

HPG WORKING PAPER

How to reform the Humanitarian Programme Cycle

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Cover photo: A child skips home from school in Mali. © Tiécoura N'Daou, 2026

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Contents

Acknowledgements / 3

List of tables and figures / 5

Introduction / 7

Recent changes to the Humanitarian Programme Cycle / 8

Key challenges and possible solutions / 11

Crisis scope setting and needs assessment and analysis / 11

Strategic planning / 14

Resource mobilisation / 25

Implementation and monitoring / 31

Conclusions and recommendations / 33

References / 36

List of tables and figures

Tables

- Table 1** Transitional contexts in the GHO / 21
- Table 2** Recommendations for HPC reform / 34

Figures

- Figure 1** The Humanitarian Programme Cycle / 9
- Figure 2** Changes in key metrics pre-and post-prioritisation, 2022 vs 2025 / 13
- Figure 3** Percentage of people in need targeted or prioritised, 2015–2026 / 16
- Figure 4** Change in crisis severity vs targeting between 2024 and 2025 / 17
- Figure 5** Funding requirements disaggregated by longevity of plans, 2016–2026 / 19
- Figure 6** Percentage of changes of funding requirement vs percentage of funding received / 26
- Figure 7** Total funding requirements divided by number of people targeted and prioritised, 2015–2026 / 29
- Figure 8** Difference between unit cost for target vs. prioritised populations in the 2026 GHO / 30
- Figure 9** Number of people reached (and not reached but still in need), 2021–2025 / 32

Acronyms

EDG	Emergency Directors Group
FTS	Financial Tracking System
GHO	Global Humanitarian Overview
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
HPC	Humanitarian Programme Cycle
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
JIAF 2.0	Joint and Intersectoral Analysis Framework 2.0
MSNA	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PIN	people in need
RRP	Refugee Response Plan
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
UNSDCF	UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework

Introduction

The Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC), as developed by the global humanitarian system led by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), represents an attempt to achieve the impossible: to present a highly complex and dynamic set of needs in the most challenging crises across the world in a consistent way that allows for realistic planning and resource allocation. The political context shapes access to populations in need and the ability to understand and reflect their situation, which means that some crises achieve major international support while others become neglected and are not allocated the same level of resources. Consistency and coherence have always been difficult to achieve.

Despite these challenges, the HPC has become an indispensable tool for assessing humanitarian needs, planning humanitarian responses and mobilising resources. Decreasing humanitarian funding since 2023 has placed significant pressure on the system and led to reforms of the HPC, including greater prioritisation and boundary setting within Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs). As part of the Humanitarian Reset and UN80, additional efforts are being taken to simplify the planning of appeals to reduce the burden on humanitarian partners. However, there is a growing lack of trust in the process (NRC et al., 2025). Many feel that the reforms of the HPC do not go far enough and its credibility is being brought into question as the humanitarian system grapples with significantly less funding.

This paper analyses some of the challenges faced by and shortcomings of the HPC and suggests recommended policy options for reform.¹ It is not concerned with the minutiae of the process of producing HNRPs, but rather provides a strategic-level analysis of the extent to which the HPC is achieving its objectives. These objectives are primarily to produce quality data and analysis on humanitarian needs and financial requirements, and to also be fit-for-purpose as a planning framework. Indeed, a central line of enquiry is the inherent tension in being able to simultaneously achieve these different objectives and the inconsistencies in the data produced. The paper is based on a review of relevant reports on the subject, 15 key informant interviews with donor representatives and organisations engaged in the HPC, as well as data analysis of key trends.

Recognising the complexity of the process, for each challenge identified in this paper, three policy options are proposed. These range from incremental reform to substantive reform to transformative reform, in view of different opinions and the level of change that might be realistic.

¹ The paper does not explicitly analyse the planning of Refugee Response Plans undertaken by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR); however, it does address how the HPC interacts with the planning of refugee responses.

Recent changes to the Humanitarian Programme Cycle

The HPC is a coordinated set of actions undertaken by humanitarian actors to improve the predictability, speed and effectiveness of their response to emergencies, and is overseen by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). It is based on a six-step process (see Figure 1): scope setting, analysis, planning, resource mobilisation, implementation and evaluation. The aim of the HPC is to help ensure that the humanitarian response is needs-based, coordinated and accountable to affected populations. It promotes collaboration among humanitarian actors and facilitates the use of evidence-based data and analysis to inform decision-making (OCHA Knowledge Base, n.d.a).


The HPC aims to answer three primary questions, in relation to needs, response and funding:

1. What are the causes, scale and severity of humanitarian needs and where are they?
2. What response is needed?
3. What are the financial requirements to fund the agreed plan?

The research highlights the challenges of answering these questions simultaneously. It also shows the difficulty of providing consistent and credible data that is trusted by the different users of the HPC, including donors, humanitarian organisations and other partners. For these reasons, the process has been criticised by some actors with concerns that the HPC is not achieving what it set out to achieve (ICVA, 2025).

Since 2023, several changes have been made to the HPC process, which coincided with falling levels of humanitarian funding. After several years of expansion in both their scope and financial requirements, the concept of ‘boundary setting’ was introduced to ensure that HNRPs focused more precisely on life-saving humanitarian needs rather than long-term structural problems. Efforts were also made to lighten the process, which was reduced by 51 days between 2023 and 2025, while the appeal document length decreased by 67% on average (OCHA, 2025a).

The suspension of US humanitarian funding in January 2025 and other donor cuts prompted further prioritisation. The Emergency Relief Coordinator requested Humanitarian Coordinators to revise their 2025 HNRPs to prioritise urgent life-saving actions, and tasked the Emergency Directors Group (EDG) to use the analysis coming from Humanitarian Coordinators and Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) to set out a clear prioritisation plan by March 2025 for saving as many lives as possible with the reduced level of resources (OCHA, 2025b). This process led to the accelerated transition of the IASC humanitarian coordination architecture (within which the HPC process sits) and planning processes in eight countries: Cameroon, Colombia, Eritrea, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan and Zimbabwe (IASC Emergency Directors Group, 2025).

