment on NATO's involvement in relief activities, and did little to articulate their independence from NATO.[137] NATO government statements on humanitarian and military objectives and the concept of a 'humanitarian war' went by largely uncontested at the time. However, by continuing to work in areas of FRY subject to NATO air strikes (outside Kosovo) some DEC agencies did help sustain a measure of neutrality and independence, and have pursued this more actively in Kosovo working with all groups. One advantage of international agency networks and alliances is that they enable different sections to work with different parties.

During the refugee crisis, there is evidence that some DEC agencies also resisted pressures from donors to respond in particular places. For example, both Merlin and CARE resisted pressure from OFDA and the US ambassador respectively to operate a 24-hour health service in Camp Hope, on the grounds that there was no need. It was noted that DEC funds meant that some agencies did not have to take money from the British government, which according to one agency '*kept us honest'*.[138]

Most DEC agencies collaborated with NATO forces in implementing their programmes, taking advantage of their logistics or security to deliver assistance. Some implemented projects jointly with the military. Although several DEC agency staff expressed unease about too close an association, at a practical level 'pragmatism' was the order of the day. Others were excited by their contact with an efficient military machine: '*I asked for ten people and they turned up in the morning and did whatever was needed*.'[139]

Pragmatism, however, would not be considered sufficient justification to collaborate with warring parties in other situations. Maintaining neutrality would be essential for sustaining humanitarian access and to secure donor funding. In other contexts agencies have drawn up codes and policies to sustain the independence of humanitarian action (Leader, 1999). In the Kosovo emergency there was less incentive for this. In Kosovo, only Oxfam and the Red Cross had policies to guide staff on working with the military. CARE has subsequently commissioned a discussion paper on civil-military cooperation.

11.8 Conclusions

Awareness, application and monitoring of the Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards was poor.

[137] This contrasted to MSF, the most vocal critics of NATO's participation.

[138] Interview with CARE, London, March 2000.

[139] Interview with senior NGO manager, Skopje.

Given the entwining of political, military and humanitarian objectives in the Kosovo crisis, the DEC agencies could not escape being seen as partial. Collectively, they did not question the term 'humanitarian war' or point out the consequences of NATO air strikes.

Limited assessments meant it was difficult to judge if assistance was proportional to need and there was little monitoring of operations to ensure impartiality. The provision (in some cases over-provision) of assistance without adequate assessments of need undermines the principle of impartiality, as well as being inefficient.

However, agencies were able in the field to avoid some of the excesses of bilateralism, for example, by assisting refugees outside the camps, and to sustain a neutral position by providing assistance in Serbia and Montenegro.

Despite precedents of military involvement in humanitarian activities (for example, Bosnia) and a significant amount of policy dialogue, the issue was scarcely raised by DEC agencies during the emergency. Despite the collaboration, there remains a clear 'culture gap' between the military and NGOs.[140] Agencies' practice of working with the military varied and most lacked policies or guidelines for field staff.

DEC appeal funds can help to sustain the independence of DEC agencies.

The impact of the huge response to Kosovo and of the aid 'circus' on efforts to strengthen and professionalise the humanitarian system will need to be monitored by the DEC. At the same time Kosovo provides a marker against which donor responses to other emergencies can be judged.

11.9 Recommendations

(i) The DEC should require as a condition of membership that agencies support the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards.

(ii) The DEC should require member agencies to be signatories to the People in Aid Code.

(iii) The DEC should give more emphasis to human resource issues in future evaluations.

(iv) The DEC should require agencies to monitor their performance in relation to the Code of Conduct, Sphere indicators and the People in Aid Code. Indicators for monitoring application of the People in Aid Code should be developed. The Lessons Learning model of real time monitoring should be developed further to monitor their application.

[140] One NATO officer interviewed reported that he knew nothing about NGOs before coming to Kosovo. Another described the military as '*a rather a right wing organisation'* and the NGOs as '*anti-military tree huggers*'.

(v) The DEC should monitor the impact of the huge international response to Kosovo emergency on future emergencies.

(vi) Agencies should develop guidelines for cooperation with the military.

12. THE DEC

12.1 Context

The Disasters Emergency Committee was founded in 1963 and the Kosovo appeal is the 43rd appeal it has mounted. In 1996, the DEC was restructured, *inter alia* widening the membership from five to 15 and introducing a range of governance regulations, including the requirement for an independent evaluation after each appeal (Borton, Hallam & Landa, 1996b; Borton, Hallam & Landa, 1996a; Borton, Hallam & Landa, 1996c). This evaluation is the fourth since this requirement was introduced.[141]

The DEC underwent an organisational review in 1999 (Hailey, Elliot & May, 1999), the recommendations of which are being implemented in 2000.

The DEC's objective as formulated in its Memorandum of Association is as follows:

> *To support UK charitable sector NGOs ('agencies') in their task of alleviating acute human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the effects of a major disaster, by:*
>
> *a) providing an accredited national forum for joint fundraising by UK charitable voluntary sector NGOs ('agencies') in order to maximise the funds raised and facilitate immediate commitment from participating agencies;*
>
> *b) creating a focal point for the response of the public, the broadcasters and others to such disasters;*
>
> *c) facilitating agency cooperation, coordination and communication;*
>
> *d) ensuring that funds are used in an effective, timely, fully accountable way.*

The Kosovo appeal has been the largest DEC appeal ever, as shown in Figure 1. It tested the DEC systems and guidelines, in some cases to their limit.

12.2 Overall Strengths and Weaknesses of the DEC Kosovo Appeal

The participating agencies noted the following positive points:

- The appeal provided the agencies with substantial funds which were highly flexible in their application.
- It enabled some agencies to get up and running while raising money from donors and also to leverage money from donors.
- It enabled funding gaps to be filled.
- DEC money is politically 'neutral' and so could be spent, for example, in Serbia where it was difficult to raise donor funds.

Overall, flexibility was seen by the agencies as the key positive characteristic of DEC money.

[141] Earlier evaluations have been undertaken for Sudan, Hurricane Mitch (Central America) and Bangladesh.

Weaknesses most often noted were:

- Lack of forecasting of appeal income and therefore uncertainty about how money would be available to the agencies, disrupted planning.
- A complicated phasing system with overlapping dates.
- Limitations caused by the six-month rule, even though the phasing extended the overall period of expenditure from six to eighteen months.
- Too much money (agencies, particularly local partners, being stretched to spend).
- Unclear guidelines in terms of reporting and expenditure.

From the evaluation team's point of view, additional important issues arising were:

- Poor quality of the DEC planning and reporting framework.
- Poor quality of many of the plans and reports submitted by the agencies (and lateness).
- Limited capacity of the DEC Secretariat, for example to monitor agency reporting or to share information.
- Questions about the concept of the evaluation and the 'back-loaded' model.[142]
- Confusion in some agency field staff's minds about what the DEC is — some see it as another donor like ECHO, rather than as a collective framework of the agencies themselves.

12.3 Guidelines for Expenditure

As stated in its objectives, the DEC is a collective mechanism for raising public funds to meet '*acute human suffering'*. The appeal advertising speaks about urgent need. However, in the case of the Kosovo appeal, substantial amounts of DEC expenditure in this emergency fell outside the acute suffering criterion and have been committed to rehabilitation activities and, in some cases, in assistance to populations not directly affected by the crisis.[143]

The Operational Sub-Committee of the DEC was concerned about this 'leakage' and, while continually reminding agencies that funds were for those directly affected by the war, acknowledged that it was probably impracticable rigidly to enforce this guideline.[144]

Agencies interpreted the 'rules' differently and while some agencies, such as Oxfam and CARE, undertook projects in Albania after the refugees had returned home, World Vision did not spend DEC money in Albania because it thought such expenditure would be outside the DEC guidelines.

---

[142] The back-loaded model '*places the onus of judgement on member agencies themselves as to whether or not they are able to utilise funds in a way that will stand up to evaluation. Awareness that their work will be evaluated should deter from 'opting-in' those unsure of their capacity'* (DEC, 1999b).

[143] For example, a number of agencies work with populations in Albania, Macedonia and FRY not directly affected by the emergency.

[144] OSC comments on Phase II 'four-week plans of action' re-submissions, 18 November 1999.

The DEC Secretariat sometimes interpreted the guidelines inconsistently. In the case of assistance to schools, Christian Aid was told that this was not an appropriate use of funds[145] but BRCS, CARE, Oxfam and Save the Children did commit money to schools. World Vision was told that money could not be used for psychosocial projects, whereas other agencies used that heading without challenge.[146]

The DEC generally rules out in all appeals support to state education, religious buildings or teaching programmes and other development programmes.[147]

There are a variety of other areas where some guidance for agencies could be useful:

- Treatment of contingency funds — if required, these need to be incorporated into the relevant expenditure headings.
- Loans.
- Treatment of capital items.

12.4 The Six-Month Expenditure Rule

The DEC rules see the six-month rule as an important part of the 'contract' with the British public which emphasises that money donated will be spent quickly for emergency needs. It is also intended to prevent agencies salting money away in their reserves. Agencies that cannot spend their shares of DEC funds are encouraged to return unspent funds to the pool for redistribution rather than forcing themselves to spend money too quickly.

The phasing of the Kosovo appeal disbursements partially circumvented this rule. In several cases, agencies were allowed no-cost extensions from Phase II to IIb which effectively gave them a two-month extension.

The norm is that for each phase, however, the money has to be spent within six months.[148] Agencies found this rule restrictive when moving into more rehabilitation-type work. Those agencies working with local partners pointed out that the time frame can be a constraint when the speed of implementation is limited by capacity. Tearfund withdrew the projects to support the Novi Sad Christian Centre as the funding was for more than six months. MedAir did not execute the Bread of Life project (for Serb refugees to make bedsheets for collective centres in Kosovo) due to time constraints and logistical difficulties. Oxfam reported that time constraints meant it was not possible in Albania to go through a full community participation process.

---

[145] OSC comments on 48-hour plans of action, 2 April 1999.

[146] Source: World Vision UK headquarters interview. Reportedly the OSC has advised against the use of DEC funds for psychosocial projects, but there is no record of such a statement or of the exchange with World Vision.

[147] Written communication from the DEC Executive Secretary.

[148] Legal advice to the DEC is that agencies participating in an appeal have a legal entitlement to their share of the pool for six months only. After that they have an entitlement to what is disbursed to them by decision of the Executive Committee. If an agency does not return unspent funds, or delays their return, or spends funds beyond the six-month period without leave, the DEC would be entitled to seek legal redress. (Written communication from the DEC Executive Secretary).

For the Kosovo appeal, the expenditure stretched over a period of 18 months and the 'acute suffering' guideline was restrictive and inappropriate. Humanitarian standards indicate that agencies should be aware of connectedness issues and should avoid 'fire brigade' type interventions, given that needs can extend well beyond the six-month period.

In Kosovo, the evaluation team already saw evidence that donor funding was beginning to dry up. Given the flexibility of DEC money, it seems unfortunate that the DEC six-month rule also follows this short-term approach.

The current DEC structure works to raise money when there is substantial public, and by definition, media interest in an emergency. The DEC appeal approach therefore does little to broaden understanding of crises and perpetuates a view that these are one-off events in which the problems will be solved quickly by money. Given that the DEC is now becoming a substantial financial player in the humanitarian scene, discussion around the six-month rule may provide an opportunity to discuss with the broadcasters the possibility of 'deepening' the DEC message.[149]

12.5 Phasing

The phasing of expenditure was agreed by the Executive Committee of the DEC as a way of regulating the huge amount of money raised by the appeal. It also saw phasing as a way of providing flexibility to meet humanitarian needs, whether the refugees stayed in neighbouring countries or returned to Kosovo.

Agencies welcomed the phasing of the Kosovo appeal expenditure as an *ad hoc* way of dealing with the scale of the appeal income, while still retaining the six-month rule structure. However, they found the actual system which was implemented to be complicated and confusing. In future any such phasing should not involve overlaps.

In addition, agencies felt that the DEC Secretariat was slow to forecast income and this made planning difficult.

In the case of Phase II, for expenditure between August 1999 and January 2000, approval for the money was only given in mid-September, giving a more limited time for implementation.

Agencies also noted that disbursements of DEC funds were made on the basis of their percentage shares and with no link to what the agencies had requested.[150]

12.6 Dealing with Large Appeals

The agencies receiving the largest shares of the Kosovo appeal funds acknowledge that there were difficulties in absorbing such large amounts of money. In fact, quite early on, the OSC was aware of '*the risk that the scale of the response from both member agencies and the*

[149] The importance of the media coverage afforded to DEC appeals is substantial, given that a recent report on the coverage of global affairs on British television underlined the diminishing coverage during the 1990s (Stone, 2000).

[150] This issue is now being looked at with the proposed introduction of a Disbursement Protocol.

wider international actors may exceed the immediate needs of the affected population'.[151] It is therefore perhaps surprising that the Executive Committee took the relatively unusual step on 15 April 1 999 of extending the period of joint action (PJA) from the normal two to four weeks. Factors behind that decision included concerns about the forthcoming winter period and a wish to see the agencies continue their public collaboration.

12.7 Planning and Reporting

The DEC planning and reporting system comprises a 48-hour plan of action, a four-week plan of action and then financial and narrative reports to be completed one month after the end of the six-month period.

The evaluation team found a number of difficulties with this structure:

(i) While the 48-hour plan provided an important mechanism whereby agencies opted-in to the appeal, they were of little value for the evaluation because they were drawn up before any detailed response plans had been formulated.

(ii) The four-week plan of action is intended to provide the baseline information for the evaluation (DEC, 1999b). Although sometimes quite detailed, agencies often made substantial changes to their DEC expenditure plans later in response to changing circumstances in the field and/or to changing fundraising needs. In the case of Kosovo the sudden and unexpectedly rapid return of refugees to Kosovo in June 1999 was one such instance when agency plans had to change rapidly.[152]

(iii) However the practices of agencies in informing the DEC Secretariat of these changes varied considerably. In at least two cases it remained unclear to the evaluators exactly which programmes were covered by DEC expenditure.

(iv) There need to be standard procedures about informing the DEC Secretariat of changes of plan. An interim report at the 12-week mark, as implemented for the 1999 Orissa appeal, would help to record changes and might help the Secretariat to forecast better the level of funds unspent and likely to be returned.

(v) There were a number of problems with the final reports:

- Some agency reports were good, but others were of very varying quality and did not always follow the DEC format.
- It was sometimes very difficult to work out exactly what DEC money had been spent on, making it difficult, if not impossible, to establish accurately how DEC funds had been spent both geographically and sectorally.
- For the purposes of this evaluation, Phase II reports were late. This was partly because the one month deadline for reporting is too short for many programmes, particularly those executed by partners or large programmes covering a number of countries.

[151] OSC comments on 48-hour plans of action, 2 April 1999.

[152] Informants noted that donors such as ECHO were unusually flexible in this situation.

Final reports were not looked at in any systematic way by the DEC Secretariat, even for conformity with the format. Although the OSC does make initial comments on the 48-hour and four-week plans, it does not look at the final reports. In current practice, the reports were therefore only used by the evaluation team.


Interestingly, none of the Plans of Action or final reports is seen by other DEC agencies. While the circulation of large amounts of paper or large electronic files might not be useful, the availability of documents on a DEC intranet database might facilitate the sharing of information.

There needs to be clarification as to the purposes of the plans and reports. There should be capacity in the DEC Secretariat to do the basic checking of the final reports. The formats should be revised.

12.8 Agency Capacity and Allocation of Funds

The basis on which the DEC allocates money as a share of the cake is a fairly crude estimate of agency income (refer to Figure 4).

Figure 4: Allocations from DEC for the 12 agencies



It is not fine tuned for each emergency. There is a large differential between the percentages of the agencies, with three[153] taking nearly two-thirds of appeal income and four agencies[154] taking less than 6 per cent. The 1999 organisational review proposed that no one agency should receive more than 25 per cent of the overall appeal total.

The allocation of funds is a difficult and sensitive issue. The team felt that there should be some facility available to the DEC to recognise the particular capacity of an agency within a region. For example, in the case of Kosovo, Children's Aid Direct appears to be an agency whose prior position in the region should have made it eligible for additional funds.

[153] BRCS, Oxfam and SC.

[154] Children's Aid Direct, Concern, Help the Aged, Merlin.

Factors which any new allocation system could take into account include:

a pre-existing presence in the area.
previous relationships with local partners which have a proven capacity for emergency response.

12.9 Role of the DEC Evaluation

The primary objectives of the independent evaluation are:

(i) *To ensure transparency and accountability in the use of funds provided by the British public.*

(ii) *To encourage member agencies to learn individually and collectively from their experiences in responding to major disasters* (DEC, 1999b).

(iii) *To encourage the development of good practice and the attainment of acceptable standards among member agencies (Section 1 of DEC Handbook).*

(iv) *Management control, to provide a basis for disciplining poor performers (inherent in the evaluation given the references in the DEC handbook to sanctioning those criticised by the evaluation.*

The independent evaluation is also intended to play a key role in the so-called 'back-loaded' model of funding which the DEC adopted in 1996. The knowledge that an independent and publicly available evaluation will be carried out is meant to ensure that agencies abide by DEC rules and do not, for example, commit themselves to spending more money than they effectively can.

In effect the evaluation has audit, disciplinary and lesson-learning functions. The experience of this evaluation indicates that all these functions cannot be discharged and do not sit well together.

The evaluation team found the following difficulties:

- The scale and range of the DEC-funded programmes in a major appeal can be huge. It is not possible to carry out effective evaluations of those programmes, unless the agency itself has its own well-established monitoring and evaluation system in place. In this evaluation, the work of the team was facilitated when the agency had carried out its own evaluation, as for example in the case of the British Red Cross and, to an extent, Christian Aid (Silkin & Bouman, 1999; UNHCR, 1999).
- There are methodological difficulties about what is being evaluated. While the emphasis is on the use of DEC funds, these are often used as contributions to larger programmes or in support of larger programmes. In those cases, the programme document for the whole programme should be baseline against which the evaluation is carried out. The shortcomings of the DEC four-week plan of action has already been mentioned in Chapter 12.
- The DEC evaluation cannot achieve sufficient detail to be a substitute for individual agency evaluations. It is not clear that an external evaluation is the best vehicle for promoting institutional learning and providing discipline within the DEC system.