Figure 1 The Humanitarian Programme Cycle

Source: OCHA (2025a)

In June 2025, a hyper-prioritised Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO) 2025 was published that targeted 114.4 million people facing the most life-threatening needs, which represented 38.3% of the 298.9 million people in need of humanitarian assistance globally and only 64% of the 178.7 million people targeted for humanitarian assistance at the beginning of 2025 (OCHA, 2025c). A hyper-prioritised GHO has remained a priority of the Humanitarian Reset (IASC, 2025). Donors have also communicated that they want to see a simplified HPC that focuses on affected people's priorities (Donor Group, 2025). On 8 December 2025, the UN launched the GHO for the following year, requesting \$33 billion to assist 135 million people of the 239 million people in need of assistance, with a prioritised element of 87 million people targeted for \$23 billion – this prioritised element effectively acts as a specific target and funding requirement for those deemed most in need.

This paper seeks to answer the question of whether these adjustments have gone far enough or whether a more fundamental reform of the HPC is required. As noted in the following sections, the purpose of the HPC is wide and it is perhaps overstretched. However, it is important to note the different uses and utilities of the HPC, specifically the HNRPs, which include:

- Primary uses:
 - to represent needs (both within a context, as well as comparable across contexts);
 - as an operational plan that shapes the response;
 - as an advocacy and fundraising document to drive donor allocations.
- Secondary uses:
 - to build consensus in-country on the humanitarian picture;
 - to carve out operational space with a host government;
 - as a reference tool for all actors;
 - to inform resource allocation of country-based pooled funds;
 - for use by donors to advocate internally and provide information upwards;
 - as an accountability and reporting baseline.

Key challenges and possible solutions

The following sections analyse the different stages of the HPC, as seen in Figure 1, including the improvements that have been made but also the ongoing shortcomings of the process.² For each issue that has been identified, recommended policy options have been included underneath the analysis, ranging from incremental and substantive changes to a more fundamental rethinking of the HPC for consideration by those stakeholders involved in the process.

Crisis scope setting and needs assessment and analysis

Key challenge: inconsistent evidence base for the definition of humanitarian needs (needs analysis)

The first step in the HPC is to establish the scope of a humanitarian crisis in a given context and then, based on this, assess the scale and severity of humanitarian needs. The definition of humanitarian action and what constitutes humanitarian needs have always been topics of debate. Some have argued, though, that with the growth of funding up until 2022, the humanitarian sector had begun to experience ‘mission creep’, especially in protracted crises where it had filled the gap left by the absence of development assistance, which should address structural challenges (Lilly, 2023). This mission creep is to a large extent the result of political failures that have left humanitarian responses as the primary form of international support for protracted crisis.

In 2023, the Joint and Intersectoral Analysis Framework 2.0 (JIAF 2.0) was introduced to answer key questions of how many people need humanitarian assistance; the nature, drivers and severity of their needs; and how sectoral needs overlap and co-exist, enabling humanitarian actors to coordinate and implement a more effective response (OCHA Knowledge Base, n.d.b). The JIAF 2.0 is used to analyse and aggregate total figures on humanitarian need (the People In Need (PIN) number) which form the basis of HNRPs and are aggregated into the GHQ. Some interviewees noted that the JIAF 2.0 has brought greater rigour to the analysis of humanitarian needs and has ensured greater standardisation between different contexts. The JIAF 2.0 has also introduced a formula to tighten the scope of humanitarian response based on a scale of severity of needs. A more directive approach to the HPC was adopted for 2026 given the fall in humanitarian funding with guidance setting out a typology of generic shocks that HNRPs should be based on. The approach also outlined criteria for establishing the extent of humanitarian needs, with the PIN number for each country only including all people living in areas where JIAF intersectoral severity is recorded as Phase 3 and above (OCHA, 2025a). As a consequence, the scope and scale of humanitarian needs included in HNRPs have decreased.³

2 The final step, operational peer review and evaluation, is not analysed as it is out of scope for this paper


3 For example, the number of HNRPs that had a country-wide scope in 2024 was 20 as compared to only 4 that had a scope of only part of the country, whereas by 2026 only 8 had a country-wide scope and 12 were part of the country.

These changes have no doubt led to methodological improvements in the HPC, which was widely acknowledged by those people spoken to as part of the research for this paper. However, there have also been several challenges with the approach adopted, with informants saying that whilst the process had improved technically, several problems remain. In particular, concern has been raised that the representation of humanitarian needs, and the PIN numbers specifically, included in HNRPs are not being defined objectively by needs assessments alone but by other considerations as well.

Three factors are increasingly challenging the credibility with which needs are presented in the HPC. Firstly, there is a dissonance between the reported PIN numbers in HNRPs and the GHO, and the broader narrative about humanitarian needs being reported. By most measures, including for example levels of food insecurity and displacement, humanitarian needs have been increasing globally in recent years and yet the overall PIN number has been decreasing in the GHO (see Figure 2). Whilst it is recognised that not everything should fall under the scope of humanitarian plans and the new JIAF methodology has sharpened the scope of assessing humanitarian needs, this gap is creating further confusion and contributing to a lack of credibility and trust in the process. This discrepancy is important given the role that the PIN number plays (as opposed to funding requirements) in informing donor resource allocation as well as the comparability of crisis.

Secondly, there is an increasing sense that the firewall between needs analysis and planning and fundraising has become less clear. The Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessments (MSNAs) undertaken to inform the HNRPs are typically seen as trusted and credible, but there is a gap between what they report as needs and the PIN number that is eventually included in the HNRP, which is normally lower. While this difference might be explained in part by the different methodologies employed by the MSNA and the JIAF, it also suggests the needs analysis within the HPC is influenced by other factors. In 2023, the decision was made to merge the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and what were then Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) into a single document (the HNRP). This helped lighten the process by reducing the number and length of documents being produced. However, many informants felt that this too far diminished the firewall between assessing needs and the setting of the targets. Some interviewees called for the delinking of these two processes to ensure that needs assessments occur independently and are not based on the ability of humanitarian actors to respond.

Thirdly, and relatedly, as some interviewees noted, there is a perception that PIN numbers have been influenced by other considerations, for example, by the extent to which funding is available, or political considerations, such as potential backlash from host governments. For example, there is no public HNRP in Ethiopia due to delays and ongoing negotiations with the government (Sida, 2026).

Figure 2 Changes in key metrics pre-and post-prioritisation, 2022 vs 2025

Sources: Global Humanitarian Overviews (PIN), INFORM Severity Index (severity), EM-DAT (climate incidents), UNHCR Global Trends (displacement), Global Report on Food Crises (acute food insecurity), ACLED (political violence incidents).

Notes: The start and end dates were selected to align as closely as possible with the publication date of the GHO 2023 and GHO 2026 (December 2022 and December 2025). Thus the data shown above for variables (except PIN) are a snapshot of the variable in the period leading up to these dates. This allows for a comparison of key metrics before prioritisation was implemented (GHO 2023 – December 2022; the last GHO prior to prioritisation), and after prioritisation was implemented (GHO 2026 – December 2025; the most recent GHO).

PIN: Data for the number of people in need compares the GHO 2023 and GHO 2026 numbers.

Severity: Data for severity compares the number of countries ranked as 'high' or 'very high' in December 2022 versus December 2025.

Food insecurity: Data for acute food insecurity compares 2022 versus 2025.

Climate incidents: Data for the number affected by climate incidents compares the rolling three-year average of climate incidents in 2022 versus 2025. Includes climatological, hydrological, and meteorological events.

Displacement: Data for forced displacement compares total 2022 and total 2025 forcible displacement numbers.

Conflict: Data for political violence incidents compares the number of incidents in 2022 versus 2025.

A recent non-governmental organisation (NGO) survey noted the pressure to reduce the PIN which has led to it being manipulated through scope-setting (on boundaries or populations) (NRC et al., 2025). Coupled with the lack of transparency over how the PIN number is calculated, this has undermined confidence and trust in the HPC. Several informants felt that the setting of the boundaries and scope of the HNRPs should be done at the planning stage and not the assessment of needs stage.

One implication of these factors is that people who are in genuine need of humanitarian assistance have been excluded from HNRPs. While humanitarian funding has never been enough to cover all needs, excluding people at such an early stage of the planning process is problematic. NGOs registered their concern in 2023 regarding the trend of boundary setting and prioritisation effectively providing aid to some while denying it to others (Joint NGO Statement, 2023). Some informants also noted how the system relies too much on a single source for needs analysis, and that the sector would benefit from a plurality of perspectives and analyses (particularly when the broader data ecosystem is struggling with funding cuts).

The core issue is that the needs analysis and PIN number as presented in HNRPs are no longer seen by many important humanitarian stakeholders as objective and tied solely to assessments, and thus these metrics fail to provide a solid evidence base.

Policy options	
Incremental reform	Split the HNO and HRP by setting the PIN number independent of any other considerations, and assigning financial requirements by PIN number in addition to the target, as is currently the case (Lilly and Pearson, 2025).
Substantive reform	Introduce an accountability mechanism (i.e. a third-party body that can scrutinise how the PIN number is calculated) to ensure that the PIN is based on credible evidence of needs and no other factors. ⁴
Transformative reform	Outsource the needs assessment and setting of the PIN number entirely for the HPC to a fully independent body separate from the UN (see, for example, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification).

Strategic planning

Key challenge: Limitations of prioritisation and hyper-prioritisation in the setting of targets for those receiving assistance (target setting)

Having established the scope, scale and severity of humanitarian needs, the next step in the HPC is to plan the response, including setting targets for those who will be assisted. The HPC has always included an element of prioritisation as it has never been the intention to assist all people in need, nor has it

4 Such a mechanism was discussed at the time of the development of the JIAF 2.0, and Severity 5 needs are already vetted globally as part of the process.


been possible to do so with the resources available. However, until recently, the difference between the PIN and the target number was not so large, with the broad objective of the humanitarian response being to assist the majority of people in need of assistance (whether inside or outside of the HNRP). However, the decrease in funding has meant that the gap between these two numbers has grown significantly so as to undermine the process. Indeed, the most striking impact of boundary setting since 2023 has been the dramatically smaller proportion of people who need humanitarian assistance that are now being targeted for such assistance (Lilly and Pearson, 2025).

Since the hyper-prioritised GH0 was published in June 2025, there are now two targets: (1) people targeted; and (2) people prioritised. The first figure is the amount of people that humanitarian partners hope to reach and remains the main benchmark against which financial requirements are set and monitored. The second figure is a prioritised figure, which is a more realistic target given the decreasing levels of funding (OCHA, 2025a).⁵ As Figure 3 shows, 74% of people in need were targeted for assistance in 2015; since prioritisation was introduced for the 2024 HPC process, the percentage has dropped to 57% in 2026 with an even smaller proportion that are prioritised – 38% of people in need globally. This means that less than 4 out of every 10 people in need of assistance are now being prioritised for assistance. Given that humanitarian assistance is perennially underfunded, the chance of someone receiving assistance has become even smaller.

For the 2026 cycle, a standardised formula was introduced for calculating the target figures. This standardisation of the HPC target-setting represents a major improvement in the process, as until then each response was able to use its own means to calculate the target. Most informants noted that prioritising in an era of limited resources intuitively makes sense. However, whilst some variation in target-setting is necessary to reflect different contexts, there appears to be limited transparency in the logic or principles used to determine how targets are being set from one context to the next, and limited coherence globally between the country plans presented in the GH0.


One illustrative example that highlights the lack of consistency around targeting and prioritisation is seen in Figure 4, where there is no correlation with the changes in targeting in HNRPs compared to the severity of the crisis as reported in the INFORM Severity Index. For example, whilst the crisis severity for Chad increased from 3.7 to 4 on the INFORM Severity Index, the number targeted fell by 71% in one year. Conversely, whilst the crisis severity for Nigeria fell by 0.2 (from 4.0 to 3.8), the number targeted fell by only 30% in one year. One might expect hyper-prioritisation to prioritise contexts that are experiencing increasing crisis severity, however, as Figure 4 shows, no relationship exists between severity and targeting.

5 The paper defines people targeted as 100% Intersectoral PIN Phases 4 + 5 and maximum 50% Intersectoral PIN Phase 3, and people prioritised as 100% Intersectoral PIN Phases 4 + 5 (OCHA, 2025a).

Figure 3 Percentage of people in need targeted or prioritised, 2015–2026

Sources: Global Humanitarian Overviews

Notes: Where a plan does not have a 'prioritised' figure, the target number is included in the sum of number of people prioritised.

Figure 4 Change in crisis severity vs targeting between 2024 and 2025

Sources: Global Humanitarian Overviews (targeting), INFORM Severity Index (severity)

Notes: Each dot represents one country with an HNRP/Flash Appeal and data for that country in either the GHO or the INFORM Severity Index. Change in targeting examines the original 2025 GHO target (before hyper-prioritisation) and the 2026 prioritised number to compare the change in the effective target in one year (the prioritised number equating to a lower-bound target). Change in severity was analysed using data from November 2024 and November 2025 (i.e. the month before the GHOs were published) in order to compare whether severity also changed across the same period.