- This evaluation has highlighted generally weak monitoring and evaluation systems. It is possible that the DEC evaluation is weakening rather than strengthening those systems, by removing the need for agencies to carry out their own evaluations.
- Agency transparency varied. Some were excellent in facilitating access to internal reports and key former staff members. A small number questioned the need for this access and in at least one case appeared to conceal agency difficulties.

This evaluation was preceded by a lesson-learning exercise, commissioned by the DEC and carried out by Valid International (Hallam, 1999). The documents from this exercise were important reference documents for the evaluation team, particularly because the lessons-learning team was able to interview a range of agency staff and other informants while the emergency was still under way. However, it is perhaps questionable whether it makes sense to carry out a lesson-learning exercise before the main evaluation. It is also noted that there was a long delay before the final report could be circulated. Unfortunately the timing of the lesson-learning exercise in June 1999 at the time that the refugees were going home meant that no substantial interviewing of beneficiaries could take place.

Several agency staff said that they would welcome more detailed feedback on their agency's performance from the evaluation team than could be included in the report and wonder whether separate de-briefings by the evaluation team might be possible. The agency summaries in Volume III are intended to provide some of this feedback.

12.10 Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the findings of an evaluation of one appeal. They need to be considered along with the findings of evaluations of previous appeals and in conjunction with the DEC's organisational review. A number of them will also require discussion and negotiation with other DEC stakeholders, especially the DEC's media partners:

(i) The DEC should clarify in its appeal publicity that money will be spent on emergency needs *and* on immediate rehabilitation needs — helping people to get back on their feet. This will require a carefully designed media strategy, but should be seen as an opportunity to convey to other DEC stakeholders (including the public and the media) the true nature of many emergencies, particularly complex political emergencies that are rarely short-term six-month events.

(ii) While the formula may vary from emergency to emergency, the DEC should modify the six-month rule to say that the bulk of the funds should be spent within six months, but a certain percentage could be carried forward for a period of expenditure of up to twelve months. This might vary between 20 per cent and 40 per cent depending on the nature of the emergency.

(iii) In addition the DEC should consider the use of up to 5 per cent of funds for preparedness and capacity-building work by member agencies for future emergencies. Some of this 'development' fund could also be used for research, learning and training initiatives in the humanitarian field that would improve the quality of member agencies' response capacities. This would require discussion and agreement with other DEC stakeholders, such as the media.

(iv) If funds are disbursed in phases, these should not overlap. The DEC Secretariat should improve its information flow to member agencies regarding phasing and anticipated income in order to facilitate agency planning.

(v) Drawing on the extensive experience of member agencies, and the pattern of donations from recent appeals, the Secretariat should improve its ability to forecast appeal income in order to facilitate appeal and agency planning, and to inform decisions about the length of the period of joint action.

(vi) The planning and reporting framework needs to be reviewed. This review should be done in conjunction with discussions about the role of the independent evaluations, drawing on the experience of this and recent appeal evaluations. A 12-week report should be instituted which, *inter alia,* would register any major changes of plan made by agencies and give the DEC Secretariat a forecast of expenditure and unspent funds.

(vii) Rules for agencies to notify the Secretariat of changes of plan from the four-week plan of action should be drawn up, and should require agencies to provide notification in writing.

(viii) The DEC Secretariat should have the resources available to provide more substantial support to the OSC and to the agencies than is now available. It should consider the appointment of a 'desk officer' post to *inter alia* monitor agency reporting; collate, analyse and disseminate information from outside sources on the emergency; facilitate information sharing, meetings and policy discussion between member agencies.

(ix) A number of recommendations in this report relate to the development of standards and good practice within the agencies and the DEC should consider the appointment of a humanitarian standards and learning post to stimulate sharing of lessons and training, both internally and externally with other humanitarian players. This would be a fixed term contract against specific terms of reference and could be responsible for promoting learning from appeal evaluations among member agencies.

(x) The DEC should review the role of the independent evaluation in the light of the experience of this and previous evaluations. In particular, this review should look at how best to tackle the different objectives of accountability, disciplinary control and lesson-learning. It should look at the interaction between the evaluation and agencies' own monitoring and evaluation procedures. It should also look at how best the evaluation process can be implemented in the early days of an emergency and whether or not there should be a lesson learning exercise at that stage. There are a number of options which the DEC could consider. Two are presented here for further consideration:

a. Development of an accredited monitoring and evaluation system to be used by each agency. In such a system the DEC would set certain standards and exercise a quality-control function, for example by reviewing terms of reference and approving the independence of the proposed evaluation team for each agency. The DEC evaluation could then be an overall meta-evaluation, drawing on the agency evaluations, investigating problem areas or key issues and drawing out overall lessons.

b. Identifying more clearly the outputs required from the evaluation team, to enable the multiple objectives to be met. For example, a number of separate and 'layered' reports could be prepared, developing the precedent set by this evaluation. Thus, an overview report with an accessible executive summary could be used to fulfil the accountability objective. A more detailed lesson-learning report could be prepared

for the member agencies, part of which would be disaggregated by agency. The impact of the latter would be strengthened by the evaluation team presenting their findings on a bilateral basis to each agency. This option would inevitably require much more time and resources than the current evaluation model.

(xi) The DEC should look at whether some system of assessment can be introduced which will fine tune the distribution of funds to agencies according to their capacities for the particular emergency. This should be part of the DEC organisational review.

(xii) The DEC should clarify the rules for funding projects from DEC appeal funds. They should specify any activities which are ruled out for funding and clarify and disseminate guidelines for the treatment of contingency funds in accounts, and the disposal of capital items.

(xiii) The DEC should update its basic data on its member agencies on a regular basis, including up to date annual reports and updated list of relevant policy statements. This could provide a useful reference source for future evaluators.

(xiv) In order to encourage learning from this evaluation and also in order to gauge the evaluation's longer term usefulness, it is suggested that each DEC agency should prepare a short report between six and twelve months after the evaluation has been published. This note would describe the follow-up steps taken in response to the findings and recommendations of this report. The DEC's OSC could prepare a simple guidance note on the format for these reports and they would be shared between the agencies.

(xv) There should be a clear and time-limited process put in place within the DEC to take forward the above recommendations.

13. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a full list of recommendations from the preceeding chapters. A clear timetable should be put in place to review and (where they are accepted) to implement these recommendations. See also recommendation 32 below. This process should be put in place by the DEC Secretariat, in consultation with member agencies.

Preparedness

1. In complex political emergencies, effective preparedness and response plans depend on access to informed political analysis. Experience of the Kosovo crisis indicates that DEC agencies need to give more thought to how available independent political analysis can be used to inform decision-making. The DEC secretariat can play an important role, by facilitating information sharing and contingency planning among its member agencies. See also recommendation 12 below.

2. The report identifies a number of factors that contribute to strong preparedness capacity, such as in-house emergency staff available at short notice, well-defined expertise in a particular sector, efficient recruitment procedures and good logistics systems. An established presence within the region and existing relationships with local partners were also important elements affecting an agency's preparedness and timely response. Each DEC agency should review its performance in the Kosovo crisis against the factors identified in this evaluation, and take steps to strengthen its preparedness capacity. Smaller agencies, which cannot afford a stand-by emergency capacity, need to have procedures for accessing resources, of all kinds, at short notice.

3. RedR plays an important role in supporting almost all DEC agencies, through training and especially through its specialist register of emergency personnel. The DEC should explore with its members and with RedR how to support RedR's training programmes for future emergencies.

Appropriateness

4. The general lack of assessments in the Kosovo crisis was a weakness. Paying attention to Sphere Standards, it is recommended that DEC agencies review their assessment skills and capacities, in order to give assessment a higher priority in future emergencies. When reviewing 48-hour and four-week plans of action, it is recommended that DEC's OSC look for evidence that DEC member agencies are satisfactorily carrying out assessments and, as far as possible, consulting with beneficiaries.

Coverage

5. Gender analysis was weak in assessments and programme design by almost all agencies. This needs to be strengthened which may require additional skills. Opportunities for learning between DEC agencies should be explored. Again, this is an issue that DEC's OSC should monitor and draw agencies' specific attention to when reviewing 48-hour and four-week plans of action.

6. In complex political emergencies affecting multiple locations and population groups on both sides of the conflict, DEC agencies need to strengthen their systems for monitoring whether their programmes are responding to needs in a balanced and impartial way. At a

minimum, better monitoring of expenditure and delivery of aid resources to different population groups would help.

7. The Kosovo crisis offers an important opportunity for the humanitarian system to learn lessons about assisting large numbers of refugees in private accommodation and with host families. DEC agencies and/or the DEC Secretariat should explore ways of facilitating lesson learning on this topic with other agencies, such as UNHCR and IFRC in order to ensure that these lessons are not lost.

Protection

8. In war-induced emergencies increasing prominence is given to the protection of vulnerable groups in addition to life-saving assistance. In such contexts, DEC agencies should give greater attention to protection objectives when designing and implementing their humanitarian response. This should be reflected better in the DEC reporting framework.

Monitoring and reporting

9. The DEC agencies need to improve the standards of their monitoring and evaluation systems. The DEC secretariat should support some collective work in this area, as part of work on developing future DEC evaluations (see recommendations 26 and 27 below).

Cost efficiency

10. Most DEC agencies are understandably wary about coming together to procure items. They fear extra bureaucracy and delays. However, there may be a case for agencies — particularly smaller agencies — to have collective stand-by arrangements for provision of commonly used items such as household kits. This should be explored by DEC agencies. There may also be scope for more information sharing between agencies (transport routes, hauliers, sources, etc). This should be considered once the DEC Secretariat is strengthened.

Coherence

11. In the Kosovo crisis, humanitarian information centres appeared to play a positive role in information sharing, coordination, advocacy and standard setting. In future emergencies DEC agencies should consider support for such centres for the dissemination of technical standards, lessons learnt, etc.

12. The DEC secretariat should play a more active role in the UK in facilitating the exchange of analysis and policy dialogue between agencies, with the objective of strengthening individual agency advocacy work, and identifying opportunities for collaboration between two or a small grouping of DEC agencies.

Performance standards and humanitarian principles

13. It is recommended that the DEC require, as a condition of membership, that agencies support the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards.

14. Currently, there is low awareness of the Sphere Standards and Code of Conduct, particularly in the field. This needs to be changed, with agencies making greater efforts to disseminate the Code and Sphere Standards internally within the agency and with

partners. It is recommended that the DEC require agencies to monitor their performance in relation to both the Code and Sphere. Real-time monitoring, either through the model of the DEC Kosovo Lesson Learning Study, or through early fieldwork by the independent evaluation team, should be developed to support this.

15. All DEC agencies should develop guidelines for working with the military, to help field staff through the dilemmas they may face on the ground, and to ensure consistency of approach.

16. DEC agencies should continue to monitor the consequences of the huge response to the Kosovo emergency, in terms of its impact on allocations of humanitarian aid to future emergencies, in the interests of promoting impartiality at the global level.

17. The DEC, as a body, should give more emphasis to human resource issues. It should consider requiring agencies to be signatories to the People in Aid code as a condition for membership. It should also include human resource issues in future evaluations, developing appropriate indicators.

18. As a number of recommendations relate to the development of standards and good practice within the agencies, the DEC should consider the appointment of a '*humanitarian standards and learning post'* to stimulate sharing of lessons and training, both internally and externally with other humanitarian players. This would be a fixed term contract against specific terms of reference and could be responsible for promoting learning from appeal evaluations amongst member agencies, and for promoting broader humanitarian policy dialogue.

The DEC appeal and expenditure

19. The DEC should clarify in its appeal publicity that money will be spent on emergency needs *and* on immediate rehabilitation needs, helping people to get back on their feet. This is important to improve connectedness. It will require a carefully designed media strategy, but should be seen as an opportunity to convey to other DEC stakeholders (including the public and the media) the true nature of many emergencies, particularly complex political emergencies that are rarely short-term six-month events.

20. The current six-month rule has been broken in practice in the Kosovo crisis and therefore needs to be addressed. While the formula may vary from emergency to emergency, the DEC should modify this rule to say that the bulk of the funds should be spent within six months, but a certain percentage could be carried forward for a period of expenditure of up to 12 months. This might vary between 20 per cent and 40 per cent depending on the nature of the emergency. Thus, during large-scale emergency responses that have received a substantial immediate donor response, agencies could retain some DEC funding for a later stage when donor interest has declined yet needs persist. Again, this should improve connectedness.

21. In addition the DEC should consider the use of up to five per cent of funds for preparedness and capacity-building work by member agencies for future emergencies. Some of this 'development' fund should also be used for research, learning and training initiatives that would improve the quality of member agencies' response capacities. This, and the recommendation above, would require discussion and agreement with other DEC stakeholders, such as the media.

22. If funds are disbursed in phases, these should not overlap. The DEC Secretariat should improve its information flow to member agencies regarding phasing and anticipated income in order to facilitate agency planning.

23. Drawing on the extensive experience of member agencies, and the pattern of donations from recent appeals, the secretariat should improve its ability to forecast appeal income in order to facilitate appeal and agency planning, and to inform decisions about the length of the period of joint action.

24. The planning and reporting framework needs to be reviewed. A 12-week report should be instituted which, *inter alia,* would register any major changes of plan made by agencies and give the DEC secretariat a forecast of expenditure and unspent funds. In addition, rules for agencies to notify the secretariat of changes of plan from the four week plan of action should be drawn up, and should require agencies to provide notification in writing. See also recommendations 25, 26 and 27 below.

25. The quality of financial reporting needs to be improved, and the links between financial and narrative reporting. Specific suggestions are included in Appendix 10. Some basic information on unit costs within the DEC reporting system would increase levels of accountability and measurements of cost efficiency.

26. The DEC should review the role of the independent evaluation in the light of the experience of this and previous evaluations. In particular, this review should look at how best the different objectives of accountability, disciplinary control and lesson learning should be tackled. It should look at the interaction between the evaluation and agencies' own monitoring and evaluation procedures. It should also look at how best the evaluation process can be initiated in the early days of an emergency and whether or not there should be a separate lesson learning exercise at that stage.

27. There are a number of options which the DEC should consider. Two are presented here:

    (i) Development and adoption of an accredited monitoring and evaluation system to be used by each agency. In such a system the DEC would set certain standards and exercise a quality control function, for example by reviewing terms of reference and approving the independence of the proposed evaluation team. The DEC evaluation would then be an overall meta-evaluation, drawing on the agency evaluations, investigating problem or key issue areas and drawing out overall lessons.

    (ii) Improving the current model by identifying more clearly the outputs required from the evaluation team, to enable the multiple objectives to be met. Developing the precedent set by this evaluation, a number of separate reports would be prepared. For example, an overview report with an accessible executive summary would be used to fulfil the accountability objective; a second more detailed lesson-learning report would be prepared for the member agencies, part of which would be disaggregated by agency. The impact of the latter would be strengthened by the evaluation team presenting their findings on a bilateral basis to each agency. This option would probably require more time and resources than the current evaluation model.

28. The DEC should look at whether some system of assessment can be introduced which will fine tune the distribution of funds to agencies according to their capacities for the particular emergency. This should be part of the DEC organisational review.

29. The DEC should clarify the rules for funding projects from DEC appeal funds. They should specify any activities which are ruled out for funding and clarify and disseminate guidelines for the treatment of contingency funds in accounts, and the disposal of capital items.

30. The DEC should update its basic data on its member agencies on a regular basis, including up to date annual reports and updated list of relevant policy statements. This would provide a useful reference source for future evaluators.

31. The DEC secretariat should be given additional resources to provide more substantial support to the OSC and to the agencies than is now available. It should consider the appointment of a *desk officer* post to *inter alia* monitor agency reporting, collate analyse and disseminate information from outside sources on the emergency, facilitate information sharing, meetings and policy discussion between member agencies.

32. In order to encourage learning from this evaluation and also in order to gauge the evaluation's longer term usefulness, each DEC agency should prepare a short report between six and twelve months after the evaluation has been published. This note would describe the follow-up steps taken in response to the findings and recommendations of all three volumes of this evaluation. The DEC's OSC should prepare a simple guidance note on the format for these reports and they would be shared between the agencies.

Some of these recommendations need to be considered along with the findings of evaluations of previous appeals and in conjunction with the DEC's organisational review.

REFERENCES

Please also refer to the list of background documents in Appendix 11

Barutciski,M. (2000) Solutions and Responses to the Humanitarian Crisis in Kosovo (1998-1999). Prevention and Preparedness Regarding the Refugee Emergency (DFID; Refugees Study Centre).

Bibby,S. (1999) Public Health Indicators - Draft (Oxfam).

Borton,J., Hallam,A. & Landa,C. (1996c) The Structure and Functioning of the 'New' DEC: a Discussion Paper - Draft.

Borton,J., Hallam,A. & Landa,C. (1996b) The Structure and Functioning of the 'New' DEC: Final Discussion Paper.

Borton,J., Hallam,A. & Landa,C. (1996a) The Structure and Functioning of the 'New' DEC: Resolving the Outstanding Issues. Report to the Steering Committee.

CARE International (2000) The Kosovo Crisis - What can we Learn? (Second draft).

Chairman's Conclusion (2000). Regional Funding Conference Brussels, March 29-30, 2000 (Relief Web).

Chomsky,N. (1999) *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo.* USA: Pluto Press.

Christian Aid (1999) Kosovo Refugee Emergency 24th August.

Coates,K. (2000) 'Ethical Imperialism: The War after the War.', in K. Coates (ed) *The Spokesman.* Nottingham: Russel Press Ltd.

Davidson,S. (1998) *Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel.* London: Relief and Rehabilitation Network, Overseas Development Institute.