Some interviewees have noted that, on a basic level, it is confusing to have two targets, particularly as the difference between the two numbers is not clear. Country humanitarian operations have also not consistently applied the formulas that have been proposed, even when they are meant to have been standardised.⁶ A larger problem that several informants mentioned was the arbitrariness in which targets are set: not according to the formula in the guidance but rather retrofitted to match the financial requirements that the country operation estimates that it will receive. A familiar anecdote shared in the research was that although PIN numbers are presented in HCT meetings based on the needs assessment, the target tends to be set arbitrarily to match the best estimate of how much money

⁶ For example, the target in the 2026 HNRP for Somalia is based on 80% of Severity 4 and 30% of Severity 3. However, guidance states that the target should be based on 100% of Severity 4 and 5, and maximum 50% of Severity 3.

an operation thinks it will receive in a year. Therefore, contrary to the guidance, targets are not being set based on the ‘demand’ for humanitarian assistance but rather ‘supply’ factors of how much money might be available and the capacity of agencies to respond (ICVA, 2025).

However, there is nothing in the 2026 HPC guidance that explicitly says that targets or financial requirements of HNRPs should be calculated based on how much funding country humanitarian operations think that they will mobilise (OCHA, 2025a).⁷ Donors report the funding they provide after the fact and do not forecast what money they have available for each year, which if made available would significantly improve humanitarian planning and the elaboration of HNRPs. There is also no significant guidance or formula on whether targeting should reflect what funding is potentially available or agency capacity to deliver the response, nor on national capacity of host authorities or local communities to respond, which is another key consideration. NGOs have argued that humanitarian appeal costings should reflect the response to total need, not existing agency capacity or previous funding levels, enabling fair resource allocation both within and across crises (ibid.).

Furthermore, targeting can feel opaque to affected populations. As a Ground Truth Solutions report notes, communities regularly say they don’t feel informed about the assistance available to them, and don’t know how aid providers decide who receives aid and who does not (GTS, 2025).

The biggest question in regard to prioritisation and hyper-prioritisation is: what is the purpose? There are several different views on this. Several interviewees noted that the hyper-prioritisation presented in HNRPs does not reflect the reality on the ground, and even if organisations took on board hyper-prioritisation, it would still take time to redirect existing programming. It is not clear whether prioritisation affects funding allocations, which is based on a broader set of considerations. Other activities (whether in non-prioritised geographies or, for example, resilience activities) are continuing regardless but may not be recognised or plugged into the humanitarian system (e.g. in coordination forums). Thus, if the intended effect is to influence actions on the ground, it is questionable whether this is happening whilst also sidelining activities that are actually happening and being funded.

Policy options	
Incremental reform	Drop hyper-prioritisation as a separate target and revert to a single target in the HNRPs.
Substantive reform	Develop guidance for assessing the capacity of agencies and expected funding to set targets more realistically, consistently and transparently, publishing the rationale in each case and making sure to integrate community participation into targeting and response planning.
Transformative reform	Donors forecast what funding they provisionally are going to provide each year based on the assessed needs so humanitarian actors can provide a realistic target for what needs they are going to be able to cover. ⁸


7 Financial Requirements are defined as People Targeted in 2026 x total \$ costed per person in 2025.

8 It is acknowledged that not all funding comes from government donors, and thus this may only present a partial picture of future donor funding.

Key challenge: removal of transition contexts and resilience activities has left a gap in planning and resource mobilisation (protracted crisis)

The majority of humanitarian crises remain protracted, lasting at least five years but often far longer. As Figure 5 shows, 96% of the funding requirements in 2026 were for inter-agency plans lasting five years or more. Indeed, this was one of the principal factors that led to the expansion of HNRPs when humanitarian funding was more plentiful before 2023. Some countries had UN-coordinated appeals for decades. This was clearly an unsustainable position.

Figure 5 Funding requirements disaggregated by longevity of plans, 2016–2026



Source: Data collected for the *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2026*, which in turn is based on UN OCHA FTS, Syria Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan dashboards and UNHCR data.

Notes: Contexts are considered to be a recurrent crisis if they have had two to four years of consecutive humanitarian appeals; contexts are considered to be in protracted crisis when they have had five or more years of consecutive humanitarian appeals. This includes regional appeals, for example regional Refugee Response Plans, but this does not include global appeals, such as the global elements of the Covid-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan.

The prioritisation process in the HPC has addressed this issue, including through the EDG prioritisation plan adopted in June 2025, which initiated the transition out of eight operations – although no explicit or published criteria were used in the discussions (IASC, 2025; NRC, 2025a). The 2026 GHO went one step further with the most consequential trend of the plan being the explicit transition away from the international humanitarian system in many contexts (Pearson and Holloway, 2025). As Table 1 shows, up to 10 inter-agency plans in 2026 are on the path to transition or already dropped from the GHO, and there is potential for a longer-term transition elsewhere.⁹ The guidance for the 2026 HPC process underlined the need for transition and exit strategies in HNRPs, but did not provide explicit instructions for how this should be done other than including in the template a section on how to advocate for the people that no longer would be covered in the plan, and prompting contexts to outline what steps are being taken towards a responsible transition (OCHA Knowledge Base, 2026).

The implication of entire plans being dropped is that residual humanitarian needs in these ‘transition’ contexts have become invisible to those outside the context, including donors when it comes to implementing their resource allocation models and deciding which responses they are going to fund. Furthermore, there is no well-developed view on what ‘transition’ looks like. For example, research suggests that when Iraq transitioned away from the international humanitarian architecture, development funding did not fill the gap and leadership and coordination vacuums led to a stalled transition away from humanitarian activities, which still continue in the absence of an HNRP (Pearson and Holloway, 2025). There is also a lack of a planning framework for transitions, as well as detailed off-ramps built into existing plans, meaning that any transitions are likely to be chaotic and may fail.

As pressure grows to narrow the HPC’s definition of humanitarian response, a further question arises: how does the international system transition into new crises, not just out of existing ones? If the system aims to keep the overall caseload low, needs and crisis severity may escalate in places without international coverage and remain largely unseen – leaving gaps where assistance is required.

9 Mozambique was also a candidate for accelerated transition but avoided this path in 2025. It remains to be seen whether Mozambique will be pushed towards this path again.