DEC (1999b) DEC Handbook: Rules and Guidelines (Draft).

DEC (1999a) Operations Sub-Committee comments on 48-hour plans of Action for Kosovo appeal.

DFID (2000) Kosovo Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Programme - Report on Activities: 26 March 1999 to 31 March 2000.

FAO & WFP (1999) Special report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Kosovo Province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Fennell,J. (1998) Emergency Assessment and Contingency Plan. Albania/Macedonia (CARE International).

Gowan,P. (2000) 'The Euro-Atlantic Origins of NATO's Attack on Yugoslavia', in T. Ali (ed) *Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade.* UK: Verso.

Grunewald,F. & De Geoffroy,V. (1999) 'Kosovo: Drawing Lessons from a Disaster', *RRN Newsletter 15.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Guest, I. (2000) Misplaced Charity Undermines Kosovo's Self-Reliance (Overseas Development Council).

Hailey,J., Elliot,S. & May,N. (1999) DEC 1999 Organisational Review.

Hallam,A. (1998) Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies, *Good Practice Review*, vol. 7.

Hallam,A. (1999) Kosovo Crisis: Lesson Learning Study. Final Report (Valid International).

HelpAge International (2000) International DEC Kosovo Crisis Appeal Phase II Report.

Herson,M. (1999) Macedonia Kosovar Refugee Situation (Oxfam).

House of Commons (2000) Select Committee on Foreign Affairs - Fourth Report, Kosovo.

Humanitarianism and War Project & Humanitarian Law Consultancy (1999) The Interaction of NATO-related forces with humanitarian actors in the Kosovo Crisis. Discussion note prepared for Netherland's Foreign Minister's workshop.

ICG (1998) Kosovo Spring: Report on Kosovo.

IFRC (1996) Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.

Ignatieff,M. (2000) *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond.* London: Chatto and Windus.

International Development Committee (1999) Kosovo: The Humanitarian Crisis (Third Report).

Kelly,C. (7/6/99) Draft standards for project operations in Albania.

Lawrence,M. & Borrel,A. (1999) Joint WFP/UNHCR Food Needs Assessment of Minorities in Kosovo.

Leader,N. (1999) 'Humanitarian Principles in Practice: A Critical Review', *RRN Discussion Paper 3.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Malcolm,N. (1998) *Kosovo: A Short History.* UK: Macmillan.

MCIC (2000a) Report on the Public Opinion Poll concerning the Project 'Raising Public Awareness'.

MCIC (2000b) Results from the Examination of the Public Opinion on the Refugees to the Republic of Macedonia.

Minear,L., Van Baarda,T. & Sommers,M. (2000) NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis, *Occasional Paper #36.*

OCHA (1999) Report of the Interagency Needs Assessment Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

OCHA (2000) UN Consolidated interagency Appeal for Southeastern Europe Humanitarian Operation.

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights (1999) Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told: An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998 to June 1999 (Part I).

Oxfam (1999c) Regional Strategic Framework for the Balkans Emergency (July).

Oxfam (1999b) Sitrep 10. Oxfam Albania. June 14th 1999.

Oxfam (1999a) Women's Role in Camps.

Oxfam (2000) An End to Forgotten Emergencies.

Paul,D. (1999) 'Protection in Practice: Field-Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm', *RRN Network Paper 30.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Porter,T. (2000) The Partiality of Humanitarian Assistance - Kosovo in Comparative Perspective, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*

Pugh,M. (2000) Civil-Military Relations in the Kosovo Crisis: An Emerging Hegemony - Draft (University of Plymouth; Copenhagen Peace Research Institute).

Save the Children (1999) Save the Children Calls for Urgent Humanitarian Access to Kosovo.

Shearer,D. (1999) Macedonia: comments on the general situation and future projections (Save the Children).

Silkin,T. & Bouman,D. (1999) One, Two, Many …. But Not Yet Whole. Mid-Term Evaluation Emergency Appeal EUKC91 of ACT in Macedonia and Albania (Christian Aid).

Silkin,T., Kieffer,G. & de Klerk,T. (2000) Report of an Evaluation of EUBK91 (ACT).

Stone,J. (2000) Losing Perspective: Global Affairs on British Terrestrial Television 1989-1999 (Third World and Environment Broadcasting Project).

Stone,M., Anema,F. & Wissink,H. (2000) The Balkans Evaluation. An Examination of the Role of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's Response to the Balkans Crisis (ICRC; IFRC).

Suhrke,A., Barutciski,M., Sandison,P. & Garlock,R. (2000) The Kosovo Refugee Crisis - An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response.

The Sphere Project (1998) The Sphere Project - Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Preliminary Version).

The Sphere Project (2000) Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Final Version).

The World Bank (1999) The World Bank Group Response to Post Conflict Reconstruction in Kosovo: General Framework for an Emergency Assistance Strategy.

UNHCR (1999) Recommended Food Aid Strategy for Internally Displaced and Returnees in Kosovo.

UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe (1999a) Preliminary Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.

UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe (1999b) Second Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.

Van Brabant,K. (1999) NGO Security management Workshop in Kosovo - Prizren. Only available on-line: www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/newslet/kosovsec.html (Overseas Development Institute).

WHO (1999) Health Needs Assessment in Kosovar Refugees in Host Families in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Williams,S. (2000) Gender and Human Rights in the Macedonian Refugee camps (Oxfam).

Woodward,S. (1995) *The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War.* Washington: Brookings Institute.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Terms of Reference

Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds
Terms of Reference
Approved: 22July 1999

1. Background

DEC agencies have been present in the Balkans for much of the past decade, including in Kosovo, where assistance has been provided against a background of conflict between Serb and Albanian. The commencement of the NATO bombing of Serbia on 24 March 1999, following the breakdown of negotiations with President Milosevic, forced many agencies to suspend programmes and withdraw staff from both Serbia and Kosovo.

The bombing of Serbia and the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Albanians resulted in further conflict and displacement in Kosovo. Within just a few weeks, over one million ethnic Albanians were forced to flee their homes, many seeking refuge in neighbouring Albania and Macedonia, as well as in the Yugoslav Republics of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conflict has also seen many ethnic Serbs displaced from their homes in Kosovo and the rest of FRY.

The international community was unprepared for the scale of the exodus from Kosovo and conditions for the refugees were initially extremely difficult. The possibility that violence would spread to other areas, the involvement of the Western military, and the plight of the refugees, all in a European context, led to massive media interest in the emergency. Against this background, the DEC launched what would become its most successful appeal ever, so far raising over £40 million in pooled funds. A considerable proportion of the initial expenditure of pooled funds, though by no means all, has been channelled to meet the needs of the refugees in Albania and Macedonia. As these refugees have returned to Kosovo, the agencies have re-established programmes in Kosovo to support their reintegration and the rehabilitation of the province.

The refugees have encountered a wide variety of conditions in their countries of asylum: tightly controlled refugee camps; immediate transport to third countries; accommodation with host families; informal camps constructed in civic buildings. Providing assistance to those in need has been complicated by the dispersion of refugees to many sites, the difficulties of obtaining information on those residing with host families, and the weak transport and communication infrastructure in some of the areas hosting refugees. The response has been characterised by the involvement of hundreds of INGOs, a number of whom had no prior experience in emergency work, nor experience of work in the Balkans. Other important factors in the response have been the presence of NATO troops, acting in a humanitarian role, and the availability of very high levels of funding from bilateral donors.

The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) is an umbrella charitable organisation which launches and coordinates a National Appeal in the UK in response to a major disaster overseas. It brings together a unique alliance of aid, corporate, public and broadcasting services to rally compassion and ensure that funds raised go to bring effective and timely relief.

The DEC Kosovo Appeal was launched on 6 April 1999. To date, the appeal has generated over £40m. pooled funds, which have been disbursed amongst the 12 DEC agencies that participated in the appeal *(see Appendix 1 for summary of disbursements)*. These funds have supported activities in: medicine and health care; water and sanitation; clothing and household items; pre-school activities; education; family tracing, amongst other sectors.

DEC agencies have been active throughout the region, working in camps, in host communities and with all those affected by the Kosovo crisis.

DEC rules require an independent evaluation of the expenditure of appeal funds to be initiated in the eighth month following an appeal launch. This provides an important mechanism for DEC transparency and accountability to fundraising partners and the British public. Evaluation also enables DEC agencies to extend individual and collective learning on good practice in response to humanitarian emergencies. Once the evaluation process is completed, the final report will be made public.

2. Key purpose of the evaluation

The evaluation should provide an independent assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the DEC agencies' response to the Kosovo crisis:

Appropriateness

- Were the actions undertaken appropriate in the context of the needs of the affected population and the context in which the agencies were operating? Was sufficient attention given to the identification of clear objectives and activities that would ensure objectives would be met?
- Was the assistance appropriate in relation to the customs and practices of the affected population?
- To what extent were potential and actual beneficiaries consulted as to their perceived needs and priorities? What was the level of beneficiary involvement in project design, implementation and monitoring? How effective and appropriate were these processes in ensuring relevant and timely project delivery in support of the most needy and vulnerable?
- Was the assistance provided in a timely manner?

Efficiency

- Were resources used efficiently? For instance, were more expensive forms of response (such as air transport) used longer than was necessary? Would greater investment in preparedness measures have resulted in more effective and less costly responses?

Impact

- What direct and indirect evidence is available that the action taken contributed to the reduction of mortality, morbidity and suffering and that the affected population was assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and livelihoods?
- What systems or indicators did the agencies use to evaluate the effectiveness of their work?

Coverage

- Was DEC assistance provided to all major population groups facing life-threatening situations?
- What efforts were made to ensure that particular populations, vulnerable groups and areas were not overlooked?
- Were beneficiaries correctly and fairly identified and targeted?

Connectedness

- Was the assistance provided in a way that took account of the longer-term context?
- Did the assistance seek to strengthen the capacity of local agencies and personnel?

Coherence

- What steps were taken by participating agencies to ensure their responses were coordinated with each other and with other agencies?
- Were other actions, such as advocacy work, undertaken by the member agencies to complement their immediate relief actions?

These criteria take into account 'standard' evaluation questions, and also reflect the DEC's objective, the NGO/Red Cross Code of Conduct and those disaster response objectives of DEC member agencies which are broadly shared. Thus, objectives such as achieving a coordinated response, ensuring that relief activities take account of longer-term considerations and that the capacity of local organisations and personnel is strengthened during the response, are explicitly included in the criteria.

Following the field visits the evaluation team should be in a position to comment on the adequacy of management, accounting, monitoring and reporting processes of the DEC agencies and their field level partners. They should also be able to comment on the key constraints that affected the DEC supported programs, and how the different DEC agencies dealt with them.

3. Specific issues for consideration

- What was the added value of DEC appeal funds in the context of the overall humanitarian response? Did DEC funds facilitate a quick response?

- Was there disproportionate attention given to refugees in camps compared to those staying with host families? What more could have been done to support host communities? Since the return of the refugees to Kosovo has a disproportionate level of assistance been focussed on the returning refugees compared to other vulnerable groups both in Kosovo and the other provinces and countries affected?
- Was gender considered in the agencies' emergency assessments? Did relief provision include special components for women and, if so, were these systematically monitored?
- How did the involvement of NATO troops in supporting humanitarian action affect the coordination and delivery of assistance?
- The DEC's mandate is concerned with bringing immediate relief to those in need. However, this appeal, together with funding from bilateral donors, has raised potentially more than can be spent meeting 'immediate' needs. Does this require a re-wording of the DEC mandate? Has the volume of aid funds made available in this response led to a pressure to spend out of proportion with agency capacity or of the needs on the ground? Have standards been too high?
- What was the level of cooperation in the field? Could more have been done to help improve the effectiveness of DEC agencies' response in terms of joint logistics, communications packages, and inter-agency information flows?

4. Method

Participating DEC agencies will be required to submit the following material (in both hard copy and electronic format) to the Secretariat *before* the evaluation team commences its work:

- A summary chronology.
- Key documents on the agency's response to the emergency and their use of DEC funds, including the 48-hour plan of action; the 4-week plan of action; and the final report of expenditure.
- Names, contact details and roles during the response of key agency personnel in the head office and in the relevant field offices.

The Secretariat will prepare a package of materials on each participating agency to be given to the evaluation team. The evaluation team will begin with a review of documentation.

A member of the evaluation team will visit the head office of each agency to undertake preliminary interviews and collect and review supplementary documentation. Evaluators should be allowed full access to relevant files. The schedule of the fieldwork will be discussed during these visits. This is likely to be a difficult issue give that many operations will already have closed down by the time the evaluation team is ready to begin fieldwork. The consultant's schedule, accommodation and transport arrangements will be finalised and communicated to all agencies at least one week prior to the team's visit.

In the field, the evaluation team will seek to spend a period with each agency that is roughly proportional to the share of DEC pooled funds received by each agency. During their work the evaluators will fill out the chronology of decisions and actions so as to understand the context and the level of information that was available to the agency in deciding on a particular action. During their time with each agency the team will interview key personnel remaining in-country (contacting others prior to the field visits or on their return) and undertake visits to selected project sites/areas. It is recognised that many of the sites will have closed down by the time the evaluators reach the field. The evaluators will have to make extensive use of agency reports where site visits would prove pointless. It should be noted that in the case of agencies that are part of larger organisations, UK assistance might not be distinguishable from that of global counterparts.

As well as interviewing the agency's project officers and key officials in coordinating agencies (eg. OCHA, UNHCR and the host government) and partner agencies, a sample of beneficiaries will be selected and interviewed by the evaluators. These interviews will be conducted without agency personnel being present, using interpreters hired directly by the evaluation team. The beneficiaries will be questioned on their views of the assistance provided, the way they were selected and assistance was provided, and their overall views of the agency. Interviews with individuals may be complemented by discussions with groups of beneficiaries. So as to assess the agency's targeting and beneficiary selection methods, the evaluation team will also interview a selection of potential beneficiaries who did not receive assistance. Given the fact that many of the camps will be closed by the time the evaluators visit, related beneficiaries will be interviewed in Kosovo.

It is expected that the evaluation team will use gender-aware and participatory approaches to seek the views of beneficiaries and, where appropriate, non-beneficiaries. Inclusive techniques will be expected of the evaluators, to seek active participation in the evaluation by members of local emergency committees, staff of implementing partner agencies and member agencies, representatives of local and central governments.

Agencies 'Final Expenditure Reports' will be examined to assess direct and indirect project costs, and, in conjunction with beneficiary/team assessment of direct and indirect benefits, to compare the cost-effectiveness of different approaches.

The evaluation will be undertaken with due reference to the Red Cross/Red Crescent NGO Code of Conduct, which all agencies have signed. Reference should also be made to the Sphere Standards.

Before leaving the country members of the team will indicate their broad findings to the Country Representative and senior staff of each agency and note their comments.

There is currently an on-going DEC lesson-learning study taking place in respect of the Balkans emergency. Two data collectors have spent time in the region conducting interviews and collecting key documents. The principal focus of the lesson-learning study has been the issue of coordination. The evaluation team will be able to draw upon the findings and documentation collected by the lesson-learning team.

A workshop should be held in London to disseminate a draft report of the evaluation and the report should be circulated one week prior to this workshop to allow for preliminary comment.

5. The Report

The evaluation report should consist of:

- Executive summary and recommendations (not more than six pages).
- Main text, to include emergency context, evaluation methodology, appeal management, commentary and analysis addressing evaluation purpose and outputs, conclusions (not more than thirty pages).
- Appendices, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework, summary of agency activities, sub-team report(s), end notes (where appropriate) and bibliography.

6. Evaluation team and timeframe

Given the speed with which many of the DEC-funded programmes in the region have closed, as refugees return to Kosovo, it is anticipated that there will be a core team of three people, with others drawn in as necessary. The Team Leader should be a generalist with a proven background in emergency evaluations. The appropriate balance of professional and analytical skills amongst the remaining team members should be determined following a preliminary examination of agency activities. It is likely, however, that expertise in water and sanitation and public health will be required. At least one person from the region should be included in the team that makes the field visits. All team members should be gender aware, a gender balance within field teams being desirable.

Consultants or independent evaluation teams short-listed in the tendering process should seek DEC approval for any proposed changes to the composition of the team originally submitted.

The evaluation timeframe should allow for circulation of a first draft, for comment by DEC agencies, in early May 2000 followed by presentation of the draft report to member agencies by end of May for completion by 10 June 2000.

7. Tenders and Evaluation Management

Tenders should be submitted to the DEC Secretariat by the closing date of 23 August 1999. A maximum five page summary should be submitted with appendices of team member CVs and an indication of availability. The DEC may wish to see substantive pieces work or to take up references of short-listed consultants.

The final decision on tenders will be taken by the DEC Executive Committee, following short-listing and interviews. Key factors will include:

- Provisional framework, methodology, team balance, local experiences, distinctive competencies, timeframe and budget, an appreciation of key constraints and comments on the above terms of reference.
- Professionalism of the bid, team experience (professional and analytical), degree of parity with the terms of reference, likelihood of achieving the DEC timetable, realism, not just competitiveness, in the cost submission.

Tenders will be accepted from 'freelance' as well as from company, PVO or academic teams.

Administration and overall coordination, including monitoring progress, lies with the DEC Secretariat. The evaluation Team Leader must, from the commencement of the evaluation, submit a weekly report on actual against anticipated progress. The Steering Committee will via the Secretariat undertake to respond to weekly submissions as necessary. In addition, the Team Leader should alert the Secretariat immediately if serious problems or delays are encountered. Approval for any significant changes to the evaluation timetable will be referred to the DEC Operations sub-committee.

It is anticipated that the selection process will be completed by mid-June.

9. Further information

For further information please contact:

Jamie McCaul
Executive Secretary
DEC
52, Great Portland Street
London, W1N 5AH
Tel: 44 + (0)171 580 6550
Fax: 44 +(0)171 580 2854
Email: decuk@ compuserve.com,

or visit the DEC's website: www.dec.org.uk**.**

APPENDIX 2: Team Members

Appendix 2.1 Core Team and Advisers

Name	Title	Organisation	Sectors
Mark Bradbury	Social Specialist	Independent Consultant, UK	Protection; Beneficiary Perspectives; Community Services
Margie Buchanan-Smith	Coordinator	Overseas Development Institute, UK	Management; Liaison with DEC; Overview
Brent Burkholder	Epidemiology Advisor	Centers for Disease Control, US	Health
Dr. Steve Collins	Public Health Specialist	Valid International, UK	Health; Distribution of non-food relief items
John Cosgrave	Watsan/Engineering Specialist	InterWorks Europe, Ireland	Water and Sanitation; Humanitarian Mine Action; Shelter; Education and Rehabilitation.
Alistair Hallam	Cost Efficiency Advisor	Valid International UK	Cost-efficiency
Debora Kleyn	Research Assistant	Overseas Development Institute, UK	Research and Documentation
Manuela Mece	Regional Specialist	Independent Consultant, Albania	Albania/Kosovo/ Macedonia: Beneficiary Perspectives; Local NGOs
Nicola Norman	Administrator	Overseas Development Institute, UK	Administration, Logistics and Documentation
Ana Prodanovic	Regional Specialist	Independent Consultant, Serbia	Serbia: Beneficiary Perspectives; Local NGOs
Jane Shackman	Psychosocial Advisor	Independent Consultant, UK	Psychosocial
Fiona Watson	Nutrition Specialist	NutritionWorks, UK	Food and Nutrition; Agriculture
Peter Wiles	Team Leader	Independent Consultant, UK	All including advocacy, DEC, Institutional Issues, Human Resources

Appendix 2.2 Peer Reviewers

Name	Organisation
Prof. Raymond Apthorpe	Independent Consultant, Australian National University
Judith Large	Independent Consultant, UK
Nicholas Leader	Overseas Development Institute, UK
Joanna Macrae	Overseas Development Institute, UK
Michael Pugh	Dept. of Politics, University of Plymouth, UK
Vanessa Pupavac	School of Politics, University of Nottingham, UK
Susan Woodward	Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, UK

APPENDIX 3: Itineraries

Appendix 3.1 Team Itinerary: Preparatory Trip and Fieldwork

Date	Team Member							
	P. Wiles (Team Leader)	**M. Bradbury (Social Specialist)**	**S. Collins (Public Health Specialist)**	**F. Watson (Nutrition Specialist)**	**J. Cosgrave (WatSan/ Engineering Specialist)**	**J. Shackman (Psychosocial Advisor)**	**M. Mece (Regional Specialist)**	**A. Prodanovic (Regional Specialist)**
Preliminary Trip								
31/1/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	-	-	-	-	-	-
1/2/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	-	-	-	-	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
2/2/00	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-	-	-	-	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
3/2/00	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-	-	-	-	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
4/2/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	-	-	-	-	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
5/2/00	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	-	-	-	-	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
6/2/00	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	-	-	-	-	Albania *Tirana*	-
7/2/00	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	-	-	-	-	Albania *Tirana*	-
8/2/00	Albania *Tirana*	-	-	-	-	-	Albania *Tirana*	-
Fieldwork								
11/3/00	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	-	Albania *Tirana*	-
12/3/00	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	-	Albania *Tirana*	-
13/3/00	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	-	Albania *Tirana*	-
14/3/00	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Tirana*	-	Albania *Tirana*	-

	P. Wiles	M. Bradbury	S. Collins	F. Watson	J. Cosgrave	J. Shackman	M. Mece	A. Prodanovic
15/3/00	Albania *Tirana*	Albania *Elbasan*	Albania *Skhodra*	Albania *Elbasan*	Albania *Skhodra*	-	Albania *Elbasan*	-
16/3/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Albania *Elbasan*	Albania *Tirana*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Albania *Lushne*	-	Albania *Elbasan*	-
17/3/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Albania *Korce*	Albania *Tirana*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Albania *Tirana, Korce*	-	Albania *Korce*	-
18/3/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Albania *Korce*	Albania *Korce,Pogradec*	Macedonia *Gostivar*	Albania *Korce*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Albania *Korce*	-
19/3/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Albania *Korce* Macedonia *Gostivar, Skopje*	Albania *Korce* Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Gostivar, Skopje*	Albania *Korce* Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Albania *Korce* Macedonia *Gostivar, Skopje*	-
20/3/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Gostivar*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Gostivar*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Gostivar*	-
21/3/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Tetovo, Skopje*	Macedonia *Gostivar, Skopje*	Macedonia *Tetevo, Skopje*	Macedonia *Gostivar, Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Tetevo, Skopje*	-
22/3/00	Macedonia Skopje Kosovo *Pristina*	Macedonia *Skopje* Kosovo *Pristina*	Macedonia *Skopje* Kosovo *Pristina*	Macedonia *Skopje* Kosovo *Pristina*	Macedonia *Skopje* Kosovo *Pristina*	Macedonia *Skopje* Kosovo *Pristina*	Macedonia *Skopje* Kosovo *Pristina*	-
23/3/00	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
24/3/00	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
25/3/00	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
26/3/00	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *S. Mitrovica*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-
27/3/00	Kosovo *Pristina*	Kosovo *Peje*	Kosovo *N. Mitrovica*	Kosovo *Prizren*	Kosovo *Prizren*	Kosovo *Peje/Djakova*	Kosovo *Prizren*	-
28/3/00	Bosnia *Sarajevo*	Kosovo *Peje, Junik, Decan, Rastavica, Djakova*	Kosovo *Djakova*	Bosnia *Sarajevo*	Kosovo *Ferezaj*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Kosovo *Peje, Junik, Decan, Rastavica, Djakova,*	-
29/3/00	Bosnia Sarajevo	Kosovo *Prizren,Valezhe, Krushe, Vogel*	Kosovo *Djakova/Prizren*	Bosnia *Sarajevo*	Kosovo *Prizren*	-	Kosovo *Prizren,Valezhe, Krushe, Vogel*	-

	P. Wiles	M. Bradbury	S. Collins	F. Watson	J. Cosgrave	J. Shackman	M. Mece	A. Prodanovic
30/3/00	Bosnia *Tuzla*	Kosovo *Prizren*	Albania *Kukes*	Bosnia *Tuzla*	Albania *Kukes*	-	Albania *Kukes*	-
31/3/00	Bosnia *Sarajevo* *Banja Luka*	Kosovo *Prizren,* *Nebrogoshte,* *Mushnekova*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Bosnia *Sarajevo* *Banja Luka*	Kosovo *Djakova*	-	Kosovo *Prizren,* *Nebrogoshte,* *Mushnekova*	-
1/4/00	Montenegro *Podgorica*	Kosovo *Ferezaj*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Montenegro *Podgorica*	Kosovo *Djakova, Peje*	-	Kosovo *Peje*	-
2/4/00	Montenegro *Podgorica*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Serbia *Belgrade*	Montenegro *Podgorica*	Kosovo *Peje*	-	Kosovo *Peje*	Serbia *Belgrade*
3/4/00	Montenegro *Berane* *Podgorica*	Kosovo *Gjilan* *Viti*	Serbia *Belgrade*	Montenegro *Berane* *Podgorica*	Kosovo *Peje* *Djakova*	-	Kosovo *Djakova*	Serbia *Belgrade*
4/4/00	Serbia *Belgrade*	Kosovo *Lipljan,Kamenice,* *Donja Gushterica*	Serbia *Belgrade* *Smederevo*	Serbia *Belgrade*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-	Kosovo *Pristina, Klina*	Serbia *Belgrade,* *Smederevo*
5/4/00	Serbia *Belgrade*	Kosovo *Mitrovica* *Vustrri*	Serbia *Belgrade*	Serbia *Belgrade*	Kosovo *Mitrovica,* *Vustrri*	-	Kosovo *Pristina*	Serbia *Belgrade*
6/4/00	Serbia *Belgrade*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Serbia *Novi Sad*	Serbia *Belgrade*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-	Kosovo *Pristina*	Serbia *Novi Sad*
7/4/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Kosovo *Pristina*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Kosovo *Pristina*	-	Kosovo *Pristina*	Macedonia *Skopje*
8/4/00	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*	-	Macedonia *Skopje*	Macedonia *Skopje*

Appendix 3.2 Team Itinerary: UK, Ireland and Switzerland

Date	Team Member									
	P. Wiles (Team Leader)	**M. Bradbury (Social Specialist)**	**S. Collins (Public Health Specialist)**	**F. Watson (Nutrition Specialist)**	**J. Cosgrave (WatSan/ Engineering Specialist)**	**J. Shackman (Psychosocial Advisor)**	**Hallam (Cost Efficiency Advisor)**	**M. Mece (Regional Specialist)**	**A. Prodanovic (Regional Specialist)**	**M. Buchanan-Smith (Coordinator)**
22/12/99	London *Planning Meeting I*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London *Planning Meeting I*
10/1/00	London *Planning Meeting II*	London *Planning Meeting II*	London *Planning Meeting II*	-	-	-	-	-	-	London *Planning Meeting II*
18/1/00	London *Team Meeting*	-	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	-	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	-	-	London *Team Meeting*
19/1/00– 28/1/00	Preliminary agency meetings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31/1/00– 8/2/00	Peter Wiles, Mark Bradbury and Manuela Mece: Preparatory Trip to the Region *(See separate itinerary)*									
27/1/00	London *DEC Secretariat*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London *DEC Secretariat*
10/2/00	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London *Team Meeting*
14/2/00	London *M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting*	London *M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting*	London *M. Vickers Briefing/ Team Meeting*	London *M. Vickers Briefing/ Team Meeting*	London *M. Vickers Briefing/ Team Meeting*	London *M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting*	London *M. Vickers Briefing/ Team Meeting*	-	-	London *M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting*
15/2/00	London *Peer Review Workshop I*	London *Peer Review Workshop I*	London *Peer Review Workshop I*	London *Peer Review Workshop I*	London *Peer Review Workshop I*	London *Peer Review Workshop I*	London *Peer Review Workshop I*	-	-	London *Peer Review Workshop I*
16/2/00	Milton Keynes *World Vision*	London *Preparing F.W. Itinerary*	London *Preparing F.W. Itinerary*	Milton Keynes *World Vision*	Milton Keynes *World Vision*	-	-	-	-	London *Preparing F.W. Itinerary*
17/2/00	London *BRCS*	London *BRCS*	-	London *BRCS*	London *BRCS*	-	-	-	-	-
18/2/00	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	-	-	-	London *Team Meeting*

	P. Wiles	M. Bradbury	S. Collins	F. Watson	J. Cosgrave	J. Shackman	Hallam	M. Mece	A. Prodanovic	M. Buchanan-Smith
21/2/00	Oxford *Oxfam*	Oxford *Oxfam*	-	-	Oxford *Oxfam*	-		-	-	-
22/2/00	London *Christian Aid*	-	-	London *Christian Aid*	London *Christian Aid*	-		-	-	-
23/2/00	London *CAFOD*	London *DFID*	-	London *CAFOD*	-	-	-	-	-	London *DFID*
	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	-	London *Team Meeting*	-	-	London *Team Meeting*
24/2/00	Dublin *Concern*	-	-	-	Dublin *Concern*	-	-	-	-	-
25/2/00	-	-	-	-	London *RedR*	-	-	-	-	-
		Teddington *Tearfund*	-	-	Teddington *Tearfund*	-	-	-	-	-
28/2/00	Oxford *Oxfam*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Reading *CAD*	-	Reading *CAD*	-	-	Reading *CAD;Mitigation International*	-	-	-	-
29/2/00	London *Merlin*		London *Merlin*	-	Manchester *MAG*	-	-	-	-	-
	-	London *HAI*	London *HAI*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1/3/00	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*	-	London *DEC Agency Workshop I*
2/3/00	Geneva *ICRC*	London *Finalising F.W. itinerary*	Geneva *ICRC*	-	London *Finalising F.W. itinerary*	-	-	London *Finalising F.W. itinerary*	-	-
3/3/00	Geneva *IFRC/UNHCR*	London *Finalising F.W. itinerary*	Geneva *IFRC/UNHCR*	-	-	-	-	London *Finalising F.W. itinerary*	-	-

	P. Wiles	M. Bradbury	S. Collins	F. Watson	J. Cosgrave	J. Shackman	Hallam	M. Mece	A. Prodanovic	M. Buchanan-Smith
6/3/00	London *CARE*	London *CARE*	-	London *CARE*	-	-	-	-	-	-
	London *Security Brief*	London *Security Brief*	London *Security Brief*	London *Security Brief*	London *Security Brief*	London *Security Brief*				
7/3/00	London *SC*	-	London *SC*	-	-	London *SC*	-	-	-	-
	London *Finalising F.W. itinerary*	London *Finalising F.W. itinerary*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11/3/00 - 8/4/00	**Fieldwork** *(see separate itinerary – Appendix 3.1)*									
4/4/00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London *DEC ExCom*
10/4/00	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	London *Team Meeting*	-	-	London *Team Meeting*
11/4/00 - 30/6/00	**Writing up and editing**									
10/5/00	London *Peer Review Workshop II*	London *Peer Review Workshop II*	London *Peer Review Workshop II*	London *Peer Review Workshop II*	London *Peer Review Workshop II*	London *Peer Review Workshop II*	London *Peer Review Workshop II*	-	-	London *Peer Review Workshop II*
22/5/00	**Draft Report to be circulated to agencies for comments**									
24/5/00	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*	London *DEC Agency Workshop II*
20/6/00	London *DEC Agency Workshop III*	London *DEC Agency Workshop III*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London *DEC Agency Workshop III*
20/7/00	London *Teleconference with OSC*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London *Teleconference with OSC*
24/7/00	**Second Draft to be circulated to agencies for final coments**									
18/8/00	**Final Report to be submitted**									

APPENDIX 4: Table of Interviewees

(NB Excludes beneficiary and host families interviewees)

1. UK/Ireland

Organisation	Name	Title
BRCS (London)	Paul Anticoni	Head of International Aid Department
	Chris Hurford	Desk Office for Central Europe and the Balkans
	Jason Parker	Desk Assistant for Central Europe and the Balkans
	Richard Blewitt	Head of International Programme Advisory & Development Dept.
	John Mitchell	Humanitarian Policy Advisor
	Leanne Taylor	Head of International Personnel
	Lois Austin	Former - PNS Coordinator ICRC Kosovo
CAD (Reading)	Anne Walsh	Director of Programmes
	Steven Bell	Programme Support Manager
	Wube Woldemariam	Emergency and Support Coordinator
	Nigel Scott	Finance Director
	Sarah Thomas	Personnel Manager
	Gaynor Jones	Volunteers Manager
	Nicola Donnelly	Overseas Personnel Department
	Dave Paddick	Operations Manager
CAFOD (London)	Matthew Carter	Emergencies Coordinator
	Andrew Wilson	Eastern European Office
CARE (London)	Will Day	Director
	Ariel Wosner	Balkans Programme Officer
	Howard Standen	Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator/Policy Analyst
Christian Aid (London)	Alison Kelly	Head of MEECA Team
	Antony Mahony	Senior Programme Officer, Eastern Europe
	Sarah Packwood	Kosovo Emergency Programme Officer
	June Wyer	Head of Programme Funding & Support team
	Neil Garvey	Emergency Capacity Building Officer
	Tim Boyes-Watson	Head of Finance Team
Concern (Dublin)	Dominic McSorley	Regional Manager (Asia, Central America & Eastern Europe)
	Isabelle Kidney	Overseas Dept
	Howard Dalzell	Head of Evaluation Planning & Monitoring
	Connell Foley	Leader of Operational Team in the Balkans
DEC (London)	Jamie McCaul	Executive Secretary
	Kate Robertson	Evaluations Consultant
DFID/CHAD (London)	Matthew Baugh	Head of Section Five, Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Dept.
	Sarah Maguire	Legal Specialist, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Dept.
	Debi Duncan	Conflict Prevention Specialist, Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Dept.
HAI (London)	Lesley-Anne Knight	Emergencies Manager
	Nadia Saim	Emergencies Assistant
	Jane Skobe	Communications
	Adam Platt	Director of Programmes
	Sangetta Patel	Head of Personnel
	Sylvia Beals	Head of Policy
MAG (Manchester)	Richard Moyes	Project Coordinator
Merlin (London)	Cassie Knight	Information Officer
	Alex Brans	Desk Officer for the Balkans
	Tim Healing	Epidemiologist, working in Albania April 1999
	Bruce Lawrence	Medical Director

Oxfam (Oxford)	Paul Smith-Lomas	Director, Humanitarian Department
	Heather Hughes	Programme Assistant, EE/FSU
	Paul Sherlock	Technical TeamCoordinator
	Woldu Mahary	Technical Advisor, EE/FSU
	Adam Leach	Regional Director, EE/FSU/ME
	Phil Bloomer	Team Leader, Policy Department
	Lizzie Selwood	Regional Policy and Advocacy Adviser
	Maurice Herson	Humanitarian Coordinator (EE/FSU/LAC)
	Diane Crocombe	AMEE Team Manager, International Funding Unit
Oxfam (Wiltshire)	Charlotte Warren	Health Advisor, EE
RedR (London)	Jerome Oberreit	Recruitment and Placement Manager
Save the Children (London)	Joanna Clark	Regional Programme Development Officer, C./E. Europe
	Judy Lister	Regional Director UK-Europe
	Peter Poore	Senior Health Advisor
	Mike Gaouette	Head of Emergencies Unit (former Programme Director, Macedonia)
	Lola Gostelow	Emergencies Advisor (previously Nutrition Advisor)
	Anna Taylor	Nutrition Advisor
	Michelle Stratford	Press Officer
	Christine Nylander	Senior Personnel Officer
	Rob Garnett	Ex-SC country representative, Serbia
	Ian Russell	Ex-SC coordinator, Albania
Tearfund (Teddington)	Steve Penny	Team Leader, Disaster Response Team
	James Thurlow	Operations Officer, Balkans
	Nick Roberts	Accountant, Disaster Response Team
	Seamus Anderson	Project Officer, Mediterranean and Central Asia desk
	David Talbot	Human Resources, Disaster Response Team
	Joy Kemp	Ex-Director of Programmes, Albania. Mitigation Int'l
	Steve Kemp	Mitigation International
UNHCR	Peta Snadison	External Evaluator
	Susanne Jaspars	Former CARE Albania employee
World Vision (Milton Keynes)	Sue Birchmore	Regional Manager
	Kevin Flanagan	Deputy Regional Manager