Table 1 Transitional contexts in the GHO

	Context	2025 people in need (PIN, millions)	2025 funding requirement (\$ millions)	2026 people in need (PIN, millions)	Notes
Transition contexts On the path	Cameroon	3.3	359	2.9	Cameroon, Colombia and Nigeria are undergoing an accelerated transition process. The 2026 GHO notes that Nigeria will undergo a ‘transition from an internationally supported humanitarian operation to one that is locally led, implemented and funded by 2028’, whilst Cameroon is ‘one of the eight accelerated transition countries under the Humanitarian Reset’. The GHO does not explicitly say Colombia is undergoing a transition, but notes ‘enhancing coherence and complementarity among humanitarian, peace, and development efforts to support sustainable transitions, while preserving distinct mandates’ as a goal.
	Colombia	9.1	342	6.9	
	Nigeria	7.8	910	5.9	
Transition contexts Already dropped from the GHO	El Salvador	0.8	67	Dropped from the GHO 2026	The 2026 GHO notes that: ‘in Central America, three countries have transitioned out of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle and partners are focused on bolstering development action, while responding to persistent humanitarian needs’.
	Guatemala	2.2	101		
	Honduras	1.6	138		
	Regional: Ukraine	2.1	690		The 2026 GHO notes the following about the Ukraine RRP: ‘now in its final year, it will no longer be included in the GHO’s humanitarian financial requirements as the response moves from meeting immediate humanitarian needs toward more sustainable, nationally anchored approaches’. It also notes the following about three other RRP: ‘the 2026 planning cycle also marks an important moment of transition. Three existing RRP – the regional Afghanistan, DRC and South Sudan situations – are entering a sunset phase as operations evolve, national leadership strengthens, and response models shift toward nationally integrated and development-anchored approaches’.
	Regional: Afghanistan	6.9	622		
	Regional: DR Congo	2.1	781		
	Regional: South Sudan	4.4	714		

Source: OCHA, 2025f

In view of the decreased levels of humanitarian funding, the need to focus on life-saving assistance through hyper-prioritisation clearly is a logical approach to take. However, the consequences of this approach are that many resilience activities and more long-term interventions that help address the vulnerability of populations to humanitarian needs have been excluded from HNRPs (Swithern and Obrecht, 2025). Strategic objectives on resilience have been removed entirely from some HNRPs or included in other strategic objectives, although to a minimal scale.

It is not possible to quantify the scale of such activities that have now been excluded from the scope of the HNRPs, but it has been significant in many contexts. In Somalia, for example, the HCT decided to focus entirely on a single life-saving strategic objective in its 2026 HNRP and excluded in its entirety the resilience strategic objective and associated activities. The consequence of hyper-prioritisation is that most resilience activities have now fallen outside the scope of HNRPs but have not necessarily been taken up within other assessment, planning and resource-mobilisation processes.

Resilience approaches are what crisis-affected populations say they need and are a strategy to transition out of protracted crisis. However, reduced humanitarian funding should not necessarily mean that these activities are no longer being funded. Indeed, hyper-prioritisation may not have improved the funding picture for humanitarian action given that it has excluded assistance that is still being funded but now no longer falls within the scope of an HNRP, and therefore may not be reported and tracked, for example, by OCHA's Financial Tracking System (FTS).¹⁰

There has not been a system-wide approach to resilience and more long-term interventions falling outside the scope of HNRPs, and the nexus is low down the list of priorities in the Humanitarian Reset. The template for the HNRP includes a section for how humanitarian actors should advocate to development actors to address the needs that they can no longer cover, but the HPC does not go further than this. UN80 includes a commitment to prepare a cross-pillar proposal to align the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCF), HNRPs and Peacebuilding Strategies (UNSG, 2025). The main challenge is not necessarily aligning separate development, humanitarian and peace plans, but rather adopting a more integrated planning approach altogether. This would also enable reduced funding to be used as cost-effectively as possible to address interconnected problems. In tandem with the international systems set up across the nexus, there also needs to be greater thinking on how these interplay with state capacities and the importance of building national systems. Humanitarian, development and peace planning processes remain largely siloed despite serving the same population groups in the same crises (ICVA, 2025).

NGOs have suggested merging or making interoperable key humanitarian and development planning processes, currently led by OCHA, UNHCR and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) (ibid.).

¹⁰ OCHA's FTS tracks funding inside and outside of HNRPs and Refugee Response Plans, however, there may be reduced incentives to report funding that does not sit within the scope of the appeal.

Another suggestion from an interviewee is that a needs analysis across the nexus could be a common starting point, with needs (e.g. humanitarian, resilience, development) analysed as whole, which then get segmented into the respective planning frameworks afterwards.

Policy options	
Incremental reform	Include clear benchmarks and exit strategies in HNRPs for protracted crises and produce tailored planning frameworks for transition contexts where humanitarian actors are leaving.
Substantive reform	Retain resilience activities in HNRPs but do not include the cost of them in the financial requirements.
Transformative reform	Pilot having a single strategic crisis response plan that combines HNRPs and the UNSDCF while retaining modular sections and financial requirements (as occurred in the Syria Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan) for humanitarian, resilience and development activities.

Key challenge: limitations of the one-size-fits-all planning framework of the HPC

Currently, there is a single approach and template for drafting HNRPs. These are developed on an annual basis for all countries experiencing humanitarian crisis where IASC coordination structures and processes have been activated. Flash Appeals can be developed for rapid-onset crises. If there is a significant change in the humanitarian situation, an addendum to an HNP can be published during the year to outline the additional needs. The HPC guidance for 2026 introduced the standardisation of three strategic objectives (given that they are usually the same for most contexts) that should be used in a uniform way.¹¹ HNRPs are still predominantly based on a sectoral planning framework, aligned with the cluster system, although many informants spoke about the limitations of this approach.

The increasing standardisation of the HPC process and elaboration of HNRPs has no doubt led to improvements in the quality and consistency of the products. However, there are several limitations to this one-size-fits-all approach to humanitarian planning:

- 1. Crisis-specific planning.** The HPC assumes that crises are all the same but, in reality, they are not. Rapid-onset, protracted, transition and exiting crises potentially require different kinds of planning frameworks. Crises could be categorised according to which phase they are in, and/or whether they are deteriorating or improving, and whether the approach of humanitarian actors may need to change and HNRPs adjusted accordingly.
- 2. Multi-year planning.** As noted earlier, most crises last years if not decades. While crises are dynamic, the approach of humanitarian actors does not change significantly from year to year in many contexts and the HNRPs tend to be repetitious, with the main updates being to change the planning

¹¹ The three standard objectives are: SO1 – Saving Lives & Alleviating Suffering; SO2 – Protecting Safety and Rights; and SO3 – Sustaining Lives and Livelihoods.

figures. There have been several efforts to introduce multi-year HNRPs and even guidance for this, but these tend to be additional plans rather than a replacement of HNRPs, which remain yearly plans. It is challenging to analyse humanitarian needs over the long term, and multi-year planning will be difficult to achieve without multi-year funding. However, more could be done to move towards a multi-year approach to HPC planning. Multi-year planning cycles may also enable longer-term planning with greater ability to focus on transitioning in a responsible manner, as well as facilitating linkages to broader development work (Egeland and Msuya, 2024).