2. Switzerland (all interviews took place in Geneva)

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
ACT	Miriam Lutz	Coordinator (by telephone)
Henri Dunant Institute	Martin Griffiths	Director (former UN Regional Coordinator)
ICRC	Victoria Gardener	External Resources Division
	Arnold Blaettler	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
	Pierre Kraehenbuehl	Head of Task Force for Balkans Operations
	Feena May	Formerly Head of Balkans Logistics Cell
	Ariane Curdy	Nutritionist
	Scott Gardener	Relief Coordinator
	Karen Coudert	Nutritionist
IFRC	Bernard Chomilier	Head of Logistics Department
	Mark Wilson	Desk Officer for FRY and Bosnia
	Penny Elghady	Desk Officer for Central and Southern Europe
	Martin Faller	Deputy Director Europe Department
UNHCR	Mohamed Dualeh	Emergency Unit: Health
	Rita Bhatia	Emergency Unit: Nutrition
	Jo Hegenauer	Former Senior Programme Officer FRY

3. Albania

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
AEP (Tirana)	Robert Baker	Administrator
Albanian Govt (Skhodra)	Dr Astrit Beci	Director of Health in Skhodra prefecture
ANGOF (Tirana)	Artan Spahiu	Director
ARC (Tirana)	Pandora Ketri	Secretary General
ARC (Elbasan)	Griselda Pepa	Secretary
	Ylli Myftari	Administrator
	Endri Stoja	Volunteer
	Nasuf Myftari	Member
CAD (Kukes)	Guy Steward	Programme Coordinator
	Shkelzeni Popa	Logistics Manager
CAD (Pogradec)	Genti	Translator
CAD (Tirana)	Lefteri Selman	Teacher Trainer
CAFOD Albania (Tirana)	Shkelqim Bozgo	Executive Director
	Anne Hadcroft	Emergency Coordinator
CARE (Korce)	David Majagira	Programme Coordinator
	Diana Coci	Project Officer
	Ada Permeti	Emergency Programme Assistant
	Andrea Duro	Engineer
	Vasilika Qijgazi	Compliance Officer
CARE (Tirana)	Charlie Earle	Programme Manager
DFID	Tony Conlay	Head of Office
Diaconia Agapes	Penny Deligiannis	Director
Humanitarian Info. Centre	Aurela Hoxha	Director
ICRC	Ariane Tombet	Head of Delegation
	Pierre-Andre Junod	Detention Delegate
IFRC (Tirana)	Frank Kennedy	Head of Delegation
	Gorkhmaz Husseynov	Logistics Coordinator
Kukes TV (Kukes)	Nermin Spahiu	Announcer/Producer
Local Partners Project (Korce)	Elerleta Kastrati	Project Officer
Merlin (Tirana)	Ray Dolphin	Country Manager
	Lucy Heaven	Accountant, Ex-Oxfam Administrator
MoH (Skhodra)	Gjovalin Grevhpja	District Director of Public Health
MoH (Pogradec)	Eli Cani	Chief of Micro Biology Dept, Institute of Public Health
Mitigation Int. (Tirana)	Alma Gugushi	-
	Amita Paza	-
	Patrice Servais	-
MoE (Kukes)	Faria Zeneli	School Director
Municipality Skhodra)	Esma Boksi	Administrator
Municipality (Kukes)	Saphet Suln	Mayor
Oxfam (Tirana)	Luli Gjeka	Programme Representative
	Raphael Mutiku	Technical Team Leader
	Arnila Venolresh	Senior Community Programme Advisor
Oxfam (Lushne)	Arben	Office Manager
	Alketa Grepcka	Health Promoter
	Irma Pashkja	Health Promoter
	Murray Wilson	Programme Manager
Oxfam (Skhodra)	Steve Edwards	Programme Coordinator
	Janet Symes	Programme Manager
Oxfam (Korce)	Ella	Health Promoter
Prefecture (Elbasan)	Nikolla Bica	Health Advisor of Prefecture

SC	Sigmun Karlstrom	Director
Tearfund (Kukes)	Stanley Bute	Project Coordinator
	Sarah Casey	Health Promotion Coordinator
	Afrim Korbi	Office Manager
	Bashkim Muca	Director of Cultural Palace/Chairman of District Council
UNHCR	Marion Hoffman	Representative
	Philippos Papaphilippou	Senior Programme Officer
	Terry Pitzner	Community Services Coordinator
UNICEF (Tirana)	Lenin Guzman	Project Officer
VUsh (Tirana)	Ina Kumi	Coordinator
	Cori Crawford	Crisis Centre Coordinator
Water Centre (Debresse)	Shiop Suliman	Head
WFP (Tirana)	Ismat Fahmi	Country Director
	Jerry Bailey	Head of Programming Unit
WHO (Tirana)	Luca Scali	-
Women for Global Action Association (Tirana)	Linolita Prifti	Oxfam Local Partner
	Raimonda Prifti	Oxfam Local Partner
World Vision (Tirana)	Chalon Lee	Country Representative
	Julian Srodecki	Programme Officer

4. Bosnia

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
Association of Albanians in Bosnia (Sarajevo)	Suada Axhanela	President
	Muharrem Zejnullahu	Member
CARE (Sarajevo)	Emil Bobovnik	Regional Manager
Hi Neighbour (Sarajevo)	Nada Uletilovic	Secretary
	Dragan Culic	Financial Manager
ICVA	Robert Possnett	Regional Director
LWF (Tuzla)	Bernhard Staub	Director, BiH and Croatia
	Semina Selimovic	Project Manager
Oxfam (Sarajevo)	Jane Gronow	Regional Representative for Eastern Europe
	Mia Vukojevic	BiH Programme Representative
	Alistair McArthur	Emergency Programme Coordinator
	Christina Rackley	Eastern Europe Funding Coordinator
	Vesna Ciprus	Deputy Regional Representative for Eastern Europe
Republika Srpska RC	Korda Drago	Humanitarian Coordinator
SC (Sarajevo)	Patricia Strong	Programme Director BiH
SC (Banja Luka)	Olivera Damjanovic	Programme Manager
	Dusko Pejcic	Programme Support/Logistician Officer
WHO (Sarajevo)	Adriaan Korver	Head of Office

5. Kosovo

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
ACT (Pristina)	Thorkild Hoyer	Director
ADRA (Pristina)	Tanja Radoeaj	Psychologist
BRCS (Pristina)	Colin Mackay	Project Manager
	Mark Coxon	Construction Manager
	Martin Holl	Construction Delegate

British KFOR (Pristina)	Major Catherine Buchanan	Liaison Officer
CAD (Pristina)	Chrissie Gale	Country Director [former Programme Manager in Kosovo for SC)
CARE (Pristina)	Chris Sykes	Programme Coordinator
	Liz Sime	Assistant Mission Director – Programme Support
	Cassie Mcilvaine	Programme Coordinator/CARE Firewood Programme
CARE (Prizren)	Andrea Rothweiler	Area Coordinator
CARE (Ferezaj)	Fatmir Selimi	Operations Manager/Agromonist (also in Libljan)
	Andrew Taylor	Agriculture Programme Manager
Chayupe Primary School (Vustrri)	Idrisi Feret	School Director
Christian Aid (Rahovac)	Esat Paqarizi	Engineer
	Alan Strachen	Programme Manager
	Zamir Bugari	Translator
Centre for Social Work (Lipljan)	Mehdi	Director
Concern (Pristina)	Susan Fraser	Country Rep.
	Barry Lorton	Shelter Coordinator
	Paula Connelly	Finance Administrator
Concern (Peje)	Elvana Islaimi	Architect
	Kenan Kasniqi	Engineer
	Mary Walsh	Social Programme Coordinator
	Iliriana and Nasibe	Social Team
	Erzen	Artist, Social Team
CordAid (Djakova)	Tones Meijer	Shelter Coordinator
CRS (Prizren)	Fred Cocozzelli	Food Monitor
	Jonathan Campbell	Project Coordinator
CRS (Pristina)	Kathleen Moynihan	Zonal Director
CRS (Dragash)	Gjoni Lumezi	Food Monitor
DFID/CHAD (Pristina)	Anthony Welch	Head of Office
	Robert Stevens	Health Advisor
DRA (Pristina)	Harry Lamé	Team Leader
ECHO	Patricia Penntier	-
	Ylber Morina	-
Elena Gjkika Women's Group (Klina)	Lala Grabanica	Coordinator
	Nysret Sulaj	Coordinator
Finnish KFOR (Lipljan)	Major Vessa Ranki	CIMIC Officer
Handikos (Lipljan)	-	Coordinator
Handikos (Prizren)	Ali Darshe	Regional Coordinator
	Refki Kryazu	Leader of Prizren Group
	Nuria Vetio	Disabled Women's Council
	Floria Horte	Disabled Women's Council
HAI (Pristina)	Chris Gregory	Director
	Nuria Gonzales	Programme Manager
ICRC (Pristina)	Rene Boeckli	PNS Coordinator
	Damian Noble	Relief Coordinator
IFRC (Pristina)	Kris Hurlburt	Psychosocial Programme Coordinator
Institute of Public Health (Mitrovica)	Dr Qamile Ramadani	Director
Institute of Public Health (Djakova)	Dr Sinan	Head
International NGO Council (Pristina)	Paul Currion	Information Officer, Humanitarian Information Centre

Islamic Relief Worldwide (Pristina)	Abdullah Gani	Finance Officer
	Martin Prior	Head of Mission
Kosovo Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims	Feride Rushiti	Coordinator
Leidshak Collective Centre (Mitrovica)	Various	-
Lejgenda Women's Association (Viti)	Habiba Benasira	Coordinator
	Hajera Pira	Coordinator
	Abida	Centre Coordinator
Liria Women's Association (Gjilan)	Activists	-
MAG (Pristina)	Don McDonald	Programme Manager
MCIC (Djakova)	Alex Krazalovski	Programme Coordinator
	Ismet Isufi	Agricultural Project Officer
MedAir (Peje)	Sylvain Bonjour	Project Director, Balkans
MineTech (Pristina)	Andrew Jackson	Deputy Manager
	Vic Thackwray	Manager
MTS (Djakova)	Fatmir Bosniak	Head of Djakova Branch
	Sadik Polloshka	President
	Murat Memaj	-
MTS (Decan)		
MTS (Pristina)	Morat Nemiah	Head of Decan Branch
MTS (Prizren)	Jak Mita	Vice President
Municipality (Djakova)	Pjeter	President
Novib (Pristina)	Dr Pal Leka	Director of Health and Social Policy Department
ODI	Van de Lest	Finance Officer and Acting PM
OSCE-UNMIK	Belaj Besiana	Translator for Fieldwork
	Hans Bochove	NGO/Civil Society Support Officer
OSCE (Prizren)	Richard Chambers	Programme Officer/NGO/Civil Society Development Democratisation
Collective Centre (S. Mitrovica)	Mark Manley	Human Rights Officer
Oxfam (Pristina)	Leo MacGillivray	Programme Representative
	Dukagjin Kelmendi	Disability Programme Officer (also Prizren)
	Pranvera Reqica	Programme Manager (also Viti)
	Jeton Cana	Programme Manager
	Jane Cocking	Regional Emergency Coordinator (and Acting Programme Representative)
	Gary Mitchell	Head of Internal Audit
	Colin Reynolds	Technical Team Coordinator
	Ben Taylor	Information and Funding Officer
	Baton Begolli	Solid Waste and Trucking Manager
Oxfam (Prizren)	Jeton Albana	WatSan Team
	George Barreras	WatSan Engineer
	Orhan Beseni	Technical Assistant
	Agron Fehmiu	Engineer/Technical
	Muxaxhiri Goranci	WatSan Team
	Astrid Vokshi	WatSan Team
	Ardiana Perjuci	Disability Programme Assistant
	Jeton Muhaxhim	Health Promoter
Oxfam (Mitrovica)	Jordi Cardona Castro	Programme Manager
	Merita Shehu	Health Coordinator

	Modeste Mirindi Mahebara	WatSan Engineer
Oxfam (Mitrovica)	Ivan Podanovic	Coordinator
SBASHK (Pristina)	Agim Hyseni	President of SBASHK
	Albina Duraku	Social Welfare (Kosovo), Child Tracing (Macedonia)
SC (Pristina)	Jesper Frovin Jensen	Senior Programme Manager (also Prizren)
	Jon Johnson	Country Representative
	Ariana Mustafa	Child Protection Officer
	Florije Pajaziti	Education Programme Coordinator
SC (Peje)	Nora Taraku	Education Project Officer
	Ardian Gojani	Education Project Officer
SC (Djakova)	Viosa Mullatohim	Pre-school officer
	Bardhyl Koshi	Recreation Officer
	Gerrard Young	Health Coordinator
	Reshat Mati	Assistant Health Coordinator
	Mohamed Abdi	Project Manager
SC (Prizren)	Linda Deda	Stores and Distribution Officer [also field officer for MTS]
	Ahmed Kryeziu	School Engineer
SC (Decani)	Luaras Oseku	Shelter Coordinator
	Francis Lakas	Ex-SC School PC
	Frank Selch	Project Administrator
SNI (Pristina)	Sam Rutherford	Country Director
Tearfund (Pristina)	Paul Stambrook	Project Coordinator
	Emma Strathon	-
	Sadiq Gashi	Project Assistant
Tearfund (Djakova)	Lendita Lleshi	Public Health Education
	Paul Stanbrook	Logistics Coordinator
	Anthony Land	Deputy Head of Officer OPS
UNHCR	Bill Tall	Coordinator
UNHCR (Prizren)	Melissa Brymer	Centre for Crisis Psychology
UNICEF (Pristina)	Patrick Channer	Deputy Programme Manager
UNMACC (Pristina)	John Flanagan	Programme Manager
	Habibia	School Director
UNMIK (Rahovac)	Behar Vuchetirnna	School Director
	Mavouchu Kupta	Teacher
UNMIK (Xerxe)	Masar Lila	School Secretary
	Darlene Bisson	Regional Programme Advisor
WFP (Pristina)	Letty Coffin	Programme Manager
World Vision (Pristina)	David Finley	Country Director
	Jim Hooper	Agricultural Project Manager
	Liesbeth Speelman	Community Services Manager

6. Macedonia

Organisation	**Name**	**Title/Dept**
American Assemblies of God (Skopje)	Craig Mattison	Area Director, Eastern Europe
CAD (Skopje)	Sarah Butterworth	Programme Manager
	Ron Langford	Director
	Clare Street	Health Programme Manager
CARE (Skopje)	Milica Kokotovic	Country Rep
	Daniella Kostovska	Project Officer
	Jolene Olive	Programme Officer
	Benjamin May	Drama Worker

CARE (Skopje)	Carol Sharman	Programme Manager
	Julie Stapleton	Finance Officer
Collective Centre (Radusa)	Etem Rmadani	Camp Manager
CRS	Nick Ford	Country Representative
	Kevin Tobin	Director, Kosovo Support Services
DFID	Tony Winton	Head of Office
El Hilal (Skopje)	Abdurauf Pruthi	President
El Hilal (Gostivar)	Selim Salih	Local Director
El Hilal (Tetevo)	Fatmir Tresi	President
Emergency Committee (Krusevo)	Arif	Head
	Irfan	Member
ICRC (Skopje)	Francoise Stamm	Head of Delegation
IFRC	William Harper	Head of Delegation
	Alfred Hasenhohrl	Relief Coordinator
	Suzana Tuneva	Senior Programme Officer
League of Albanian Women in Macedonia (Tetevo)	Myquereme Rusi	President
	Xhani Kreshova	Member
	Gjynere Nebiu	Professor of Pedagogy
	Drita Selmani	Member
Macedonian RC (Tetevo)	Qathip Besimi	Branch Secretary
Macedonian RC (Tetevo)	Janeveska Todorka	Desk Officer
MCIC (Skopje)	Vladamir Lazovski	Project Officer
	Aleksandar Krzalovski	Project Officer
	Dimce Mitreski	Project Officer
Mesecina (Tetevo)	Shakir Melori	President
	Elesoran Selvidon	Coordinator of Women's Club
	Islam Shakir	-
Mesecina (Gostivar)	Muhamed Toci	Programme Coordinator
	Memedali Rahmani	President
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy	Boge Cadinovski	Advisor to the Minister
MRC (Skopje)	Janevska Todorka	Desk Officer
	Vlado Dimovski	Camp Manager, Dare Bumbol Collective Centre for Roma
	Katerina Petrushevska	Social Worker, Dare Bumbol Collective Centre for Roma
Municipality (Gostivar)	Jamin Nuredini	Mayor
	Zudi Xhelili	Council Chairman
Municipality (Vrutok)	E. Ismaili	Municipal Secretary
Oxfam (Skopje)	Zola Dowell	Programme Representative
	Richard Lawrence	WatSan Engineer
	Yohannes Hagos	Programme Manager
	Turgaj Mazllami	Hygiene Promoter, Stanovic II/Cegrane Camps
Oxfam (Skopje)	Vendela Fortune	Disability Advisor
	Alan Jenkinson	QIPS PC
	Richard Lorenz	QIPs Manager
	Tulaj, Sunag & Gordona	Community Services
Oxfam (Gostivar)	Feriz Sinani	Senior Construction Supervisor
	Yllza Ademi	Project Assistant
SC (Skopje)	Teuta Demjaha	Senior Health Advisor
	Ted Bilsborrow	Relief Coordinator
SNI (Skopje)	Terry Aislabie	Acting Director
	Marilyn Brayton	Finance Director, Balkans

SNI (Tetevo)	Stacey Whitman	Project Worker
UNICEF (Skopje)	Dr Pinu	UNICEF Health Officer
	Mai Bente Snipstad	Centre for Crisis Psychology
UNHCR (Skopje)	Agostino Mulas	Senior Programme Officer
	Andrew Jones	QIPS Manager
	Brad Woodruff	Medical Coordinator
UNHCR (Cegrane)	Andrew Jones	Former Camp Manager for CARE
WFP (Skopje)	Dale Skoric	Head of Office
	Monique Thorman	Programme Officer

7. Montenegro

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
ICRC (Podgorica)	Agathe Stricker	Head of Sub-delegation
IFRC (Podgorica)	Scott Simmonds	Head of Sub-delegation
IOCC (Podgorica)	Matthew Parry	Country Representative
SC (Podgorica)	Gordon Ivanovic	Programme Director
World Vision (Berane)	Judy-Leigh Moore	Programme Manager
	Judy-Ann Slobig	Community Services Manager
	Bojan Djakovic	Administrator and Computer Teacher, Community Centre

8. Serbia

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
Bread of Life	Jasmina Tosic	
CARE (Belgrade)	Anthony McEvoy	Project Manager
EHO (Novi Sad)	Karoyl Beres	Director
	Anna Bu	Programme Coordinator
CAFOD partners (Belgrade)	Various	Various
ICRC	Peter Stocker	Head of Delegation
	Serge Marmy	Deputy Head of Delegation
	John Roche	Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator
ICVA	Ann Pesic	-
IFRC (Belgrade)	Sten Swedlund	Head of Delegation
	Bogdan Dumitru	Programme Coordinator
	Bo Andren	Logistics Delegate
IOCC (Belgrade)	Ivan Bojanic	Head of Office
Oxfam (Belgrade)	Marina Skuric-Prodanovic	Programme Representative
	Slobodanka Torbica	Deputy Emergency Programme Coordinator
	Robert Schneider	Emergency Programme Coordinator
Oxfam (Smederevo)		Radinac Collective Centre
		Community Service Project officer
		Engineer
SC (Belgrade)	Karlo Puskarica	Acting Country Representative
	Nenad Bosiljcic	Logistics Officer
UNHCR	Gert Westerven	Assistant Representative (Protection)
UNOCHA (Belgrade)	Robert Painter	Head of OCHA
WFP (Belgrade)	Viney Jain	Deputy Senior Emergency Coordinator
WHO (Belgrade)	Jukka Pukkila	Head of Office
	Melite Vujnovic	Health Information Officer
Yugoslav Red Cross	Dr Rade Dubajic	Secretary General
	Dragan Knezevic	Cooperation and Dissemination

APPENDIX 5: Kosovo Crisis Timeline to 31 January 2000

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1968		Kosovo Albanians demonstrate for recognition as a separate republic. Serbian concessions include establishment of an Albanian language university.	
1968–74		Amendments to Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions give further autonomy to Kosovo (and Vojvodina).	
1974		Yugoslavia's third constitution adopted defining Kosovo and Vojvodina virtually as sovereign republics but without the right to secede from the Federation (ICG, 1998).	
1980	Yugoslav President Tito dies in May.		
1981		Widespread demonstrations in Kosovo calling *inter alia* for a 'Kosovo Republic'.	
1985	Enver Hoxha, Albanian leader since 1944 dies.		
1987		Leader of League of Communists of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, says in April at a Serb demonstration in Kosovo '*No one shall beat these people*!'	
1989		Changes to the 1974 Serbian constitution by the Serbian parliament and approved by constituent parts of the Federation strip Kosovo of its autonomy. Commemoration of 600th anniversary of battle of Kosovo at Kosovo Polje attended by estimated one million Serbs.	
1990			
January		Demonstrations and riots in Kosovo result in state of emergency being declared and Yugoslav security forces sent in.	
July		Kosovo Albanian parliamentary delegates led by Ibrahim Rugova declare independence and set up a shadow government.	
1991			
June	Slovenia & Croatia declare independence.		
August	Fighting escalates between Croatia and Yugoslavia.		
Sept.	Macedonia declares independence.	EU conference on Yugoslavia, included explicit discussion on special status for Kosovo.	
1992			
March	Fighting spreads to Bosnia Albanian elections end 47 years of communist rule.		

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
April	Siege of Sarajevo starts	The republics of Montenegro and Serbia (including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina) declared the formation of anew Yugolsavia. A newconstitution is adopted but the status of Vojvodina and Kosovo remains unchanged in the current Yugoslav state.	
May	International sanctions against Montenegro and Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia admitted to UN	Parallel Kosoov Albanian parliament elected. KLA starts small-scale attacks on police.	
August	London Conference on former Yugoslavia.		
Sept		Establishment in Geneva of International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) – one working group to look at national minorities including Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Kosovo.	
Dec		US President George Bush warns Milosevic that any action towards Kosovo would be taken seriously, but not mentioning military force.	
1993			
January	Presentation of Vance-Owen Peace Plan.		
April	FYROM admitted to UN.		
May	Bosnia Serbs reject Vance Owen peace plan. ICTY established.		
1994			
Feb	Mortar shell kills 68 in Sarajevo market.		
1995			
May	NATO starts air strikes against Bosnian Serbs but ends them after UN peacekeepers taken hostage. Croatia expels ethnic Serbs from W Slavonia UN protected area.		

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
July	Bosnian Serb forces enter Srebenic and Zepa 'safe areas' – estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslims killed.		
August	Croatia expels ethnic Serbs from Krajina.	Serbian authorities start settlement of Croatian Serbs in Kosovo.	
October	Cease-fire in Bosnia.		
Dec.	Dayton Peace Agreement signed in Paris.	Kosovo not referred to in Dayton Peace Agreement.	
1996			
		KLA emerges more openly for the first time as militant Kosovo Albanians increasingly question Rugova's 'passive resistance' strategy.	
1997			
January		KLA suspected of car bombing Serb rector of Pristina university. KLA leader killed.	
Feb–March	Albanian disturbances following collapse of Pyramid schemes	Flow of arms and ammunitions to the KLA and Kosovo following the opening of the stores in Albania.	
March		Four people injured by car bomb in central Pristina, Kosovo.	
1998			
		Size of FRY security forces increases in Kosovo	
Feb		Serb security force operations in Drenica area and other offensives during the Spring against KLA.	
April		The Contact Group for Former Yugoslavia (US, GB, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) agree to re-impose some sanctions on Yugoslavia that had been lifted.	
May		End May/June 12,000 refugees from security force operations in Kosovo entered Tropoje in Albania.	
June		NATO makes first threat of military action against Serbia.	
July		• Kosovo Albanians inaugurate their outlawed parliament – legislators dispersed by Serbian police. • Serb offensive against KLA.	
August		UN calls for cease fir after village of Junik is over run by Serb offensive.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1998			
Sept		• UN Security Council (without China) approves resolution 1199 highlighting an impending humanitarian catastrophe, demanding a cessation of hostilities and international monitors for withdrawal of security forces to pre-March 1998 levels. • UNHCR announces that there are as many as 200,000 IDPs in Kosovo. 60,000 are in the open without shelter. • Agreement to a Kosovo Verification Mission by the OSCE.	
13 Oct		NATO approves activation order authorising Secretary General to start air strikes within 96 hours.	
16 Oct		NATO extends deadline for the FRY to come into compliance with terms of accord on Kosovo, giving Milosevic until 27 October to honour the agreement.	
24 Oct		UN Security Council resolution 1203 passed which endorses the OSCE agreement and demands full cooperation from both sides.	
27 Oct		4,000 special police troops depart Pristina thus bringing Serb compliance with the terms of agreement it had reached.	
Nov		KVM headed by Ambassador William Walker begins to arrive and functions	
Dec		Ceasefire starts to break down.	
1999			
15 Jan		45 ethnic Albanians are discovered massacred at Racak.	
16 Jan		FRY refuses to allow the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to investigate.	
17 Jan		UNHCR notes that 20,000 people have fled their homes since last December, 5,000 of whom are from Racak alone.	
29 Jan		The six nation contact group gives Serbs and ethnic Albanians an ultimatum to attend peace talks in France starting 6 February.	
30 Jan		The North Atlantic Council agrees that the NATO Secretary general may authorise air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory.	
6 Feb		Talks begin at Chateau Rambouillet.	
23 Feb		Breakdown in Rambouillet talks.	
10 Mar		Ambassador Holbrooke and Hill travel to Belgrade to persuade Milosevic to accept interim political accord.	
15 Mar		Talks continue in Paris. Ethnic Albanian delegation signs interim agreement.	
18 Mar		Serb delegation refuse to sign and peace talks are suspended.	
19 Mar		Kosovo Verification Mission withdraws.	
21 Mar		Holbrooke sent to Belgrade to give Milosevic a final warning.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1999			
23 Mar		• Serb National Assembly passes Resolutions responding to the Rambouillet proposals. • UN agencies and INGOs evacuate from Kosovo.	
24 Mar		**NATO air strikes begin at 1900 GMT.**	
25 Mar		• Massive outflows of refugees from Kosovo, mainly to Albania and Macedonia (see Table 2 for sequence of refugee flows). • 65,000 refugees trapped at Blace on the Macedonian border in appalling conditions.	
29 Mar		ICRC withdraws from Kosovo.	
30 Mar			DEC's OSC Conference call to discuss appeal launch. Feeling in favour but recommendation to EXCOM awaits further information.
31 Mar			EXCOM decision to launch DEC appeal for Kosovo and affected populations in the Balkans.
1 April			EXCOM conference call. Feedback from OSC on 48 hour plans – concerns about coordination, agencies new to the region and response will exceed immediate needs.
4 April		Agreement with Macedonian authorities to admit refugees to NATO built refugee camps with Western countries agreeing to take 91,000 refugees in a Humanitarian Evacuation Programme.	Easter holiday weekend in Western Europe.
5 April			DEC EXCOM conference call.
6 April			• **DEC Kosovo appeal launched.** • **Phase I until 4 October 1999.**
9 April			Estimated appeal income £9.7m
15 April			DEC EXCOM conference call – decision to extend Period of Joint Action till 26 April.
18 April		UNHCR estimates that half a million Kosovo Albanians have fled.	
22 April		• NATO Summit decision on Kosovo reaffirms Five Points and adds conditions for suspending bombing. • NATO intensifies air campaign.	
23 April		ICRC President meets Milosevic to obtain assurances for ICRC to work in Kosovo.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1999			
26 April			• DEC EXCOM meeting – agreed on £15 disburse-ment within six-month appeal launch date. • Period of Joint Action ends.
29 April		FRY files a suit at the International Court of Justice against 10 NATO countries.	
30 April			• Estimated appeal income £20.4m.
7 May		• Moderate Albanian leader is found dead in Kosovo. • NATO planes hit Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (accidentally).	
9 May		UNHCR announces that it is facing a financial crisis in its Kosovo Emergency operation.	
14 May		First ICRC exploratory mission to Kosovo since withdrawal on 29 March.	
16 May		UN Secretary General's Inter-Agency needs assessment mission to FRY starts (ending 27 May)	
17 May		Greece calls for a cease fire to *'give diplomacy a chance'*.	
23 May		NATO begins a bombing campaign of the Yugoslav electricity grid, causing major disruption to power and water supplies.	
24 May		• Head of UN fact finding mission states he has seen 'revolting' signs of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. • ICRC reopens office in Pristina.	
27 May		Milosevic and four other Serbian leaders are indicted by the UN war crimes tribunal for crimes against humanity.	
28 May			DEC's OSC comments on Phase I four-week plans of action.
31 May			Estimated appeal income £37.9m.
3 June		FRY accepts terms brought to Belgrade by EU envoy Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Chernomyrdin which specifies withdrawal of all Serbian and Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and 'substantial NATO participation' in an international security presence.	DEC EXCOM meeting. It was agreed that to distribute remaining funds according to agencies needs in a new sixth month. Phase II expenditure package and to ask agencies for new plans of action by 15 July.
8 June		• The West and Russia reach a landmark agreement on draft UN Resolution at G8 talks on troops withdrawal. • UNHCR estimate that 780,000 refugees and IDPs have been displaced to countries surrounding Kosovo and over 81,000 have left the region on the HEP.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1999			
9 June		• NATO Secretary general calls for a suspension of NATO bombing after evidence that Serb forces are withdrawing from northern Kosovo • Military Technical Agreement signed. • **UN Resolution 1244 is adopted, setting up the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.**	
10 June		NATO air strikes suspended after 78 days	
12 June		• Russian troops enter Pristina, three and a half hours before NATO troops enter Kosovo and install themselves at the airport. • British, French and US KFOR troops enter to begin taking control of withdrawing Serb forces.	
13 June		Serb troops begin pulling out of Pristina.	
14 June		First UN and INGO workers start to return to Kosovo.	
15 June		• OSCE reports that 2,000 Kosovo Albanians have arrived back in Kosovo. • ICRC reports that 33, 000 Serbs have left Kosovo.	DEC: JMC to ExCOM: *'returned funds from Phase become part of Phase II distribution and any 'left over' is bid for'.*
20 June		• In accordance with the Military Technical Agreement on 9 June, Serb forces completely withdrawal from Kosovo. • More than 100, 000 refugees have already returned to Kosovo despite UNHCR pleas not to go.	
21 June		KLA and NATO sign military undertaking.	
22 June		• UNHCR estimates that 214,050 refuges have returned to Kosovo so far. • NATO and UNHCR announce that organised repatriation will begin next week.	
27 June		Roma in Kosovo start to flee due to 'revenge attacks' by ethnic Albanians.	
28 June		23, 000 NATO troops in Kosovo.	
29 June		UN deploys first team of the international police force in Kosovo.	
30 June			Estimated appeal income £44.1m.
2 July		Bernard Kouchner appointed head of the UN Mission in Kosovo.	
13 July		UN agencies announce that organised repatriation of refugees outside of the Balkans will begin on 15 July.	
15 July		Bernard Kouchner arrives in Kosovo.	
16 July		WFP estimates that 146, 000 Serbs have left Kosovo for Serbia.	
21 July		UNHCR estimates that the number of IDPs in Serbia and Montenegro is 170, 000.	
23 July		UNHCR estimates that 720, 700 refuges have returned to date to Kosovo.	
28 July		Donors conference in Brussels. US$2.082 billion in aid pledged for Kosovo.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1999			
31 July			Estimated appeal income £46.8m.
1 Aug			• **DEC Phase II begins: 1/8/99–31/1/00.** • **DEC Phase IIb begins: 1/8/99–30/3/00.**
4 Aug		UNHCR estimates that 80 per cent of the over 850, 000 ethnic Albanians who fled Kosovo during the war have returned to Kosovo.	
6 Aug			DEC's OSC comments on Phase II four-week plans of action
Nov		UNHCR estimates 200,000 minorities, mainly Serbs and Roma, have fled Kosov since the end of the NATO bombing.	3 Nov DEC: EXCOM meeting: £27m disbursed in Phase II – because of returns between £1m and £2.5m will be available. Agencies asked to submit plans and budgets by 1 October. A decision needs to be made on whether remaining funds will be distributed in the usual way or whether agencies should be asked to submit a proposal for all or some of the money on a basis of need and the ability to spend effectively.
18 Nov			DEC's OSC: comments on Phase II four-week plans of action (resubmissions)
2000			
1 Jan			**Phase III begins: 1/1/00–31/6/00.**
31 Jan			**DEC Phase II ends.**

APPENDIX 6: DEC Agencies: DEC-Funded Programme Distribution by Country (Phases I And II)

DEC Agency	Albania	Bosnia	Kosovo	Macedonia	Montenegro	Serbia
BRCS	✓	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
CAFOD	X	X	✓	✓	X	✓
CARE Int'l UK	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	X
CAD	✓	X	✓	✓	X	X
Christian Aid	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓
Concern	✓	X	✓	X	X	X
HAI	X	X	✓	✓	X	X
Merlin	✓	X	X	X	X	X
Oxfam	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓
SC	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Tearfund	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	X
World Vision	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X

Figure 5: Geographical allocation of DEC funds: Phase I




Figure 6: Geographical allocation of DEC funds: Phase II





Figure 7: Allocation of DEC funds: Phases I and II



APPENDIX 7: DEC Agencies: Types of Refugee Situation Assisted using DEC funds during the NATO Bombing Period

DEC Agency	Camps	Collective Centres	Private Accommodation	IDPs
BRCS	✓	✓	✓	✓
CAFOD	X	X	X	✓
CARE	✓	✓	X	X
CAD	✓	✓	✓	x
Christian Aid	X	✓	✓	✓
Concern	X	✓	✓	X
HAI	X	X	✓	X
Merlin	✓	✓	✓	X
Oxfam	✓	✓	✓	✓
SC	✓	✓	✓	✓
Tearfund	✓	✓	✓	X
World Vision	X	✓	✓	✓

APPENDIX 8: Overview of DEC Agency Evaluations of the Kosovo Crisis and Post-Emergency Responses

Agency	Evaluations and Lesson Learning Studies carried out (Internal and External)	Changes that are being made to Emergency Response Systems	Comments
BRCS	• Evaluation of the joint ICRC/IFRC response to the Balkans Crisis (March 2000). • BRCS Internal Review (March 2000).	None known of.	-
CAFOD	• Internal lesson learning review (September 1999). • Post DEC Evaluation internal review (mid 2000).	• Corporate Task Team reviewing general emergency response systems. • Three additional emergency officers recruited.	CAFOD Albania - • Internal lesson learning review in August 1999. • Emergency Preparedness workshop in Feb 2000.
CARE Int'l UK	• Carried out a Lessons Learning Review of its response to the Kosovo crisis in January. The report has been internally discussed and is not yet published. • Undertaken an impact study on livelihood security among families who hosted refugees in Elbasan, Albania. • Undertaking an internal review of aid-military relations.	• Currently reviewing its emergency policies.	CARE UK has made use of DEC Funds for specific research: • Humanitarian Ombudsman Project. • Recruiting a Standards Consultant in Albania to review application of Sphere Standards. • An assessment of systems for social protection in Kosovo.
Children's Aid Direct	None known of.	None known of.	-
Christian Aid	• ACT mid-term evaluation, August 1999. • ACT final evaluation Jan 1999 • Christian Aid internal evaluation March 2000.	• Have created a Strategy Working Group and a manual has been prepared involving all units.	-
Concern World-wide	• Carry out internal lessons learning exercise after every emergency operation.	• Consultant carried out emergency response capacity assessment after the Balkans. Recommended changes still under review. • Considering having a programme with a watching brief	• Assessment reflects emergency work world-wide, not just the Balkans.
HelpAge Int'l	• No evaluation or lesson learning studies carried out. • HAI case study material from the refugee crisis has been used in the 'Ageing and Development Report'(1999).	• Emergency response procedures have been reviewed. • In April published 'Guidelines for Best Practice' for assisting older people in disasters and humanitarian crises.	-
Merlin	None known of.	None known of.	-
Oxfam	• No formal lessons learning or evaluation but internal reports reflect on lessons learned and some come close to auto-evaluation.	-	• In future plan to send public health teams rather than water teams.