3. **Area-based planning.** A key priority of the Humanitarian Reset has been to make humanitarian responses more people-focused and locally led and yet the HPC is predominantly a top-down, cluster-led exercise. With an increased focus on area-based coordination, there is potentially the need to shift to a more area-based planning framework, which also presents an opportunity to join up activities across the nexus at a local level. One suggestion from informants was for response planning to cover the whole response at a strategic level, but for operational plans then to be developed at an area-based level.
4. **Community priorities.** The HPC is predominantly a supply-driven response-planning process. Community priorities are not meaningfully captured and included in the analysis, which means the HPC response planning remains a top-down process driven by agency/sector mandates and capacities, rather than crises-affected people's own understanding of their realities (ICVA, 2025). Promoting people-centred approaches has been a central feature of the Humanitarian Reset. The Flagship Initiative was not able to demonstrate how a new appeals system could be constructed and stakeholders were not willing to take the leap of faith required and risk compromising resource mobilisation and strategy setting (Sida et al., 2026).
5. **Forward-looking planning.** The HPC is ostensibly based on an assessment of humanitarian needs at a given time rather than a forecast of how they may evolve over the lifetime of the HNRP. This is the approach despite the fact that there is increased focus on anticipatory action to respond to crises before they deteriorate so as to reduce their impact and make the response more cost effective (Grand Bargain Caucus on Scaling Up Anticipatory Action, 2024). Data analysis for several humanitarian need indicators in relation to food insecurity, climate risks, internal displacement, etc., now include a forecasting element, thus opening the door for the HPC to adopt a more forward-looking planning approach.
6. **Cross-cutting approaches.** With the focus on sectoral plans in the HPC, cross-cutting approaches such as gender, protection, climate, accountability to affected populations, and more, tend to get relegated to a box or a section that describes the issue but without necessarily outlining a plan for how they will be addressed and what results will be achieved. These approaches are not given prominence within the indicator frameworks of an HNRP, so it is difficult to know whether progress is being made.
7. **Humanitarian access.** The lack of humanitarian access is often the key impediment to the implementation of HNRPs (funding challenges notwithstanding). The section on access in HNRPs is, however, normally a description of access constraints and structures set up to address them rather than a detailed assessment of whether there is a correlation between needs, access and coverage, as well as the strategies and benchmarks for reaching more people in need, in hard-to-reach areas, as a measure of success.

8. Refugee response planning. An agreement was reached several years ago for Refugee Response Plans to be included in HNRPs although this has occurred in a somewhat inconsistent way. UNHCR has not undertaken prioritisation in the same way as has been applied to HNRPs, which has led to differences in how financial requirements are decided.

Some informants also queried whether the HNRP is used as an operational plan. One informant said that the HNRP is not an actual operational plan but rather a ‘narrative over the top’, whilst another said that it gives us ‘a sense of a plan’ but agencies do their own planning and programming.

Policy options	
Incremental reform	Introduce shock- and/or area-based planning into HNRPs to complement the sectoral plans that are included and make these based more on community priorities.
Substantive reform	Increase a new component of the HNRPs that provides a results framework for cross-cutting issues to increase accountability for results.
Transformative reform	Develop a categorisation of different plans and pilot separate planning frameworks and templates of HNRPs for different types of crisis contexts based on the forecasting of needs.

Resource mobilisation

Key challenge: the HPC is not a reliable tool for mobilising and allocating humanitarian funding

The penultimate part of the HPC concerns resource mobilisation. The GHO outlines the financial requirements that humanitarian actors hope to raise to fund the planned response. The funding of humanitarian action is not based on predictable budgets but rather voluntary contributions, with aid agencies constantly attempting to raise funding. Ideally, donors should allocate their funding impartially so that it reaches those most in need. Indeed, some donors, including the UK, Sweden and the European Union, have developed funding allocation models. These formulas include indicators related to the scale and severity of needs as well as other factors that are used to calculate and apportion humanitarian budgets to different crises.


The GHO is one of the sources for enacting this allocation, along with the INFORM Severity Index and other data sources (which may in part also rely on the GHO). However, these funding allocation models have not been adopted by all donors, and many of their funding decisions are as likely to be based on the political priorities of donor governments as they are the level of objective need. For these reasons, some crises receive more attention and funding than others, which are neglected, as demonstrated by various NGO advocacy reports (NRC, 2025b).

Analysis of shifts in funding and funding requirements, however, does not suggest the setting of funding requirements has any consistent impact on how much funding a context receives. As Figure 6 shows, there is no correlation between a change in the funding requirements and a subsequent change in funding received by a context. For example, Somalia reduced its funding requirement by 39% between

2023 and 2024 and yet received 27% less funding. Conversely, Chad increased its funding requirement by 29% across 2024 and 2025, yet received 30% less funding. The lack of correlation in either direction suggests that changing the funding requirement has little bearing on the funding received. This counters two hypotheses. One is that by appealing for more funding, a context will receive more funding (the ‘aim for the stars, reach the moon’ strategy). Whilst the funding gap might be larger, it sends a signal that funding is needed for that crisis. The other hypothesis is that by reducing the funding requirement, more funding will be forthcoming as it becomes more politically feasible for donors to give to those crises and doesn’t look like they are throwing good money after bad.

If either of these hypotheses held, one might expect to see a correlation between changing the funding requirements in an HNRP and the change in funding received. There is little in the data to prove there is any such statistical relationship. However, as one interviewee noted, there had been concern that funding requirements were ‘too high’, whilst another noted a concern that data through the rest of the HPC was being ‘retrofitted to fit the plan and the funding requirements’. Thus, whilst the actual setting of the funding requirement may have little effect on funding received, the secondary effect may be that it influences the data produced as part of the HPC, such as targets and needs data. Rather than setting financial requirements based on speculation of what donors may fund, it would make more sense to focus on the process being independent and objective.

Figure 6 Percentage of changes of funding requirement vs percentage of funding received



Source: UN OCHA FTS

Notes: Each dot represents one country with a plan and the change over either 2023 versus 2024, or 2024 versus 2025. Three outlier cases are not included on the graph for ease of readability (Palestine, and regional response plans for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan across 2023 to 2024). $R^2 = 0.09$.

The arbitrariness of prioritisation and its relation with resource mobilisation has been borne out by the recent US–OCHA \$2 billion agreement (OCHA, 2025d). In the 2026 GHO, certain countries were removed, namely El Salvador and Guatemala, because they were perceived as no longer experiencing humanitarian needs, only for them to be included as one of the 17 priority countries in the \$2 billion agreement between the US and OCHA. Kenya and Uganda are being funded under this agreement even though they have not been included in the GHO for several years. Whilst this is just one donor and analysis can't necessarily be extrapolated widely, if prioritisation were seen to drive donor allocations, one might have expected the countries outlined in the \$2 billion agreement to align with the prioritisation exercise – which they have not.

It is not the fault of the HPC that some crises are prioritised by donors and others are not. Ideally, donors would forecast their annual funding commitments following the publication of the GHO each year so that humanitarian agencies would know what level of funding they had available for the year, to enable them to plan the implementation of HNRPs accordingly. In reality, the funding of HNRPs is based on a 'begging-bowl' approach where agencies continually try to raise that extra bit of funding to get closer to reaching their financial requirements and target for assistance.

Policy options	
Incremental reform	All donors should introduce, and use more consistently in a coordinated fashion, funding allocation models based on a diversity of data sources including severity needs in different crisis.
Substantive reform	Plan donor coordination meetings as part of the HPC to inform response planning to share their provisional funding targets for the year, to allow better planning of targets and funding requirements.
Transformative reform	All donors to align their funding decisions to ensure that the allocation of funding is based on the objective reporting of needs and not any other considerations.

Key challenge: cost efficiency and value for money are not an explicit component of the HPC

There have been significant improvements in recent years to strengthen the costing methodology for the financial requirements outlined in HNRPs. These used to be based on the budgets of individual projects included in HNRPs before an activity-based costing approach was introduced, and finally replaced, as the single way of setting financial requirements from 2026 (OCHA, 2025e). With cuts to humanitarian funding in recent years, there has been an increased focus on cost efficiency to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered based on the most optimal use of resources. Donors, such as the UK, ensure that value for money is part of their programming framework, which must be demonstrated in project proposals. Aid agencies have begun to develop methodologies to undertake cost-benefit analysis that underpins their programmatic choices (see the Dioptra tool, for instance).¹²


¹² Available at www.dioptratool.org/.

However, cost efficiency and value for money are not explicit components of the HPC. While the unit costs of different interventions are factored into the calculation of the financial requirements of sector plans, this is not presented in the HNRPs, so donors wishing to fund the plan would not know what the trends are on cost efficiency and the trade-offs of supporting one intervention over another. Cost efficiency and value for money are not an exact science, dependent as they are on multiple factors including rising inflation. Even some rough calculation of unit costs in the HNRPs, though, shows some of the inconsistencies (Lilly and Pearson, 2025). For example, over the course of the last decade, the unit cost of reaching a person targeted for humanitarian assistance has fallen in real terms when taking into account inflation. As Figure 7 shows, in 2015, the unit cost of reaching a person targeted was \$390 per person, compared to \$230 per person in 2026. There are four possible explanations:

1. the cost of humanitarian assistance has become 40% cheaper in a decade (though there is little to suggest this is the case);
2. targeting prioritises easy-to-reach populations and thus focuses on viability over vulnerability;
3. assistance has become less comprehensive or lower quality;
4. costing calculations are not reflecting the real-world cost of operating.


Furthermore, there appear to be different approaches regarding costing prioritised populations. As Figure 8 shows, the cost of reaching a person targeted is higher than a person prioritised in some contexts, whilst in others it is the opposite. This suggests that different contexts take different approaches in choosing who to target, who to prioritise, or how to cost operations. A higher prioritised unit cost could suggest a strategy of focusing on fewer people at higher costs; whilst a higher target unit cost may suggest that prioritisation is leading to a strategy of trying to ration assistance and reach more people.

Both Figure 7 and Figure 8 suggest that costing is either not applied consistently across contexts, or targeting is occurring not based on higher severity needs but viability. The difficulty in interpreting the costing numbers in HNRPs further illustrates the need for transparency regarding the costing of HNRPs.

Figure 7 Total funding requirements divided by number of people targeted and prioritised, 2015–2026

Sources: OCHA's FTS and Global Humanitarian Overviews

Notes: Adjusted for inflation. Cost per person deflated as per OECD DAC deflators and IMF World Economic Outlook data. 2024 =100.

Figure 8 Difference between unit cost for target vs. prioritised populations in the 2026 GH0

Source: OCHA, 2025f

Notes: RRP = Refugee Response Plan; CAR = Central African Republic; DR Congo = Democratic Republic of Congo

Policy options

Incremental reform	Publish the unit cost of activities in the HNRPs transparently.
Targeted reform	Introduce a full component of the HPC that outlines an approach to cost efficiency and value for money.
Transformative reform	Establish a mechanism for donors to scrutinise the cost efficiency and value for money of HNRPs.


Implementation and monitoring

Key challenge: the limited focus in the HPC on results monitoring and demonstrating the impact of humanitarian assistance

Almost the entirety of the HPC process is focused on assessing needs, planning the response and mobilising resources, with limited attention given to results monitoring to report on what has been achieved with the money that has been raised. Response monitoring in the 2026 HPC has focused mainly on presence and whether the response has been based on the severity of the needs and aligned with communities' preferences (OCHA, 2025a). Some country humanitarian responses have published periodic monitoring reports outlining the results achieved implementing HNRPs, but this is not a standard practice. The GHO each year includes a figure for how many people were reached the previous year with assistance. For example, in 2025, 98 million people were reached with assistance, which was 65% of the target in the GHO and 32% of the people in need, even when the plan received a fraction of its financial requirements (OCHA, 2024). However, these figures are generally not seen as reliable as there is no system-wide procedure for aggregating results. A Development Initiatives report notes how research points to 'different methods and incentives for agencies to calculate the number of people reached' and such a measure may not be a good measure of the quality or impact of assistance, whilst a synthesis of Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations raises questions around the utility of such numbers (DI, 2023; IASC, 2026).