SC	• Review of emergency response (Hallam); management review.	• Extensive changes – strengthening emergency dept; clarified regional responsibility; improved emergency response capacity.	-
Tearfund	• DRT carried out an internal lessons learning exercise. Are planning an evaluation.	• Are considering how better to integrate DRT with partners.	• Carried out scenario planning for further crises in region.
World Vision	• Lesson learning report.	• Have now set up permanent emergency response teams.	• One emergency team by world regions.

APPENDIX 9: Other Balkans Evaluations

Date	Author/Organisation	Title
23 Aug 1999	Silkin,T. and Bouman,D.	One, two, many …. but not yet whole. Mid-term evaluation. Emergency Appeal EUKC91 of ACT in Macedonia and Albania.
Nov. 1999	Humanitarianism and War Project and the Humanitarian Law Consultancy	The Interaction of NATO-related Military Forces with Humanitarian Actors in the Kosovo Crisis. Discussion note prepared for Netherland's Foreign Minister's workshop.
29 Nov 1999	Valid International	Disasters Emergency Committee. Kosovo Crisis: Lesson Learning Study.
Dec 1999	Médécins Sans Frontières	MSF Response in Macedonia to the Kosovo Refugee Crisis. A new Humanitarian Order?
1999	ETC UK	Main Report: Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Crisis in Kosova. March to May 1999.
31 Jan 2000	Telford,J. (contracted by DFID)	Coordination in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency. The Emergency Group (EMG) Albania
Feb 2000	Suhrke, A., Barutciski, M., Sandison,P. and Garlock,R.	The Kosovo Refugee Crisis. An independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response.
May 2000	Anema,F., Stone,M. and Wissink,H.	The Balkans Evaluation: an examination of the role of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement's response to the Balkan's Crisis. Lessons and recommendations for future crisis situations.
May 2000	World Food Programme	Summary Evaluation Report on Kosovo regional emergency operation. Food Assistance to Kosovar internally displaced persons and refugees in the FRY, Albania and FYRoM.
26 May 2000	National Audit Office	DFID Emergency Aid: the Kosovo Crisis.
1 June 2000	Ministry of Defence	Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis.
2000	CARE International	The Kosovo Crisis – What can we learn? (second draft).
2000	The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,	Evaluation of the Kosovo crisis.
2000	Minear,L., Van Baarda,T. and Sommers,M.	Occasional Paper # 36. NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis.

APPENDIX 10: DEC Reporting Framework – Some Proposals

1. The DEC narrative report format (draft DEC Handbook, Chapter 4) is good and should be retained.

2. Where agencies use a narrative format different from the DEC's, they should be required to include all of the headings covered in the DEC format, if necessary as an annexe to a report originally prepared for other uses/donors.

3. The DEC should require that financial reports are submitted with the expenditures for separate projects clearly identified. As agency accounts are normally maintained on a project basis with a separate account for each project, this should present no great difficulty for the agencies.

4. Agencies should be required to give a global statement of their expenditure broken into in-country, regional, and international expenditures, replacing the current requirement to split costs into in-country and off-shore costs at the detailed budget level.

5. The division of expenditure into sector headings is currently unclear and leads to inconsistencies in reporting. DEC should clarify the reporting requirements for agencies, including:

   - Requiring that agencies should use the sub-headings that best fit the activities that they are doing, but that those sub-headings should be presented in the framework of the DEC standard Financial Reporting Headings.
   - Agencies should be expected to report on an appropriate level of detail consistent with the agencies own internal financial controls.
   - All major capital items (costing more than £5,000, with a useful life of more than three years) should be listed, together with the agency's plans for their disposal at the end of the project.
   - Some basic information on unit costs within the DEC reporting system would increase accountability as well as providing information for the agencies' financial management needs.

6. These proposals on reporting will need to be cross-checked against decisions that the DEC may make about monitoring and evaluating appeals as a result of the recommendations in the main report.

APPENDIX 11: Background Documents

During the evaluation, over 2,500 documents have been collected and catalogued (including those inherited from the Lesson Learning Study). These documents are available at ODI for research purposes. Some of them are listed below.

Action by Churches Together (1999) EUKC91 Appeal - Midterm Evaluation Terms of Reference (Christian Aid).

Agger, I. (1995) *Theory and Practice of Psychosocial Projects under War Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.* Zagreb: ECTF.

Agger, I., Jareg, E., Mimica, J. & Rebien, C. (1999) Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Psychosocial Projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus (COWIConsult in Association with DiS).

Ali, T. e. (2000) *Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade.* UK: Verso.

Amnesty International (1999) The Forgotten Resisters: the Flight of Conscientious Objectors to Military Service after the Conflict in Kosovo.

Apthorpe, R. & Mayhew, B. (1999) A Possible Model for a Humanitarian Ombudsman: Report on Action Research in Kosovo.

Balanzino, S. (1999) NATO's Humanitarian Support to the Victims of the Kosovo Crisis.

Ball, P. & Belanger, J. (1999) Kosovo Refugee Survey - Attitudes about Return, Preliminary Results (UNHCR).

Baro, D. (1999) Assessment on the Situation of Refugee Families in Private Accommodation. Kukes, 23-28 May (Save the Children).

Bartnik, U. (1999) A Winterization Strategy for Kosovo Refugees in Albania (Emergency Management Group).

Barutciski, M. Western Diplomacy and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

Barutciski, M. (2000) Solutions and Responses to the Humanitarian Crisis in Kosovo (1998-1999). Prevention and Preparedness Regarding the Refugee Emergency (DFID; Refugees Study Centre).

Bibby, S. (1999) Public Health Indicators (Draft) (Oxfam).

Boelaert-Suominen, S. (2000) The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Conflict, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp217-252.

Borton, J., Hallam, A. & Landa, C. (1996c) The Structure and Functioning of the 'New' DEC: a Discussion Paper (draft).

Borton, J., Hallam, A. & Landa, C. (1996b) The Structure and Functioning of the 'New' DEC: Final Discussion Paper.

Borton, J., Hallam, A. & Landa, C. (1996a) The Structure and Functioning of the 'New' DEC: Resolving the Outstanding Issues. Report to the Steering Committee.

Bradt, D., Sallabanda, A. & Panayiotis, A. (1999) Economic Preparedness and Disease Control: Concept Paper and Implementation Plan (International Red Cross).

Briza, J. (2000) Minority Rights in Yugoslavia (Minority Rights Group International).

Brookings Institute (1998) Ad Hoc Working Group on the Protection of Persons Under Threat in Kosovo.

Brown University (2000) The Interaction of NATO Related Military Forces with the Humanitarian Actors in the Kosovo Crisis.

Brusin, S. (1999) Health Needs Assessment in Kosovar Refugees in Host Families in the Former Republic of Macedonia (WHO; EURO; PAR).

Burger, J. A. (2000) International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learned or to be Learned, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp129-145.

CAFOD (2000) Sanctions on Serbia - Time for a Review?

Cahn, C. & Peric, T. (1999) Roma and the Kosovo Conflict (ERRC).

Caplan, R. Kosovo: The Implications for Humanitarian Intervention, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

CARE International (1999a) Basic Needs Assessment of Albania.

CARE International (1999b) Lessons Learned form Kosovo Refugee Support FRY Macedonia.

CARE International (2000) The Kosovo Crisis - What can we learn? (Second draft).

Carter, K. (1999) Balkans Crisis Background (Tearfund).

Children's Aid Direct (1999) Basic Refugee Household Survey.

Chomsky, N. (1999b) Crisis in the Balkans - On Kosovo from the Znet Forum (ZNet).

Chomsky, N. (1999a) *Lessons from Kosovo: The New Military Humanism.* USA: Pluto Press.

Chomsky, N. (1999d) The Current Bombings: Behind the Rhetoric (Zmag).

Christian Aid (1999) Notes of Kosovo emergency working group meeting, 15th December.

Clarke, W. (1999) When Force is Necessary: NATO's Military Response to the Kosovo Crisis.

Clifton, D. (1999) Gender Issues & Needs Assessment Among Displaced Kosovars (Oxfam).

Cohen, R. (4/9/99) Uprooted Inside Kosovo Need Aid, *Newsday*.

Cohen, R. & Korn, D. A. (2000) Failing the Internally Displaced, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

Cutts, M. (1999) The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian Access, *New Issues in Refugee Research* (Working paper No. 8)

Daalder, I. (24/6/99) Lessons of Kosovo, *Die Woche*.

Darcy, J. (1997) 'Human Rights and International Legal Standards: What do Relief Workers Need to Know?', *RRN Network Paper 19.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Davidson, S. (1999a) Measure for Measure: A Progress Report by Agencies Piloting the People in Aid Code.

Davidson, S. (1999b) The People in Aid Code: Measuring Progress.

Department for International Development (2000a) Kosovo Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Programme - Report on Activities: 26 March 1999 to 31 March 2000.

Department for International Development (2000b) Kosovo: Interim Programme Strategy.

Department for International Development (2000c) DFID Departmental Report 2000: The Government's Expenditure Plans 2000-2001 to 2001-2002.

Egorov, S. (2000) The Kosovo Crisis and the Law of Armed Conflicts, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp183-192.

Emergency Management Group (1999b) EMG Sitrep (April - June 1999).

Emergency Management Group (1999a) Winterization Strategy for Refugees in Albania.

ETC UK (2000) Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Crisis in Kosovo, March to May 1999.

European Roma Rights Center (1998) A Pleasant Fiction. The Human Rights Situation of Roma in Macedonia.

FAO & WFP Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Albania.

FAO & WFP (1999a) Special report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Macedonia.

FAO & WFP (1999b) Special report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Kosovo Province of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia.

Fennell, J. (1998) Emergency Assessment and Contingency Plan. Albania/Macedonia (CARE International).

Ferizi, H. (2000a) Mind Over Matter (Part One). Disability as a Partner of Peace Building, *OTR Kosovo*, vol. 10. (3)

Ferizi, H. (2000b) Mind Over Matter (Part Two) - Battling the Apartheid of Disability: The View from Kosovo, *OTR Kosovo*, vol. 10. (3)

Ferron, S. (1999) What's it all about? Hygiene Promotion in the Balkans (Oxfam).

Fitamant, S. (1999) Assessment Report on Sexual Violence in Kosovo (UNFPA).

Flanagan, J. (1999) UNMIK Mine Action Programme Operational Plan for Consolidation Phase Mine/UXO Clearance.

Frelick, B. (2000) Reversal of Fortune: Serbia's Refugee Crisis (US Committee for Refugees).

Frohardt, M., Paul, D. & Minear, L. (1999) Protecting Human Rights: The Challenge to Humanitarian Organisations (Institute for International Studies, Brown University).

Gibney, M. Learning from Kosovo, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

Gibney, M. (1999) Kosovo and Beyond: Popular and Unpopular Refugees, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

Gowan, P. (2000) 'The Euro-Atlantic Origins of NATO's Attack on Yugoslavia', in T. Ali (ed) *Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade.* UK: Verso.

Greenaway, S. (1999) Post Modern Conflict and Humanitarian Action: Questioning the Paradigm.

Grunewald, F. & De Geoffroy, V. (1999) 'Kosovo: Drawing Lessons from a Disaster', *RRN Newsletter 15.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Hailey, J., Elliot, S. & May, N. (1999) DEC 1999 Organisational Review.

Hallam, A. (1999) Kosovo Crisis: Lesson Learning Study. Final Report (Valid International).

Hammond, P. (2000) The Lies Last Time (Committee for Peace in the Balkans).

Hartley, J., Burnheim, S. & Ivanovska, I. (1999) Kosovo Refugees Face Trauma and Stress (UNICEF).

Hayden, W. (1999) The Kosovo Conflict and Forced Migration: The Strategic Use of Displacement and the Obstacles to International Protection (OSCE).

HelpAge International (1999) *The Ageing and Development Report: Poverty Independence and the World's Older People.* UK: HelpAge International/Earthscan Publications.

HelpAge International & UNHCR (2000) Older People in Disasters and Humanitarian Crises - Guidelines for Best Practice.

HIC, UNHCR & IFRC (1999) Plan of Action: Support of Privately Accommodated Refugees in Albania.

Hoffman, M. (2000) Peace-Enforcement Actions and Humanitarian Law: Emerging Rules for Intervened Armed Conflict, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp193-204.

Horwood, C. (2000) 'Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid', *RRN Paper 32.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

House of Commons (2000a) Select Committee on Foreign Affairs - Fourth Report, Kosovo.

House of Commons (2000b) Select Committee on Foreign Affairs - Various Reports on Kosovo (1999 to 2000).

House of Commons (2000c) Various Minutes of Evidence. March 1998 - April 2000.

Human Rights Watch (1999b) Cluster Bombs: Memorandum For Convention on Conventional Warfare.

Human Rights Watch (1999a) On the Kosovo Refugee Crisis.

Human Rights Watch (2000d) Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign.

Human Rights Watch (2000b) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Abuses Against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo.

Human Rights Watch (2000a) Macedonia: Human Rights Developments.

Human Rights Watch (2000c) Position Paper II on the Kosovo Refugee Crisis.

Human Rights Watch (2000e) Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia.

ICHR (1999) Reaching Refugees by Radio: Launching a Mass Information Campaign in Albania.

Institute of Public Health of Serbia (1999b) *FRY Health Statistics Yearbook for 1997.*

Institute of Public Health of Serbia (1999a) Serbian Health Data.

International Committee of the Red Cross (1985) The Use of Artificial Milks in Relief Actions.

International Council for Voluntary Organisations (2000) Directory of UN/Government Agencies and NGOs in Yugoslavia.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (1999) *The ICVA Directory of Humanitarian and Development Agencies in Bosnia and Hercegovina.* Sarajevo: 6th Edition. Muller.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (2000) The Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response to the Kosovo Refugee Crisis, *Talkback - the Newsletter of the ICVA*, vol. 2. (1)

International Crisis Group (1998c) Kosovo's Long Hot Summer: Briefing on Military, Humanitarianism and Political Developments in Kosovo.

International Crisis Group (1998a) Kosovo Briefing.

International Crisis Group (1998b) Kosovo Spring: Report on Kosovo.

International Crisis Group (1999b) ICG Kosovo: Bite the Bullet. A Strategy to Resolve the Kosovo Crisis.

International Crisis Group (1999d) Kosovo: The Road to Peace. Critical Implementation Issues and a 'Who's Who' of Key Players.

International Crisis Group (1999a) Milosevic's Aims in War and Diplomacy.

International Crisis Group (1999c) Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom?

International Crisis Group (2000a) Albania: State of the Nation.

International Crisis Group (2000b) Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano.

International Development Committee (1999b) Kosovo: Further Developments.

International Development Committee (1999a) Kosovo: The Humanitarian Crisis (Third Report).

International Development Committee (2000) Government Response to the Third Report from the Committee, Session 1998-99: Kosovo: The Humanitarian Crisis (House of Commons).

International Federation of the Red Cross (1996) Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.

International Federation of the Red Cross (1999a) Psychosocial Programme in Kosovo.

International Federation of the Red Cross (1999b) Psychosocial Programme Update.

International Federation of the Red Cross (1999c) World Disasters Report 1999. Chapter 8 - The Sphere Project: Everybody's Business.

International Federation of the Red Cross (2000) Appeal 2000-2001, Central and Southern Europe: Strategies and Programmes.

International Federation of the Red Cross & International Committee of the Red Cross (1999b) Integrated appeal of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in response to the crisis in the Balkans.

International Federation of the Red Cross & International Committee of the Red Cross (1999c) Joint Communication from the IFRC and ICRC. Return to Kosovo. A New Phase in the Operation.

International Federation of the Red Cross & International Committee of the Red Cross (1999a) Revised Integrated Appeal of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in Response to the Situation in the Balkans.

International Monetary Fund (2000) The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: An Updated Assessment.

Jaspars, S. (1999b) Proposal for Monitoring Food Security and Vulnerability of Kosovar Refugees in Albania (CARE International).

Jaspars, S. (12/6/99a) Recommendations for Food Distribution in Kosovo.

Judah, T. (2000) *Kosovo: War and Revenge.* Yale University Press.

Kandic, N. (2000) The Lesson of Orahovac: The International Administration in Kosovo Encourages Violence Against Serbs (Institute of War and Peace Reporting).

Kaplan, R. (2000) *Balkan Ghosts.* USA: Vintage.

Kelly, T. & Kleyn, D. (1999a) Interviews carried out by the Scribes in the Balkans.

Kelly, T. & Kleyn, D. (1999b) The Humanitarian Response: The 'Balkan Crisis' (Valid International).

KFOR Various Press Statements (July - October 1999).

KFOR Various Press Updates (October 1999 - May 2000).