For a multi-billion-dollar sector, the inability to report the results that it has collectively achieved remains a critical gap. Results reporting is far more detailed at the agency and cluster levels, but these are not aggregated at the system level. HNRPs include indicator frameworks for clusters to use in their reports, but there is no consistent reporting and limited availability of data. There are methodological challenges producing a figure for the total number of people reached with assistance as it is easy to double-count different forms of assistance (hence, agencies say words to the effect of 'x number of people have been reached with at least one form of assistance'). There is also a lack of qualitative information regarding results achieved that go beyond 'people reached' and which note how sustainable results are delivered for populations affected by crisis. An important part of a people-centred approach would also be to publish perceptions by aid recipients of what they think about the assistance that they receive.

Figure 9 Number of people reached (and not reached but still in need), 2021–2025



Source: Global Humanitarian Overviews

Policy options	
Incremental reform	Develop a more robust methodology for the reporting of results of HNRPs.
Substantive reform	Country humanitarian operations should be required to produce periodic reports on the results of their HNRPs with a standard template.
Transformative reform	Publish a global report on the implementation of the GHO each year including results, outcomes and impact of the humanitarian response (not just outputs).

Conclusions and recommendations

Significant improvements have been made to the HPC in recent years, and it remains a vital tool for humanitarian assessment, planning and resource mobilisation. As one informant noted, though, it is at best a ‘useful fiction’ given some users of the HPC report that they find the numbers not to be credible and not to provide an objective narrative. The frequent moving of the goalposts means that the story told by the HPC does not add up – these methodological changes make it difficult to interpret trends over time and undermine confidence in the process.

Hyper-prioritisation can be considered a natural response to the funding cuts, but its ongoing usefulness as a planning principle for the HPC is questionable and requires a rethink.

Most importantly, the primary objectives of the HPC need to be reclarified. Humanitarians’ primary responsibility is to assess and present the entirety of needs regardless of whether a response to them will be funded. The focus should be on producing evidence-based planning and not on overly internalising political considerations of resource mobilisation.

There is a collective responsibility of the aid system (including humanitarian and development actors) to develop plans based on community priorities that not only focus on life-saving assistance but also on resilience activities regardless of the limitations of funding.

The tools for international support for populations in situations of protracted crises are woefully inadequate. Endless humanitarian responses lasting in some cases decades has become a sticking plaster for too many contexts but has been allowed to persist due to the lack of alternatives. This is an uncomfortable truth: it is not the responsibility of the humanitarian system alone to address, but must be engaged with seriously if sustainable solutions are to be found.

This paper has provided analysis of the current shortcomings of the HPC and presented policy options for a more fundamental reform of the HPC. A full list of recommendations is presented below in a summary table. However, the authors would like to highlight the following specific recommendations because they have the potential to drive significant change while remaining achievable given current constraints:

- Introduce a firewall so that needs assessments and the setting of PIN numbers occur independently and are based on credible evidence of needs, and are not manipulated by any other factors.
- Ensure that the targets for assistance in HNRPs are based on a sound methodology that maximises objectivity and minimises political considerations, to facilitate impartial allocation and realistic response planning.
- Work with development actors to develop a planning framework for protracted and transition contexts that addresses the entirety of people’s needs.
- Develop a more differentiated planning framework so that other ways to plan the response are included (in addition to sectoral plans).

- Set financial requirements in HNRPs independently of how much money humanitarian actors think they may raise.
- Make cost efficiency an explicit component of the HPC.
- Develop more robust results monitoring of the implementation of HNRPs as well as of the impact of humanitarian action.

Table 2 aggregates the full list of recommendations presented in this paper.

Table 2 Recommendations for HPC reform

Area	Degree of reform		
	Incremental reform	Substantive reform	Transformative reform
Needs analysis	Split the HNO and HRP by setting the PIN number independent of any other considerations, and assigning financial requirements by PIN number in addition to the target as currently occurs.	Introduce an accountability mechanism (i.e. a third-party body that can scrutinise how the PIN number is calculated) to ensure that the PIN number is based on credible evidence of needs and no other factors.	Outsource the needs assessment and setting of the PIN number entirely for the HPC to a fully independent body separate from the UN (in the same way as, for example, the IPC is done on food security).
Targets and prioritisation	Drop hyper-prioritisation as a separate target and revert to a single target in the HNRPs.	Develop guidance for assessing the capacity of agencies and expected funding to set targets more realistically, consistently and transparently, publishing the rationale in each case and making sure to integrate community participation into targeting and response planning.	Donors should forecast what funding they are provisionally going to provide each year based on the assessed needs so humanitarian actors can provide a realistic target for what needs they are going to be able to cover.
Transition and resilience	Include clear benchmarks and exit strategies in HNRPs for protracted crises and produce tailored planning frameworks for transition contexts where humanitarian actors are leaving.	Retain resilience activities in HNRPs but do not include the cost of them in the financial requirements.	Pilot having a single strategic crisis response plan that combines HNRPs and UNSDCF while retaining modular sections and financial requirements (as occurred in the Syria Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan) for humanitarian, resilience and development activities.
Planning framework	Introduce shock- and/or area-based planning into HNRPs to complement the sectoral plans that are included and make these based more on community priorities.	Increase a new component of the HNRPs that provides a results framework for cross cutting issues to increase accountability for results.	Develop a categorisation of different plans and pilot separate planning frameworks and templates of HNRPs for different types of crisis contexts based on the forecasting of needs.

Resource mobilisation	All donors should introduce, and use more consistently in a coordinated fashion, funding allocation models based on a diversity of data sources including severity needs in different crisis.	Plan donor coordination meetings as part of the HPC to inform response planning to share their provisional funding targets for the year to allow better planning of targets and funding requirements.	All donors to align their funding decisions to ensure that the allocation of funding is based on the objective reporting of needs and not any other considerations.
Cost efficiency	Publish the unit cost of activities in the HNRPs transparently.	Introduce a full component of the HPC that outlines an approach to cost efficiency and value for money.	Establish a mechanism for donors to scrutinise the cost efficiency and value for money of HNRPs.
Results monitoring	Develop a more robust methodology for the reporting of results of HNRPs.	Country humanitarian operations should be required to produce periodic reports on the results of the their HNRPs with a standard template.	Publish a global report on the implementation of the GHQ each year including results, outcomes and impact of the humanitarian response (not just outputs).

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