Kiuranov, D. (1999) Vendetta on the Non-Existent: Of Kosovo Roma in and out of the International Media (ERRC).

Kosova Chamber of Commerce (2000) Situation of the Economy of Kosova after the War.

Kosovo/Operation Allied Force (2000) After Action Report: Report to Congress (US Department of Defense).

Kostovicova, D. (2000) Safe Havens for Serb Security (Institute of War and Peace Reporting).

Kovacs, P. (2000) Armed Intervention in Kosovo: the Legal Basis of the NATO Forces' Obligation to Respect International Humanitarian Law, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp103-128.

Krahenbuhl, P. (2000) Conflict in the Balkans: Human Tragedies and the Challenge to Independent Humanitarian Action, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp11-29.

Lawrence, M. (1999) Rapid Food Economy Assessment of Kosovo Province (Save the Children).

Lawrence, M. & Borrel, A. (1999) Joint WFP/UNHCR Food Needs Assessment of Minorities in Kosovo (WFP; UNHCR).

Lawrence, M. & King, A. (2000) Kosovo Food Economy Analysis. Projections of Food Aid Needs, April 2000 onwards.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1999b) A Fragile Peace: Laying the Foundations for Justice in Kosovo.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1999a) Kosovo - Protection and Peace-building: Protection of Refugees, Returnees, Internally Displaced Persons and Minorities.

Leader, N. (1999) 'Humanitarian Principles in Practice: A Critical Review', *RRN Discussion Paper 3.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Liegeois, J. P. & Gheorghe, N. (1995) Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority (Minority Rights Group).

Lister, S. (2000) Scaling-up after Hurricane Mitch (Overseas Development Institute).

Littman, M. (2000) Law and Diplomacy - How NATO's War Against Yugoslavia Breached International Law (Committee for Peace in the Balkans).

Loughry, M. & Ager, A. (1999) The Refugee Experience. Psychosocial Training Module (Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford).

Loveless, J. (1999) Reflections on Oxfam GB Tirana Programme (Oxfam).

Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation (2000b) Report on the Public Opinion Poll concerning the Project 'Raising Public Awareness'.

Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation (2000a) Results from the Examination of the Public Opinion on the Refugees to the Republic of Macedonia.

Maisonneuve, M. (1999) Kosovo: A Commander's View, *National Network News*, vol. 6. (1)

Maliqi, S. (2000) Special Report; Chaos and Complexities in Kouchner's Kosovo (Institute of War and Peace Reporting).

Marsden, P. Myth and Reality: the Return of Kosovan Albanians, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

McEwen, Y. (2000) Trauma and Psychological Injury. A Discussion Document on Research and Development Issues. Paper One (Abertay Fife University Project).

McGrath, M. (1999a) Infant feeding in emergencies: recurring challenges (Save the Children).

McGrath, R. (1999b) Kosovo: A Wasteland Called Peace.

Mental Health Workers Without Borders (1999) 'Techniques of Psychosocial Intervention', *Coping with Disaster: A Guidebook to Psychosocial Interventions following Disasters.*

Mertus, J. (1999b) *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War.* USA: University of California Press.

Mertus, J. (1999a) 'Women in Kosovo: Contested Terrains. The Role of National Identity in Shaping and Challenging Gender Identity', in S. Ramet (ed) *Gender Politics in the Western Balkans.*: The Pennysylvania State University Press.

Minear, L., Van Baarda, T. & Sommers, M. (2000) NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis, *Occasional Paper #36.*

Mines Advisory Group (1999) MAG Kosovo: Humanitarian Demining 2000.

Ministry of Defence (1999) Responding to a Humanitarian Crisis.

Ministry of Defence (2000b) Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis.

Ministry of Defence (2000a) Various Briefings (April - June 1999).

Momtaz, D. (2000) NATO's 'Humanitarian Intervention' in Kosovo and the Prohibition of the Use of Force, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp89-102.

Morris, N. (1999c) The Agency that's had a Bad War (UNHCR).

Morris, N. (1999a) UNHCR and Kosovo: A Personal View from within UNHCR, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

Morris, P. (1999b) Humanitarian Interventions in Macedonia: An NGO Perspective, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

National Audit Office (2000a) Emergency Aid: The Kosovo Crisis.

National Audit Office (2000b) Kosovo: The Financial Management of Military Operations (Ministry of Defence).

NATO (1999) Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ('KFOR') and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.

NATO (2000) Speeches and Transcripts from NATO Press Conferences (March - June 1999).

NGO Council (2000) NGO Council Kosovo members.

OCHA (1999a) Humanitarian Assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: A Discussion Paper.

OCHA (1999c) Report of the Interagency Needs Assessment Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Federal republic of Yugoslavia.

OCHA (1999b) United Nations Consolidated Interagency Appeal for The Southeastern Europe Humanitarian Operations.

OCHA (2000e) Additional 1999 Humanitarian Assistance: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. Outside of the framework of UN Consolidated interagency Appeal as of 11 February 2000.

OCHA (2000d) Contributions to the 1999 UN Consolidated interagency Appeal for the South-eastern Europe Humanitarian Operation (Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania). By Agency and Donor as of 31 January 2000.

OCHA (2000c) Funding to the Revised 1999 UN Consolidated Interagency Appeal for the South-eastern Europe Humanitarian Operation (Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania). By Appealing Agency as of 31 January 2000.

OCHA (2000a) Humanitarian Risk Analysis. Issues 2-10. August 1999 - April 2000.

OCHA (2000b) Study Series on Humanitarian Vulnerability in Montenegro, FRY, No. 1: Social Welfare and Unemployment.

OCHA (2000f) Total Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania in 1999 as of 11 February 2000. Table by donors and appealing agencies.

OECD/DAC task force Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation. Report no 1: Civilian and Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict.

Off the Record (2000c) Civil Society and the Reconstruction of Kosovo, *OTR Kosovo*, vol. 10. (1)

Off the Record (2000b) Gender Bias - Women and Peace-building, *OTR Kosovo*, vol. 10. (4)

Off the Record (2000a) Minority Politics - When a Minority Gambles on a Political Future, *OTR Kosovo*, vol. 10. (5)

Ogden, K. (2000) Coping Strategies Developed as a Result of Social Structure and Conflict: Kosovo in the 1990s, *Disasters*, vol. 24. (2)

Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe (2000) The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission.

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights (1999a) Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told: An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998 to June 1999 (Part I).

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights (1999b) Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told: An Analysis of the Human Rights Fndings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission June to October 1999 (Part II).

Oxfam (1999) Disabilities and Community Development.

Oxfam (2000) An End to Forgotten Emergencies.

Oxfam Disability Team (2000) Disabled People in Kosovo - An Overview of the Situation.

Oxfam International (2000) Winning the peace? Some Lessons from the EU's Aid to South Eastern Europe, June 1999-June 2000.

Paul, D. (1999) 'Protection in Practice: Field-Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm', *RRN Network Paper 30.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Perea, W. (1999) Rapid Needs Assessment Among Kosova Refugees Hosted by Albanian Families and Assessment of Human Right Violation Committed in Kosovo 29th April (Medecins Sans Frontieres).

Pettifer, J. & Poulton, H. (1994) The Southern Balkans (Minority Rights Group).

Porter, T. (1999b) Coordination in the Midst of Chaos: the Refugee Crisis in Albania, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

Porter, T. (1999a) Final Report, Emergency Programme Coordinator, Oxfam GB Albania Programme (Oxfam).

Porter, T. (2000) The Partiality of Humanitarian Assistance - Kosovo in Comparative Perspective.

Pugh, M. (2000) Civil-Military Relations in the Kosovo Crisis: An Emerging Hegemony (Draft) (University of Plymouth; Copenhagen Peace Research Institute).

Puxon, G. (1987) Roma: Europe's Gypsies (Minority Rights Group).

Randall, T. (2000) A Discussion Paper: Long Term Assistance to Kosovar Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (Department for International Development).

Reddick, M. & Borton, J. (2000) Though the Road be Long, Let your Heart be Strong: Identifying an Acceptable Indicator of DEC Members Capacity.

Roger Young and Associates (2000) DEC Bangladesh 1998 Flood Appeal. An Independent Evaluation.

Rogers, A. P. V. (2000) Zero-Casualty Warfare, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp165-181.

Roggo, B. M. (2000) After the Kosovo Conflict, a Genuine Humanitarian Space: A Utopian Concept or an Essential Requirement? (International Committee of the Red Cross).

Rowe, P. (2000) Kosovo 1999: The Air Campaign - Have the Provisions of Additional Protocol 1 Withstood the Test?, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 837. pp147-164.

Salama, P., Spiegal, P., Van Dyke, M., Phelps, L. & Wilkinson, C. (2000) Assessing the Vulnerability of the Serbian Minority in UN-Administered Kosovo, September and October 1999. (CDC Atlanta).

Save the Children (1999) Survey on Refugees in Private Accommodation.

Schnabel, A. & Thakur, R. (2000) *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention.* United Nations University.

Schulte-Hillen, C. (1999) Evaluation Report. MSF Response in Macedonia to the Kosovo Refugee Crisis. A New Humanitarian Order? (Medecins Sans Frontieres).

Scott-Flynn, N. (1999a) 'Coordination in Kosovo: The Challenge for the NGO Sector', *RRN Newsletter 15.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Scott-Flynn, N. (1999b) 'Post-NATO Serbia', *RRN Newsletter 15.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Shawcross, W. (2000) *Deliver Us From Evil.* Bloomsbury.

Shearer, D. (1999a) Humanitarian response to the Kosovo Conflict (International Institute for Strategic studies).

Shearer, D. (1999b) The Future of Emergency Management Group.

Silkin, T., Kieffer, G. & de Klerk, T. (2000) Report of an Evaluation of EUBK91 (ACT).

Slim, H. & McConnan, I. (1998) A Swiss Prince, a Glass Slipper and the Feet of 15 British Aid Agencies: A Study of DEC Agency Positions on Humanitarian Principles.

Spahija, V. & Drini, I. (1999) One, Two, Many …. But Not Yet Whole. Mid-Term Evaluation Emergency Appeal EUKC91 of ACT in Macedonia and Albania (Christian Aid).

Spiegal, P. & Salama, P. (1999) Kosovar Albanian Health Survey Report, September 1999 (International Rescue Committee; Institute for Public Health, Kosova; WHO; Centers for Disease Control).

Stitt, T. (2000) SHAPE CMC Conference (Disaster Response Unit).

Stojanovic, V. (2000) Roma 'Martians' from Kosovo Unwanted Wherever They Go (Institute of War and Peace Reporting).

Stone, J. (2000) Losing Perspective: Global Affairs on British Terrestrial Television 1989-1999 (Third World and Environment Broadcasting Project).

Stone, M., Anema, F. & Wissink, H. (2000) The Balkans Evaluation. An Examination of the Role of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's Response to the Balkans Crisis (International Committee of the Red Cross; International Federation of the Red Cross).

Suhrke, A., Barutciski, M., Sandison, P. & Garlock, R. (2000) The Kosovo Refugee Crisis - An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response (UNHCR).

Telford, J. (1999) Coordination in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency (EMG Evaluation) (DFID).

The Institute of History, P. (2000) Expulsions of Albanians and Colonisation of Kosova (1877 - 1995).

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000) Evaluation of the Kosovo Crisis.

The Sphere Project (1998) The Sphere Project - Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Preliminary Version).

The Sphere Project (2000b) Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Final Version).

The Sphere Project (2000a) The Sphere Project: A Programme of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response and Interaction with Voice, ICRC, ICVA.

Tzu, S. (1999) Kosovo Lessons Learned (The Strategic Issues Research Institute).

UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women.

UNHCR Protecting Refugees - A Field Guide for NGOs.

UNHCR (1989) Policy of the UNHCR Related to the Acceptance, Distribution and Use of Milk Products in Feeding Programmes in Refugee Settings.

UNHCR (1995) Revised (1995) Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees.

UNHCR (1996c) Assisting Disabled Refugees - A Community-Based Approach.

UNHCR (1996e) Background paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Kosovo.

UNHCR (1996a) Community Services in UNHCR.

UNHCR (1996b) Refugee Emergencies: A Community-Based Approach.

UNHCR (1996d) Working with Unaccompanied Children.

UNHCR (1998) UNHCR Assistance to Older Refugees - Review and Case Studies.

UNHCR (1999b) Coordination of Complementary Food Provision to Refugees in Macedonia.

UNHCR (1999i) Critical Issues Relating to Women and Children.

UNHCR (1999h) Government of Albania and UNHCR - Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Relocation of Kosovar Refugees from North Albania.

UNHCR Guidelines to NGO local staff salary (27/4/99e)

UNHCR (1999c) Kosovo Emergency Updates (April 1999).

UNHCR (1999f) Kosovo Rapid Village Assessment: First Cut, 7 July.

UNHCR (1999g) Kosovo Rapid Village Assessment: Second Cut, 26 July.

UNHCR (1999a) RC/UNHCR Registration of Kosovo Cases Accommodated by Host Families.

UNHCR (1999l) Recommended Food Aid Strategy for Internally Displaced and Returnees in Kosovo.

UNHCR (1999k) UNHCR Concept Note for the Provision of Fresh Foods to Minorities and Other Nutritionally Vulnerable Households During Winter Period in Kosovo.

UNHCR (1999j) UNHCR Kosovo Return Plan.

UNHCR (1999d) UNHCR Tirana Guidelines on Refugee Camps Layout and Watsan Facilities.

UNHCR (2000) Report by the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo (UNHCHR).

UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe (1999c) Overview of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.

UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe (1999a) Preliminary Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.

UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe (1999b) Second Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.

UNHCR and World Health Organisation (25/5/99) Infant Feeding Policy Statements.

UNICEF (1998) Children's and Women's Rights in Albania: Situation Analysis.

UNICEF (1999) Report on the PreliminaryResults of the Assessment of School Buildings in Kosovo, 29 June - 3 July 1999.

UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP & WHO (1999) Policy on Infant Feeding in Emergencies.

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (2000) Guidelines for Housing Reconstruction Kosovo 2000.

United Nations Security Council (1999) Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

United Nations Security Council (2000) Resolution 1244 (1999).

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (1999) Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response: Version 3.0.

UNMACC (2000) Statistics to March 2000.

US Committee for Refugees (2000) Reversal of Fortune: Yugoslavia's Refugee Crisis Since the Ethnic Albanian Return to Kosovo.

US Department of Defence (1999) Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review.

US Department of State (1999) Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords).

US State Department (1999b) Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo - An Accounting. December - Report 2.

US State Department (1999a) Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. April - Report 1.

USAID Kosovo Fact Sheets (April - September 1999).

Van Brabant, K. (1997) Organisational and Institutional Learning in the Humanitarian Sector: Opening the Dialogue (Overseas Development Institute).

Van Brabant, K. (1999b) NGO Security management Workshop in Kosovo - Prizren. Only available on-line: www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/newslet/kosovsec.html (Overseas Development Institute).

Van Brabant, K. (1999a) Peace-Making through Protectorate: Operational and Political Challenges. Only available on-line: www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/discussion/kosovo.html (Overseas Development Institute).

Van Brabant, K. (1999c) 'The Current Situation in the Balkans', *RRN Newsletter 15.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Vaux, T. *Kosovo: New World Order? (draft).*

Vickers, M. (2000b) *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo.* Columbia University Press.

Vickers, M. (2000a) *The Albanians. A Modern History.* Revised edn, I B Tauris & Co Ltd.

Vickers, M. & Pettifer, J. (2000) *Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity.* New York University Press.

Vincent, M. (1999) Involving the Beneficiaries, *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 5.

Wiebe, V. (1999) Cluster Bomb Use in the Yugoslavia/Kosovo War (MCC).

Wiebe, V. & Peachey, T. (1999) Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow (MCC).

Wightwick, D. (1999) A Rapid Health Assessment of Kosovar Albanians in Macedonia (UNHCR).

Williams, S. (1999) Protection of Refugee Women in the Macedonian Camps: Key Concerns (Oxfam).

Williams, S. (2000) Gender and Human Rights in the Macedonian Refugee camps (Oxfam).

Woodruff, B., McBurney, R., Janeva, N., Stoyanovska, B. & Venovska, K. (2000) Nutrition and Health Survey of Kosovar Refugees in Camps in Macedonia (UNHCR; Action Against Hunger; IMCH; UNICEF).

World Food Programme (1992) Guidelines for the Use of Milk Powder in all WFP-assisted Projects and Operations.

World Food Programme (1999b) Emergency Food Assistance in the Balkan Region.

World Food Programme (1999a) Kosovo Food Aid Tracking System.

World Food Programme (2000) Summary Evaluation Report on Kosovo Regional Emergency Operation 6040.00.

World Food Programme & UNHCR (1997) Joint WFP/UNHCR Guidelines for Estimating Food and Nutritional Needs in Emergencies.

World Health Organisation (1994) WHO Programme of Humanitarian Assistance to War-Affected Populations of the Former Yugoslavia: Report of an External Evaluation.

World Health Organisation (1999i) An Overview of a Strategy to Improve the Mental Health of Under-served Populations.

World Health Organisation (1999c) Communicable Disease Profile: Kosovo and Montenegro.

World Health Organisation (1999e) Core Principles for the Management of Health Sector Institutions and Programmes.

World Health Organisation (1999h) Country Health Report Albania (WHO, Eurohealth Programme;).

World Health Organisation (1999b) Health Needs Assessment in Kosovar Refugees in Host Families in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

World Health Organisation (1999a) Health Related Activities During Repatriation.

World Health Organisation (1999d) Kosovo Health Care System: Transition from Emergency Assistance to Long Term Development.

World Health Organisation (1999g) Surveillance System Among Kosovar Refugee Population in Albania, 5/4/99-20/6/99. Final Report.

World Health Organisation (1999f) WHO Health Sector Assessment in FRY, July 1999 (Second Edition).

Zwi, A. (1999) 'Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Older People', *The Ageing and Development Report: Poverty Independence and the World's Older People.* UK: HelpAge International/Earthscan Publications.